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Social perception is an important aspect of social communication. 
Accurate recognition of emotion is crucial to understanding how others are 
feeling, which in turn is important in developing and maintaining meaningful 
relationships. Difficulties in social perception may lead to feelings of loneliness 
and isolation, which affects quality of life and wellbeing. Social support is 
particularly important, as people get older as it helps foster wellbeing. The process 
of ageing is related to a gradual and slow decline in cognitive function. This 
decline is seen to hasten with the onset of dementia. The risk of dementia is 
greater in people with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). There has been limited 
research examining social perception in people with MCI and existing research 
has largely used static visual tasks, such as photographs and stories for assessment 
of social perception. Further, those studies have predominantly focussed on 
people with MCI that are more likely to progress to Alzheimer’s disease, i.e., 
amnestic MCI. The present study aimed to assess emotion recognition and 
complex social perception tasks using an ecologically valid tool - The Awareness 
of Social Inference Test (TASIT) - in all subtypes of MCI. The overall aims were 
to examine social perception skills in people with MCI and to examine the 
relationship between social perception and neuropsychological functioning. 
Ninety-six healthy participants (females = 69, M age = 62.74, SD = 8.1) above the 
age of 50 years were recruited from the community, and 21 participants (females 
=10, M age = 72.24, SD = 10.4) with a diagnosis of MCI were recruited from the 
local District Health Boards (DHBs). These participants were administered a 
battery of neuropsychological tests (memory, language, executive functioning and 
visuospatial functioning domains), the TASIT, social activity and network 
iii 
 
measures, and informant measures were also collected. Initially, analyses were 
conducted to determine which of four MCI classification systems (liberal, 
comprehensive, conventional and conservative) was the most appropriate for use 
in the current study. This analysis revealed that the conventional criteria (1.5 SD 
below mean in one measure of a domain) accurately classified all the participants 
with a diagnosis of MCI, and 49% of the community sample as meeting the 
criteria for MCI. Overall, 68 participants (58%) met the criteria according to the 
conventional criteria and 49 participants (42%) were in the non-MCI group.  
Analyses revealed no significant differences between the MCI and non-
MCI groups on any of the TASIT subtests. In addition, there were no significant 
differences on TASIT scores between those with multiple domain MCI compared 
to those with single domain MCI and participants with no MCI. There was no 
significant association between meeting criteria for MCI and the proportion of 
participants meeting the cut-off score for moderate deficits on the TASIT. When 
examining the sub-tests of the TASIT, there was a greater proportion of 
participants who had deficits on the recognition of emotion (76%) compared to 
the higher order social perception tests (41%). Finally, all participants obtained 
significantly higher scores on the recognition of negative emotions, suggesting 
this was easier than the recognition of positive emotions.  
A series of correlations between the TASIT sub-test scores and the 
neuropsychological domains scores were conducted. The analyses revealed no 
significant correlations between any of these measures. There were no significant 
differences between groups on their informant ratings.  
Overall, the findings suggest that MCI is not associated with a decline in 
social perception, as assessed by the TASIT. Furthermore, the results of this study 
support the suggestion that social perception may be viewed as a separate domain 
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of functioning, which could be assessed separately as part of a comprehensive 
neuropsychological assessment. This may assist in the accurate diagnosis of non-
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There is nothing more routine than communication between people, and we often 
take for granted the multitude of processes that are involved. A substantial part of 
effective communication is the ability to identify and predict others’ emotions and 
respond appropriately. Social perception, a term which is often used 
interchangeably with social cognition, is the ability to pay attention to and 
interpret a wide range of phenomena of a social nature such as verbal messages, 
paralinguistic information (e.g., vocal qualities like increased range and amplitude 
of voice frequency, shorter pauses, etc.), nonverbal behaviours (e.g., facial 
expressions), and contextual information (e.g., knowledge about potential 
conflicts between speakers) (McDonald et al., 2006). Social perception shares 
some aspects with Theory of Mind (ToM), which is the ability to understand other 
people's mental states including beliefs, emotions, intentions and making 
predictions about one's own as well as others’ behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). 
Social perception is a complex yet automatic process, which is important 
in the survival of species. For example, being able to recognise fear quickly 
facilitates appropriate responses to threatening situations (Lewis & Haviland, 
1993). Humans are largely social beings. Although social interaction is just as 
essential for survival in other animals like non-human primates and insectivores 
like hedgehogs, complex social interaction including the use of sarcasm and 
humour to convey difficult content, is exclusive to humans.  
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Studying social perception is not straightforward. For example, the true 
meaning of certain statements or remarks is essentially a combination of relevant 
social cues, the speaker’s demeanour, knowledge of social conventions in the 
culture, and the overt content in the form of what has been said. Research in the 
field of social perception is broadly conducted in two different ways. On one hand, 
biological or neuroscientific research focuses on the cerebral structures responsible 
for social perception; on the other hand, neuropsychological studies focus on the 
performance of people in social perception tests with the aim of detection or 
rehabilitation of social perceptual issues. Further, depending on the modality of 
social perception, the assessment tools or stimuli used in assessment are different.  
The relatively new field of social neuroscience has been important in 
advancing research in social perception (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992). 
Neuroscientific research is conducted using different approaches. The majority of 
studies use imaging mechanisms such as fMRI and PET to note the brain’s 
activity while the participant performs an task in order to determine structures and 
pathways of neural activity that correspond to that task (Bottini et al., 1994; 
Harada et al., 2009; Mohamed et al., 2006; Samson, Zysset, & Huber, 2008; 
Uchiyama et al., 2006). Imaging studies are also conducted in people who have 
neurological, developmental, physical or psychiatric conditions that show specific 
impairment in social perception and thus deduce the underlying neural 
mechanisms (Baglio et al., 2012; Kipps, Nestor, Acosta-Cabronero, Arnold, & 
Hodges, 2009; Malhi et al., 2008; Rankin et al., 2009; Ting, Lee, Marian, & 
Mirella, 2006). Another useful source of information is through lesion studies; 
lesion studies can elucidate a causal relationship between a brain structure and an 
aspect of social perception (Channon et al., 2007; Jaracz, 2010). 
3 
 
Social perception involves various levels of processing (Adolphs, 2003). 
On a broader level, social interaction begins with basic perception or noticing 
aspects of the other person–facial changes, voice and body language (Adolphs, 
1999a; de Gelder, 2009). This then leads to the recognition of emotions, which is 
essential to allow higher-order processes including theory of mind and 
recognising sarcasm or lying. These higher-order levels of social perception also 
include being able to sustain a conversation which involves multiple facets of 
conversational inference. For example, someone with good social skills will be 
able to understand subtle hints expressed in conversation, sarcasm and lies. 
Studying the biological mechanisms of social perception has enabled us to 
understand the complex nature of social perception, which begins with the 
recognition of emotions.  
Recognition of emotions 
Emotion recognition is paramount for any kind of social communication. One of 
the first steps in social perception is emotion recognition. It is also useful in 
higher-order processes of social perception including the recognition of deception, 
sarcastic comments, irony, humour and empathy (Adolphs, 2003). 
Emotions are automatic and shared across cultures. Emotions are divided 
into basic emotions and complex emotions. Basic emotions are differentiated 
based on their distinctiveness from other emotions in the way they are expressed, 
the biology, thoughts, images or memories associated with them, facial 
expressions, and vocal and antecedent events. The widely accepted universal 
emotions are anger, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust and happiness (Ekman & 
Cordaro, 2011). These emotions are present in people shortly after birth and they 
serve to facilitate survival by communicating needs to other people. Complex 
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emotions, which include embarrassment, contempt, pride and shame, are also 
sometimes called social or moral emotions. The development of these emotions 
depends on the social context and tends to be useful for the broader society as 
opposed to individual needs. These complex or social/moral emotions are 
essential, as they assist altruistic behaviours (Trivers, 1971) and punishment 
(Ernst & Simon, 2002).  
Both basic and complex emotions are similar in their appearance as well as 
function across various cultures (Jablonka, Ginsburg, & Dor, 2012; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004). The universality of basic emotions has a considerable amount of 
biological and genetic evidence. For example, congenitally blind people display 
the same facial expressions as people who can see (Galati, Scherer, & Ricci-Bitti, 
1997; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009). Emotions are depicted by facial 
expressions, tone of voice and body language. Additional information including 
context, situational factors and personality factors are also used as cues to 
accurately recognise emotions.  
Emotions play a role in sensitising people to pay attention to their 
surroundings. In other words, emotions direct attention or act like a “signal 
function” (Lane, Nadel, & Ahern, 2000). This signal function of emotion implies 
that we focus our attention towards parts of the environment depending on our 
current emotional state. For example, the emotion of surprise directs a person’s 
attention to new stimuli that were not expected (Browning & Harmer, 2012; 
Figueiredo, Chen, & Azevedo, 2015). 
The recognition of emotion is automatic (Tracy & Robins, 2008). The 
reason for its automaticity has some basis in evolutionary theories, making it 
easier to communicate universally, regardless of people’s cultural background 
(Russell, 1994). There have been several studies of the automaticity of emotion 
5 
 
recognition. Studies of the socio-cognitive development of children provide good 
evidence that people do not need to use complex and higher-order cognitive 
functions to recognise emotions. One-year-old children were able to recognise 
facial emotion and use the information to appraise a situation (Sorce, Emde, 
Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). They were able to recognise emotions displayed by 
their mothers as well as differentiate the faces of their mothers from strangers 
(Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009).  
The automaticity of the recognition of emotion was supported by Tracy 
and Robins (2008) who examined how the speed at which people recognised 
complex and basic emotions varied when they were asked to respond as quickly 
as possible, compared to if they were distracted during the task. The distraction 
task was included to increase the cognitive load, thereby testing if emotion 
recognition was an automatic process. People in both conditions were able to 
identify emotions equally accurately, leading to the conclusion that emotion 
recognition was independent of conscious cognitive control. Despite using 
potentially difficult stimuli such as photographs, people were good at recognising 
all basic emotions and some complex emotions (with the exclusion of contempt) 
without conscious cognitive effort.  
There have been some studies that have found that the recognition of 
certain emotions was more difficult. For example, Tracy and Robins (2008) found 
that participants performed poorly at the recognition of contempt. Similarly, 
Rapcsak et al. (2000) found that healthy participants performed poorly at the 
recognition of fear in photographs where fear was often confused with surprise. 
On the other hand, there has been some indication that the automaticity of 
emotion recognition largely lies in the task difficulty. Tracy and Robins (2008) 
suggested that the unfamiliarity of the word “contempt” contributed to the poor 
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performance at its recognition. The inclusion of additional cues such as head tilts 
(Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995), contextual cues (Ludlow, Garrood, Lawrence, & 
Gutierrez, 2014) and prosody (Ruffman, Sullivan, & Dittrich, 2009) would make 
the recognition of emotions easier.  
Emotion recognition is shared across cultures and is automatic, however a 
lack of comprehensive contextual cues can disrupt accurate identification. The 
recognition of emotions is better when there are more cues present in a test and 
the more similar it is to real life situations. As well as the different types of tests, 
emotion recognition deficits may occur when one of the many biological levels of 
processing are affected. For example, deficits in vision may lead to poor 
recognition of emotions. The next section explores the biological processes 
involved in the recognition of emotion.  
Biological basis of emotion recognition 
The structures of the brain that are involved in processing emotions are also 
involved in higher social perception skills such as detecting sarcasm. Briefly, 
there are three levels of processing involved in the recognition of emotion. At 
first, the information from the external stimuli is communicated through sensory 
organs such as the ears and eyes and transmitted to the sensory regions of the 
brain (Barbas, Zikopoulos, & Timbie, 2011). The next level of processing takes 
place at the amygdala, ventral striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex (Gosselin et 
al., 2005; Winston, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). The amygdala and the 
orbitofrontal cortex serve slightly different functions. The amygdala is involved in 
encoding stimuli, while the orbitofrontal cortex is responsible for use of the 
information to decipher its reward value by taking into consideration context and 
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experience (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Day & Walker, 2012; 
Rudebeck, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2008).  
This first level of processing occurs consciously or unconsciously 
(Ledoux, 2012). An unconscious appraisal of emotion occurs in the face of a 
dangerous situation that is either a species typical response or a previously learned 
one. An example of a species typical behaviour is the fear of heights, which is 
processed unconsciously by the amygdala (Steimer, 2002). An example of a 
previously learned situation is where victims of sexual trauma detect perceived 
danger cues in the environment unconsciously, leading to a response (Diamond & 
Zoladz, 2016; Rocha-Rego et al., 2012). These main brain regions process the 
information and trigger associative knowledge from other areas, such as the 
hippocampus, in recognising the emotional response, processing this cognitively 
and deciding what the next course of action needs to be (Adolphs, 2002). In other 
words, these brain areas aid emotion appraisal. 
The third level of processing involves the left prefrontal cortex, right 
parietal and anterior and posterior cingulate cortices. These brain regions are 
involved in more complex processes such as considering the context of a 
situation, deciding whether an action may affect the wider social group, and 
deciding how to react based on how others may perceive the response (Adolphs, 
2003).  
At a basic level, the three processes depend on each other, and the 
interactions that occur are complex. The first level of processing occurs in all 
animals and is automatic (Barbas et al., 2011). However, human beings need 
higher-level processes, as they aid difficult aspects of social perception such as 
perceiving sarcasm and lies, and being empathetic. 
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The sensory level of processing is when recognition of emotions starts 
from auditory or visual channels, as described above. The recognition of emotions 
through tactile and olfactory senses is far less important in humans as compared 
with other animals (Adolphs, 2003). Much visual recognition of emotion takes 
place by paying attention to the face and body gestures. There are different 
regions in the brain that collate this information and enable human beings to 
recognise facial expressions. The fusiform gyrus is responsible for processing the 
structural and stationary properties of faces and helps in recognising faces 
(Elizabeth & James, 2000; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Vuilleumier & 
Pourtois, 2007). The temporal lobe, specifically the anterior and dorsal regions, 
are engaged when perceiving facial expressions and movements in the eyes and 
the mouth (Elizabeth & James, 2000; Haxby et al., 2000). The dorsal and ventral 
visual streams in the brain are responsible for shape and motion information that 
contributes to recognition of emotion (Lucia, Jeffrey, Sanjida, Pawan, & John, 
2001). 
Auditory input gives us important information about prosody, frequency 
and amplitude of voice. Prosody is “the rhythmic and intonational aspect of 
language” (Ince, 2013). However, the recognition of basic emotions through only 
visual means has been shown to be easier than if only prosodic information was 
available. For example, emotions like disgust are difficult to recognise only 
through prosodic information (Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, & Goldbeck, 1991). The 
recognition of emotion via auditory means has been found to involve many of the 
same brain structures as emotion recognition via visual processing, except that the 
perceptual information from auditory stimuli follows the auditory streams 
(Adolphs, 2002). In conclusion, the recognition of emotions involves multiple 
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regions of the brain and is mostly automatic. Basic emotion recognition has a 
well-understood neural basis. 
There is evidence for specific brain structures being associated with the 
recognition of specific basic emotions. In some studies, the amygdala has been 
associated with the recognition of the emotion in all the basic emotions–happiness 
(Kipps, Duggins, McCusker, & Calder, 2007), fear (Sophie et al., 1997), disgust 
(Kipps et al., 2007), surprise (Zhao, Zhao, Zhang, Cui, & Fu, 2017), sadness 
(Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999) and anger (Sophie et al., 1997). 
Further, the recognition of all the emotions via facial information (as opposed to 
voice) may take place in the fusiform cortex (Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). 
Studies with people who have amygdala damage show deficits in the recognition 
of fear from facial photographs (Becker et al., 2012; Broks et al., 1998; de La 
Tremblaye & Plamondon, 2011). The recognition of sadness may also take place 
in the left amygdala and the temporal pole (Blair et al., 1999). Enhanced activity 
in the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortex was seen on imagining scans 
when participants recognised angry faces (Blair et al., 1999). Further, the 
recognition of anger was impaired in people who had bilateral amygdala lesions 
(Sophie et al., 1997). The anterior cingulate, posterior cingulate, medial frontal 
cortex (Phillips et al., 1998), fusiform gyrus, calcarine sulcus and the right 
superior temporal gyrus (Morris et al., 1998) have seen to be been associated with 
the recognition of happiness. The insula, also known as the gustatory cortex may 
also be involved when recognising disgust (Phillips et al., 1997). This structure 
has been specifically related with disgust, with the knowledge that the emotion of 
disgust is frequently associated with contamination by an unpleasant stimulus and 
thus linked to gustation or taste (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). The recognition of 
surprise may be associated with parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform gyrus and the 
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amygdala (Zhao et al., 2017). However, the brain functions as a complex neural 
circuit. Attributing a single brain function or a structure to the recognition of 
emotion may be an oversimplification (Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 
2008b; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007).  
The recognition of emotions involves complex interactions across different 
parts of the brain. Fortunately, this ability is not associated with complex 
cognitive faculties, and this makes accurate emotion recognition possible for most 
people. This automaticity is important in the survival of our species by aiding in 
quick and often necessary responses to the dangers in the environment. 
Recognition of emotion is crucial to interpersonal interactions, and underpins 
more complex functions such as understanding context, forming associations with 
what has been spoken and information about the speaker’s characteristics. This 
emotion recognition aids complex social interactions: for instance, understanding 
the intent of what has been spoken, deciphering sarcasm and knowing what the 
other person might be thinking. 
Higher-order social perception 
Social perception is broad and multifaceted. Once able to recognise another 
person’s emotion, we are then able to make predictions about their mental state 
and their behaviour. These high order processes have been defined using many 
terms–theory of mind (ToM), mentalising, metacognition, to name a few. ToM is 
the ability to attribute mental states to other people and be able to interpret, 
explain and predict their behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM helps with 
decoding subtle social cues in order to understand the mental states of ourselves 
and others (Martín-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010). ToM is needed in everyday 
life, as it is required in social skills such as empathy, compassion, and recognition 
11 
 
of sarcasm and deceit. Many studies have used the recognition of sarcasm, lies 
and deceit as a means to examine ToM. Assessments such as the false belief tasks, 
and empathy tasks that capture the recognition of counterfactual information can 
be an important source of information about ToM abilities.   
Higher-order social perception is called so because it requires more 
cognitive effort. There are a few steps that lead to higher social perception 
recognition (Adolphs, 2003).  In order to judge what another person is thinking, 
the first step is to perceive all the information available–facial expression, 
prosody, context, personality characteristics of the person (if available). The next 
step is to briefly abandon one’s own thoughts and emotions and assume what the 
other person’s thoughts and emotions may be. This assumption is also served by 
being able to use one’s own mind as a “model” to be able to assume what the 
other person is likely to be feeling. Failure to correctly infer what the other person 
is thinking or feeling may be due to impairment at any of the levels as described 
above (the three levels of processing). For example, if a person does not receive 
enough information, this may lead to a misinterpretation of the situation. 
Therefore, people with certain disabilities find it difficult to recognise theory of 
mind functions like recognising sarcasm in others. For example, one of the 
hallmark symptoms of people with autism is difficulty with ToM.  
Higher order social perception ability may not always be related to the 
recognition of emotions. McDonald and Flanagan (2004) examined the interaction 
between emotion recognition and social perception abilities using the TASIT with 
people with traumatic brain injury. They found that while there were some 
participants who had difficulties in recognising emotions, they did not have 
difficulties in recognising conversational inference in the form of recognising 
sarcasm and lying. Emotion recognition and first-order theory of mind judgements 
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were not related to the ability to understand social inference, while second order 
theory of mind judgements were related to that ability.  This suggests that social 
perception relies on a variety of different abilities 
Although complex in theory, some studies have found ToM is largely 
independent of cognitive functions. A narrative review of 30 studies of ToM and 
neuropsychological functions in schizophrenia patients was carried out by 
Harrington, Siegert, and McClure (2005). Twenty-six out of the 30 studies found 
that accurate recognition of ToM was independent of neuropsychological 
functions like memory, executive functioning and general intellectual ability. 
Further, in comparing children who have high functioning autism with healthy 
controls and children who have Down’s Syndrome (with a mental age of at least 
4) in their recognition of ToM, similar results have been found (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). On average, the autistic children had a much higher IQ 
(82) than the Down’s syndrome children (64). The IQ included both verbal and 
nonverbal scales. The autistic children performed poorly compared to the normal 
and the Down’s syndrome children. The Sally-Anne task (Simon Baron-Cohen, 
Alan M. Leslie, & Uta Frith, 1985) was used as the ToM measure. This is a 
change-of-location task to assess ToM in children. In this task, Sally places a 
marble in a box and leaves the room. During this time, Anne moves the marble 
from the box and places it in a basket. The participant is asked the question 
“When Sally comes back, where will she look for her marble?” 
In contrast, other studies report that ToM is associated with higher order 
cognitive functions. Experimental studies that used neuropsychological tests have 
looked into the relationship between the aspects of ToM and cognitive functions 
such as language, memory and executive functioning. In one such study, McDonald 
et al. (2014) assessed people with traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) to examine the 
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relationship between ToM and executive dysfunctions commonly seen in people 
with TBIs. The authors used TASIT (McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 
2003a), Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET)–Revised (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and the Perspective Taking (PT) 
subscale from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980) to assess 
social cognition, ToM, and cognitive empathy, respectively. This experiment was 
divided into low executive function load condition, high flexibility load condition 
and high inhibition load condition. Each of these conditions were divided into low 
ToM and high ToM. Specifically, in the low executive function load and low ToM 
condition, the participant was asked to describe the features of the holiday resort in 
a picture. In the high ToM task in the same condition participants had to describe 
the advantages of the resort for a couple with children. This was included in order 
to look into the varying amounts of executive demands on ToM. The authors found 
that poor ToM performance was related to poor executive functioning.  
The complexity of higher-order social perception is understood through 
developmental theories. Recursive thinking, the ability to think about thinking, is 
thought to be the basis of theory of mind (Corballis, 2011). First-order recursive 
thinking (i.e., “I think that you think”) has been observed in children as early as 4 
years of age (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Second-order recursive thinking ("I think 
that you think that she/he thinks") appears in 8-year-olds (Perner & Wimmer, 
1985), but it is only in adolescence and early adulthood that third-order beliefs (“I 
think that you think that he/she thinks that another person thinks…”) develop 
(Valle, Massaro, Castelli, & Marchetti, 2015). Adolescents start to show an 
increasing interest in the social environment outside the immediate family, and 
this opens a completely new world of social independence. It is realistic to think 
that ToM skills would develop at this stage, adapting to the new social needs. By 
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age 13, adolescents are able to assess emotional situations from a first and a third 
person perspective at a faster rate (Keulers, Stiers, Jolles, & Evers, 2010). They 
are quite accurate at recognising emotions, sarcasm, and lies, but still not as good 
at it as adults are (McDonald et al., 2015). 
Higher-order social perception serves many functions. In fact, from an 
evolutionary standpoint, these complex processes are essential for the survival of 
the species of humans. Humans are social beings, and the success of the human 
civilisation is evidenced by the formation of complex social interactions from a 
micro level (family) to a macro level (society, cultures, etc.). Being able to infer 
another person’s state of mind guides how we plan our own actions. An example 
is being aware of potential behaviours of other drivers when driving on the road. 
Further, higher social perception processes help with forming bonds with other 
people by being able to “read” what another person is feeling and thus sharing that 
feeling. This is more commonly known as empathy, which results in compassion.  
An important higher-order social perception process is the ability to 
process information that is delivered in a counterfactual manner, such as when 
someone has spoken a lie or has passed a sarcastic remark. This involves careful 
reflection on cues that are beyond what has been spoken. These complex 
processes are also dependent on the recognition of emotions as well as the 
development of empathy or ToM (Andrew, Juanita, & Penny, 2013). This is 
evidence to suggest that using sarcasm is indeed a complex task.  
Recognition of sarcasm 
Sarcasm is an indirect form of speech where an implied criticism of something is 
conveyed through contextual and paralinguistic cues such as vocal qualities and 
rolling of eyes (McDonald, 1999). Sarcasm is a form of irony, which is a broader 
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term to convey messages in an indirect manner. There are a few functions of 
sarcasm. It is used to increase the level of perceived politeness in the speaker 
(Jorgensen, 1996). This has been based on Brown and Levinson (1987) politeness 
theory, which posits that indirectness in speech is perceived by the listener as 
being polite. Another function of sarcasm is to decrease the potential 
aggressiveness of a critical remark (Dews & Winner, 1995).  
The TASIT which is developed by McDonald (2012) differentiates 
between two kinds of sarcasm–simple and paradoxical. Simple sarcasm is 
recognised when a neutral statement is spoken with exaggeration of vocal, facial 
and body language. For example, the statement “I have got plenty of time” is 
interpreted as sarcasm if the speaker enhanced the tone of voice, rolled their eyes 
and emphasised the word “plenty.” On the other hand, paradoxical sarcasm is 
when the statement does not make any sense unless interpreted as sarcasm.  
Verbal communication does not solely rely on face-to-face conversations. 
Complex social perception processes such as sarcasm can be communicated 
through a simple statement that may be counterfactual. An example of a 
counterfactual statement is criticism conveyed in an overly positive manner 
(“Great! What a terrific start to this party!”). Sarcasm can also be communicated 
through an echoic statement (Srinivasan & Massaro, 2003), which is a statement 
that is posed as a question (“Ashlyn ate the entire bar of chocolate?”) or an 
understatement (“That was just a minor oil spill”) (Gibbs, 2000). These statements 
make it possible for sarcasm to be communicated through text. Alternatively, 
face-to-face interpretations of sarcasm rely heavily on the paralinguistic cues 
(such as vocal qualities, including but not limited to an increased range and 
amplitude of voice frequencies, smaller pauses, higher empathic stress and an 
exaggerated lengthening of syllables) that alert the listener to go beyond the actual 
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content of the speech, which may be perceived as sincere if it were not for these 
cues (Anolli, Ciceri, & Infantino, 2000; Rockwell, 2007). Some other 
paralinguistic cues of sarcasm include facial cues like widening of eyes, rolling of 
eyes, increased and rapid blinking, grimacing and smirks (Anolli et al., 2000; 
Rockwell, 2007). Prosody serves as an important cue in the recognition of 
sarcasm. Four different types of prosody contribute to language (Monrad-Krohn, 
1947). Emotional prosody differentiates between various types of emotions. 
Linguistic prosody differentiates between questions and statements. Inarticulate 
prosody includes aspects of non-speech sounds like moans and sighs and 
attitudinal prosody provides cues regarding the person’s attitudes like enthusiasm, 
doubt, and faith. Sarcasm uses attitudinal prosody (Boss, 1996). A positive or a 
neutral statement that is spoken in a negative tone will direct the attention of the 
listener to conclude that the person is being sarcastic. In addition to prosody, 
amplitude, loudness, and a reduction in pauses can also provide important cues in 
recognising sarcasm (Gelinas-Chebat & Chebat, 1992). In addition to the role of 
physical emotional cues, sarcasm can also be conveyed by text. This is evidenced 
in the assessment of recognition of sarcasm. Most studies in the recognition of 
sarcasm have used text-based stories that contain sarcastic comments (Adachi et 
al., 2004; Maki et al., 2013). For example, the Metaphor and Sarcasm Scenario 
Test (MSST) is a tool that consists of five metaphoric and sarcastic scenarios in 
the form of words and sentences (Maki et al., 2013).  
Recognising sarcasm is a complex task. Children as young as six years are 
able to accurately understand sarcasm and irony (Ackerman, 1983; Glenwright & 
Pexman, 2010; Hancock, Dunham, & Purdy, 2000; Harris & Pexman, 2003). 
However, appreciation of sarcasm and irony develops in two steps. At four or 
five, children can understand what the sarcastic speaker believes (first-order 
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attributions); it is not until between six and eight that children grasp the intent of a 
sarcastic statement (second-order attributions) (Glenwright & Pexman, 2010; 
Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995). Six-year-old children were also able to 
make sense of a speaker's personality characteristics based on their interpretations 
of the speaker's ironic remarks (Pexman, Glenwright, Hala, Kowbel, & Jungen, 
2006).  
A complete understanding of sarcasm only occurs in middle childhood. In 
a review of papers relating to the development of sarcasm, Creusere (1999) found 
that young children around age six misinterpreted sarcasm as deception. However, 
as they grew older, between ages nine to 13, the differentiation between deception 
and sarcasm was more prominent, and they were able to make accurate 
judgements about a person being sarcastic (Demorest, Meyer, Phelps, Gardner, & 
Winner, 1984). Children as young as eight rely on intonation to recognise 
sarcasm, and as they grow older, they use contextual information as well as 
intonation to recognise sarcasm in conversations (Capelli, Nakagawa, & Madden, 
1990).  
The recognition of sarcasm is complex, and difficulties in this skill can 
happen at various levels. Based on the developmental studies mentioned above, it 
is not surprising that people with certain neurological disorders have difficulties in 
recognising sarcasm. There have been numerous studies that have found deficits 
in recognition of sarcasm through contextual cues in people with schizophrenia 
(Cassetta & Goghari, 2014; Kantrowitz, Hoptman, Leitman, Silipo, & Javitt, 
2014; Mitchell & Rossell, 2014), autism (Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh, 
& Thoma, 2013; Persicke, Tarbox, Ranick, & St. Clair, 2012), dementia (Bora, 
Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015; Kipps et al., 2009; Moos, 2011; Rapp & Wild, 
2011), epilepsy (Raud, Kaldoja, & Kolk, 2015; Stewart, Catroppa, & Lah, 2016) 
18 
 
and traumatic brain injury (Johnson, Crane, & Tatekawa, 2004; McDonald et al., 
2013).  
The assessment of social perception in general has until recently focussed 
on contrived stimuli that are devoid of contextual information, in the form of 
audiotaped exchanges and written scripts such as stories. These forms of 
assessment make the task extremely difficult and add cognitive load over and 
above what is required to infer these complex forms of social interactions. While 
research has focussed on the ability to recognise higher order social perception, 
such as ToM, empathy and irony, and the recognition of sarcasm, it has not 
always been assessed using psychometrically robust tests.  
Currently there is only one structured and standardised assessment tool for 
the recognition of sarcasm. This test is called the Awareness of Social Inference 
Test (TASIT), which uses prosody, emotion expressions, and context as cues, 
making it as close to a real-life situation as possible. The TASIT uses video 
vignettes that depict different actors who are being sarcastic, lying, or being 
sincere in scenes depicted in a series of videos 15-30 seconds long (McDonald, 
Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 2003b). The videos of simple sarcasm relied on 
identifying nonverbal cues to recognise intent, whilst, paradoxical sarcasm is 
more dependent on the semantics of the statement. At the end of each video, the 
participant is asked to answer four questions relating to what a person is doing to 
the other person, what they are trying to say, what they are thinking (which may 
be different from what they are saying) and how they are feeling.  
Biological basis of the recognition of sarcasm.  
Like the recognition of emotions, the recognition of sarcasm also requires 
multiple levels of processing. Although the perception of facial expressions is an 
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important aspect (Williams, Burns, & Harmon, 2009), emotional detection in 
sarcasm is best processed through acoustic information (Rockwell, 2007). Visual 
cues that help recognition of sarcasm are changes in the range and intensity of 
facial expression displayed by the communicator, rolling eyes, widening eyes, 
increased eye blinks, and smirks (Rockwell, 2001). Acoustic cues include 
information such as pitch, tone, intensity, pauses, and volume (Anolli et al., 2000; 
Bryant & Fox Tree, 2005; Cheang & Pell, 2008; Glenwright, Parackel, Cheung, & 
Nilsen, 2014; Woodland & Voyer, 2011). Lay people may term this as having a 
“sarcastic tone.” 
Sarcasm is frequently associated with negative affect (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986) such as disapproval, contempt and disdain and negative emotions are 
processed differently. Parts of the left orbitofrontal cortex are activated by 
negative emotions, including when a person perceives an angry expression (Pascal 
et al., 2013; Willis, Palermo, McGrillen, & Miller, 2014), or if they themselves 
are made to feel angry (Dougherty et al., 1999). The orbitofrontal cortex is also 
involved in sarcastic exchanges, possibly because they are likely to make the 
other person feel angry (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002). The temporal 
lobe has been recognised as the region where the sensory modalities unite (Moran, 
Mufson, & Mesulam, 1987), therefore receiving the sensory input of information–
in this case sarcasm.  
Once the initial levels of sensory processing are complete, the understanding 
of sarcasm requires complex processes including language, memory and executive 
functioning. To recognise if a person is being sarcastic, the person first has to 
understand the sentence spoken, which relies on knowledge about the language. 
Memory functions are related to the recognition of sarcasm. One of its functions is 
the formation of scripts, which provides emotional and semantic context based on 
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past experiences. Information regarding contextual cues are stored in memory. 
These contextual cues help in the recognition of sarcasm (Shany-Ur et al., 2012). 
Although complex, the detection of sarcasm occurs quickly. Executive functions 
including attention and speed of processing are involved in the recognition of 
sarcasm.  
The regions of the brain involved in the detection of sarcasm, once 
primary processing is complete, are complex. It activates the same circuits of the 
brain as those responsible for language and executive functioning tasks, including 
the temporal and the frontal lobes suggesting that the processes are related  
(Uchiyama et al., 2006). 
The temporal pole and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) are involved 
in aspects of recognition of sarcasm as well as cognitive processes. Studies with 
people with neurological insult to the temporal lobe (e.g., temporal lobe epilepsy 
and frontotemporal dementia) often suffer from ToM deficits (Cohn, St-Laurent, 
Barnett, & McAndrews, 2015; Hennion et al., 2015), which could contribute to 
difficulties in recognition of sarcasm. In addition, the temporal lobe, specifically 
the left temporal lobe, is involved in the memory retrieval of scripts (Maguire, 
Frith, & Morris, 1999; Westerlund & Pylkkänen, 2014). The temporal pole is 
responsible for the nuances of language: for instance, the construction of a 
sentence (Vandenberghe, Nobre, & Price, 2002), and other specific semantics 
(Bottini et al., 1994) including non-literal language (Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 
2012). Imaging studies, which assess the recognition of sarcasm through stories or 
textual cues, have shown activity in the temporal pole (Arzouan, Goldstein, & 




The MPFC is an important part of the brain that receives information from 
the temporal lobe (Bachevalier, Meunier, Lu, & Ungerleider, 1997) and is 
responsible for the non-automatic and conscious aspects of the detection of 
sarcasm (Ferstl & Cramon, 2002). The MPFC functions by generating hypotheses 
based on the knowledge derived from past experiences. It is responsible for tasks 
such as making judgements based on information generated through language 
(Ferstl & Cramon, 2002; Otsuka, Osaka, Yaoi, & Osaka, 2011), making 
evaluative judgements based on societal norms and values (Hervé, 
Razafimandimby, Jobard, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2013; Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, & 
Von Cramon, 2002), self-referential mental activity (Debra, Erbil, Gordon, & 
Marcus, 2001; Kim, 2012), and moral judgement (D'Argembeau et al., 2005; 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Yoder & Decety, 2014). 
Although these are the main structures of the brain associated with the recognition 
of sarcasm, other brain structures are also involved, including the corpus 
collosum. 
The major function of the corpus callosum is communication between the 
two hemispheres, and both the right and the left hemispheres are involved in the 
recognition of sarcasm. Not surprisingly, people with complete agenesis or lack of 
the corpus callosum, along with other cognitive issues, have difficulties in aspects 
of social cognition, including recognition of emotions, sarcasm detection and 
ToM tasks (Symington, Paul, Symington, Ono, & Brown, 2010). Symington et al. 
(2010) compared 11 high functioning participants with complete agenesis of the 
corpus callosum to 13 matched controls on tasks of social cognition. The authors 
found that their clinical sample performed poorly on the recognition of emotion 
and recognition of paradoxical sarcasm. They also found that the participants with 
agenesis of the corpus callosum struggled more with textual or language cues as 
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compared to the visual cues, implying that the corpus callosum is an important 
feature that helps in the understanding of second-order language. This has been 
demonstrated in numerous other studies also (Brown, Paul, Symington, & 
Dietrich, 2005; Gavrilescu et al., 2010). Other studies have found evidence to 
suggest that the corpus callosum is involved in the comprehension of second-
order meanings (Paul, Van Lancker-Sidtis, Schieffer, Dietrich, & Brown, 2003), 
nonliteral items (Brown, Symingtion, VanLancker-Sidtis, Dietrich, & Paul, 2005) 
and narrative humour (Brown et al., 2005). Therefore, these functions appear to 
involve both hemispheres of the brain. The findings about the relationship 
between various cognitive functions and the recognition of sarcasm is seen in a 
few neuropsychological studies and this is not consistent  
The cognitive correlates of sarcasm comprehension are confirmed in people 
with dementia who had deficits in the recognition of sarcasm tasks in the TASIT. 
Rankin et al. (2009) identified 15 out of 90 (17%) people with dementia who had 
deficits in the recognition of sarcasm on the TASIT. Recognition of sarcasm was 
positively related to language and verbal memory. However, inhibition, working 
memory, and visuospatial functioning were not related to the recognition of sarcasm. 
Another important study conducted to examine the cognitive correlates of social 
perception, including the recognition of sarcasm, was by McDonald et al. (2006). 
By assessing participants who had a brain injury, they concluded that various 
cognitive abilities such as face perception, information processing speed, executive 
functioning, working memory, learning new material and conceptual reasoning 
were associated with social perception as assessed by the TASIT.  
Spikman, Timmerman, Milders, Veenstra, and van Der Naalt (2012) 
conducted a study of social cognition with TBI patients. Tests of social cognition 
were conducted, including emotion recognition assessed by Facial Expressions of 
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Emotion-Stimuli and Tests (FEEST) (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & 
Ekman, 2002), ToM was assessed using the Cartoon Test (Happé, Brownell, & 
Winner, 1999) and the short version Faux Pas test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 
1998). The neuropsychological measures assessed memory mental speed, attention 
and executive function. There were no significant relationships between 
neuropsychological and social perception domains; however, the authors note that 
their assessment of executive functioning focused on planning, and future studies 
could include tests of inhibitory control and flexibility.  
Another important aspect that requires complex social perception skills 
and ToM is the recognition of lying.  
Recognition of lying 
Lying has been defined as “intentionally (trying) to mislead someone” (DePaulo, 
Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996, p. 991). Almost 81% of people 
admitted to lying at least once during a study interview and 34% of people have 
admitted to having lied to their spouses at some point during their relationship 
(DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), making lying quite common. Lying serves several 
functions. Some lies are told with the goal of making the other person feel better 
(altruistic lies). These lies could be compliments, pretending to agree with the 
other person or understand them. This in turn could serve to display care and 
support and to foster a positive bond between people. Other lies may be more self-
serving and benefit the person telling the lie (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). These lies 
serve the purpose of making oneself feel better, to achieve some sort of material 
gain (e.g., securing a job), protect oneself from hurt or embarrassment, gain 
affection, or increase self-esteem. During interactions with other people, 
determining whether they were telling the truth has an important evolutionary 
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function as well. Failure to determine that a person has lied may lead to an 
inaccurate appraisal of the person’s honesty, which may be a disadvantage to the 
person who is being lied to.  
The recognition of lying is a difficult task and requires many cues to be 
able to make a judgement. Because of this, when judging if a person has been 
lying, people achieve only slightly above chance level of accuracy (DePaulo et al., 
1996; Hartwig & Bond Jr, 2011; Vrij, 2008). Two explanations have been 
proposed to explain the reasons for inaccurate recognition of lying. One of the 
explanations is “wrong subjective cue hypothesis,” which states that people are 
poor at recognising the characteristics of lying. Numerous self-report studies have 
shown that people report lying to be characterised by high vocal pitch, slow 
speech (Zuckerman & Rosenthal, 1981), hesitancy, fidgetiness, other signs of 
nervousness like speech errors, more pauses, avoidance of eye contact (Malone, 
2001), as well as excessive amounts of eye contact (Vrij, 2008). However, 
research has found a low correlation between lie detection and eye contact, 
fidgeting or gaze aversion (Hartwig & Bond Jr, 2011; Vrij, 2008).  
The other explanation for inaccuracies in the recognition of lying is the 
“weak objective cue hypothesis,” which states that there are no particular 
behavioural aspects that accompany lying. In other words, people who lie try their 
best to seem sincere and therefore do not look any different from a truth teller. 
DePaulo et al. (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 116 papers on deception, 
where the behaviour while lying was compared with the behaviour while people 
told the truth. From these papers, they identified 158 different cues to deception 
that were further divided into five different categories. These were how 
forthcoming liars were (e.g., response length, cognitive complexity, rate of 
speaking), how compelling the lies were (e.g., plausibility, facial expressiveness), 
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how positive the liars were (ex. friendly, pleasantness, smiling), how tense liars 
were (ex. frequency, pitch of vice, blinking, fidgeting), and the amount of 
ordinary imperfections and unusual content (self-doubt, spontaneous corrections). 
The authors found that in laboratory experiments using mediums that were clearly 
meant to contain material that were lies and providing the participant with 
contextual information, it was easier to recognise a lie. However, the recognition 
of lies in everyday life was clearly quite difficult, as people lying in real life often 
behaved similarly to truth tellers.  
The detection of lying behaviour follows a developmental sequence, 
reinforcing the theory that this is indeed a complex social perception skill. As we 
know, young children are able to recognise emotions. The process of ToM is 
involved when judging if a person was lying (Harada et al., 2009). As explained 
in the previous section, ToM also develops in young children between the ages of 
five and nine. When discussing the recognition of lying, younger children are 
unable to use information about the discrepancy between verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour to detect lying (Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, & Williams, 2009). 
School-aged children are better able to make judgements about truth telling, 
possibly because lying is an interpersonal and socio-cultural learning that 
develops through experience. Children as young as three are able to understand 
the concept of lying. The moral implications of lying become clearer when they 
are in their preschool years. By the age of six, children are able to understand 
intent in the person lying (Lee, 2000). 
Most of the research on the recognition of lying has been in laboratory 
based studies involving college students who were asked to deliver truthful or 
false statements. It is only recently that the standardised assessment of lying has 
been given attention. Most of the assessment of lying in research has focussed on 
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using stories or stimuli that have not been standardised. The recognition of lying 
in everyday communication has been researched in two different ways. Research 
has focussed on the lie-telling behaviour (Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & 
McDermott, 2009; Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, & Thompson, 2003; Mohamed et al., 
2006) and the detection of lying (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Research with the lie 
recipient or the recognition of lying in everyday conversation typically used video 
vignettes as assessment tools that were not normed or standardised. In the 
research that has used standardised tools of assessing lying, they have found that 
people do not tend to make mistakes in the detection of lying (Kern et al., 2009) 
which is different from real life scenarios where they do make mistakes.  
The TASIT is currently the only standardised instrument that measures the 
detection of lying and consists of contextual information that make it easy to 
detect lies. The true state of affairs is revealed in the beginning of the video 
followed by the lie being told. For example, in one video, Ruth is seen telling her 
colleague that Keith smashed the boss’s car and that the boss would not 
understand. When Keith walks in and expresses worry about the boss firing him, 
Ruth lies to him saying that the boss would understand. The vignettes consist of 
people largely telling white lies. Kern et al. (2009) found that schizophrenic 
participants performed better in the recognition of lying as compared to the 
recognition of sarcasm on the TASIT. They pointed to the fact that while one 
needed to pay attention to the video and the information delivered, additional 
demands on information processing was not present in the lying condition. On the 
other hand, people with multiple sclerosis (MS) performed poorly on the 
recognition of lying on the TASIT compared to healthy controls (Genova, Cagna, 
Chiaravalloti, Deluca, & Lengenfelder, 2016). One of the variables that explain 
these differences is the level of cognitive deficits present in both of these 
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populations. While the study with MS patients included various 
neuropsychological measures which showed impairment, the one with 
schizophrenics did not assess the participants’ cognitive abilities.  
This suggests that there may be a link between higher-order cognition and 
the recognition of lying and leads to the question of what parts of the brain are 
responsible for lie recognition.  
Biological basis of recognition of lying 
In determining the various cognitive and neurological aspects of the recognition 
of lying, imaging as well as neuropsychological studies have been carried out. 
These have largely used unstandardised video stimuli and more recently the 
TASIT, the only known standardised tool that assesses the recognition of lying. 
The imaging studies used to examine lying are similar to the ones discussed in the 
biological basis of emotion recognition and the recognition of sarcasm (see page 
number 6 and 17) and include studies using fMRI (Ganis et al., 2003; Lee, Lee, 
Raine, & Chan, 2010), PET (Abe et al., 2006), as well as transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) (Karim et al., 2010).  
The neural correlates of lying point to the involvement of different parts of 
the brain depending on the recognition of an antisocial lie and a lie for prosocial 
causes. An imaging study conducted by Harada et al. (2009), prepared 28 stories 
depicting a protagonist who was either performing a good deed or one that 
deviated from social norms. Participants were asked to indicate if the protagonist 
was morally bad or good, and if they were lying or telling the truth. The temporal 
pole was engaged in the recognition of lies and the moral task (similar to that of 
the recognition of sarcasm). The temporal pole, as mentioned earlier, is the region 
that receives sensory input, as well as information from the limbic system (Moran 
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et al., 1987). The left temporal pole has already been established as an important 
part of the brain that is associated with language processes (Bottini et al., 1994) as 
well as memory retrieval (Fink et al., 1996). However Harada et al. (2009) found 
that the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) was activated largely when the lies 
were said for anti-social purposes as opposed to prosocial reasons. The role of the 
TPJ in the recognition of lying has been found by other studies as well (Harada et 
al., 2009; Young & Saxe, 2008). 
In another fMRI study of the neural correlates of the recognition of lying, 
Wu, Loke, Xu, and Lee (2011) showed 20 participants lying stories and truth-
telling stories. The lying stories were further divided into bad-act lying (antisocial 
lies) and good-act lying (prosocial lies). The truth-telling stories were further 
divided into bad-act truth telling (telling the truth after a wrongdoing) and a good-
act truth telling (telling the truth after a good act). The areas involved in antisocial 
lies were right lingual gyrus (LG), the post central gyrus (PoCG), the right 
precuneus, the bilateral inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and the TPJ. The areas of the 
brain involved in processing negatively valenced information are the LG and the 
PoCG (Isenberg et al., 1999; Ruby & Decety, 2004). The recognition of lying 
does entail ToM processes, and this is further displayed in the parts of the brain 
that are activated when recognising lying which are also involved in making ToM 
judgements. These are the TPJ (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Xiaoqin et al., 2016), 
the LG (Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Völlm et al., 
2006), the PoCG (Fiddick, Spampinato, & Grafman, 2005), the IPL (Gobbini et 
al., 2007), and the precuneus (Young & Saxe, 2008). In addition to the specific 
brain regions closely related to the act of deciphering if a person has lied, other 
regions that are primarily involved in higher-order cognitive processes such as 
language are also involved. The prefrontal cortex, which is involved in linguistic 
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coherence and comprehension of spoken language, is one such region (Ferstl & 
von Cramon, 2002).  
In addition to imaging research, studies have been conducted using 
neuropsychological measures in order to determine the relationship between 
cognitive processes and the recognition of lying. All studies to date found a 
relationship between cognitive performance and recognition of lying. One such 
study was by Genova et al. (2016). Fifteen participants with MS and 15 healthy 
controls were assessed using the TASIT and a range of neuropsychological 
measures including premorbid IQ. The people with MS were worse at recognising 
lies, and this correlated with their performance in memory, learning, processing 
speed and working memory. Further, premorbid IQ was positively related to the 
recognition of lies. It is of note that none of the participants with MS had 
impairments on the neuropsychological tests with the exception of processing 
speed.  
Similarly, Shany-Ur et al. (2012) found a significant relationship between 
global cognitive functioning and the recognition of lying, using the TASIT in a 
sample of people with dementia. They assessed 102 people with four different 
types of dementia and 77 healthy controls. They assessed recognition of lying 
using the TASIT and neuropsychological tests assessing general mental status, 
memory, language, visuospatial functioning and executive functioning. The 
people with deficits in the recognition of lying were identified if they performed 
1.5 SD below the mean. People with behaviour variant frontotemporal dementia 
(bvFTD) performed poorly compared to other types of dementia, and they also 
had higher functional impairment. People with other neurological conditions such 
as progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) also had deficits in the recognition of 
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lying, which was related mostly to their cognitive impairment rather than a deficit 
in ToM.  
Once again, just like with the recognition of sarcasm, although specific 
regions of the brain and intact cognitive function help with the recognition of 
lying, the interaction is complex. Even with the recent development of 
standardised tools to assess complex ToM functions, the research in the area of 
social perception and its relationship with neuropsychological functions is still in 
its infancy. Further, most research focusses on either young college participants or 
those with moderate to severe forms of disorders.   
Social perception in older people 
Social perception, like other human functions, follows a developmental pattern. 
Not surprisingly, the recognition of emotion is the first to develop. Infants are able 
to recognise emotions through the tone of voice (Heck, Chroust, White, Jubran, & 
Bhatt, 2018; Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009) and facial expressions (Minagawa-
Kawai et al., 2009; Sorce et al., 1985). As children grow, they are able to 
recognise referential intent, using a speaker’s gaze, speaker’s self-correction, and 
other factors which they use as cues to understand meanings of newly heard 
words (Lewis & Mitchell, 2014). Children as young as 6 years are able to 
accurately understand sarcasm and irony (Ackerman, 1983; Glenwright & 
Pexman, 2010; Hancock et al., 2000; Harris & Pexman, 2003). As described 
previously, the higher-order functions show strong relationships with neural and 
cognitive changes. Therefore, we might expect that deterioration in brain function 
due to ageing would affect people’s ability to process these higher-order elements 
of social perception. 
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Social perception in the process of ageing is not well studied. In order to 
understand any changes in social perception with ageing, it is important to also 
understand the other changes that occur because of the ageing process. These 
include changes in the physical realm–vision, hearing, and vestibular senses 
among others. Cognitive changes that occur are because of the changes in the 
brain that accompany the ageing process. These include decreases in working and 
long-term memory and speed of processing (Park & Gutchess, 2006). With age 
also come changes in motivation, cognition and time perspectives (Fiske, Macrae, 
& Neil, 2012). All these changes have an impact on how older people perceive 
basic and higher levels of social perception. The following section discusses some 
of the main changes seen as a part of ageing, followed by the changes in social 
perception. 
Physical changes  
As a part of the normal ageing process, there is typically a general slowing down 
in all the organs of the human body. Saxon, Etten, and Perkins (2014) describe the 
various physical changes that occur. This includes characteristics such as reduced 
tolerance to stress, general slowness in physical activities and slowness in 
homeostatic equilibrium of internal aspects of the body such as blood pressure and 
acid balance. Changes also occur in the sensory areas as a part of normal ageing. 
Changes in vision and hearing are especially important, as they are a key aspect of 
social perception. In order to recognise an emotion, for example, the person needs 
to be able to see the facial expressions, gestures, and hear aspects of the voice that 
would communicate the emotion. Older people have reduced visual and auditory 
functioning, which is correlated with less time spent in physical activities (Anstey 
& Smith, 1999; Christensen, Mackinnon, Korten, & Jorm, 2001; Tsai et al., 2016). 
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These changes in the sensory functioning are related to both changes in the brain 
and the sensory apparatus such as the eyes or ears (Andersen, 2012).  
Vision is important in the recognition of emotions as well as the complex 
elements of social perception. Studies have found changes in the eyes due to the 
process of ageing. For example, there are changes in the properties of the rods 
(Gosala, 2012; Jackson, McGwin, Phillips, Klein, & Owsley, 2006; Patryas et al., 
2013), cones (Zhu, Brown, Rife, & Craft, 2006) and the retinal ganglion cells 
(Mann et al., 2005). Changes in vision in the ageing process include changes to 
light sensitivity (Richards, 1977), which also effects being able to detect an object 
(Seichepine et al., 2012).  
The recognition of emotions or other complex aspects of social perception 
also rely on auditory aspects like prosody, tone and pitch. Age-related hearing 
loss, also known as presbycusis, is a common condition and can have multiple 
causes (Davis et al., 2016). Some of these causes include long-term exposure to 
long-lasting or loud noises. People who were exposed to loud noises in 
occupational settings for a significant portion of their lives often have hearing 
issues relating to this exposure (Basner et al., 2014). Other medical conditions 
such as diabetes, high blood pressure and using certain kinds of drugs like 
chemotherapy drugs can also lead to hearing loss (McKee, Stransky, & Reichard, 
2018). Hearing loss has also been associated with changes in brain structure and 
function that accompany the ageing process (Lin et al., 2014). Changes in brain 
structure also lead to cognitive changes that are seen to accompany ageing.  
Cognitive changes  
Many studies demonstrate that as people age, their cognitive faculties decline 
steadily (Christensen et al., 2001; Insel, Morrow, Brewer, & Figueredo, 2006; 
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Rolls & Deco, 2015; Turner & Spreng, 2012). There has been some evidence of 
decline in processing speed and memory, but there have also been findings of 
intact crystallised abilities in older people (Harada, Natelson Love, & Triebel, 
2013; Salthouse, 2012). More rapid decline in cognition is related to poor health, 
fewer years of education, less time spent in activities, and physical and medical 
illness like abnormal blood pressure (Christensen et al., 2001). Changes in 
memory are also seen in ageing. Short-term memory and episodic memory decline 
as people age (Rolls & Deco, 2015). Delayed free recall (remembering without a 
cue) (Price, Said, & Haaland, 2004), source memory (remembering where one 
learned some information) and prospective memory (remembering to do 
something later in the future) (Schnitzspahn, Stahl, Zeintl, Kaller, & Kliegel, 
2013) are also seen to decline with age. However, some aspects of memory 
remain stable with age. This includes recognition memory (retrieving information 
with a cue), memory for temporal events and procedural memory (how to do 
things) (Harada et al., 2013).   
Executive functions are a set of mental abilities that help us to attend to 
information, make decisions and judgements, and shift between different 
activities. By middle age, adults have already begun to experience decline in a 
range of executive functioning and memory domains (Turner & Spreng, 2012). As 
adults grow older, tasks related to executive functioning and working memory 
become increasingly difficult (Insel et al., 2006; Turner & Spreng, 2012). 
Decreases in executive functioning with age are seen in the reduced capacity to 
form new concepts, abstract thinking, response inhibition and mental flexibility 
(Oosterman et al., 2010; Salthouse, 2010; Singh-Manoux et al., 2012). Older 
people particularly struggle with activities that require quicker responses (Hayden 
& Welsh-Bohmer, 2012). They also find it difficult to perform verbal and 
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mathematical reasoning tasks, which suggests a decline in inductive reasoning 
(Singh-Manoux et al., 2012). In contrast, older people have no difficulties in being 
able to find similarities, describing the meanings of proverbs or in their reasoning 
capabilities with familiar material (Harada et al., 2013).  
Changes in language abilities, which are frequently related to complex 
cognitive functions, are less of a problem with older people. Overall, language 
remains intact with age and some aspects, like vocabulary, improve with age 
(Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Salthouse, 2009), although there are exceptions. 
After the age of 70, the speed with which one is able to name a common object 
declines and this decline continues through the years. Further, verbal fluency, 
namely the ability to generate words that begin with a certain letter or naming as 
many animals as possible, declines with age (Salthouse, 2010; Singh-Manoux et 
al., 2012).  
Like language, visuospatial skills remain intact with age (Harada et al., 
2013). This includes being able to recognise familiar objects, being able to 
perceive an object, and spatial perception. The exception lies in visual 
construction skills (Salthouse, 2009). There is a gradual decline in the ability to 
assemble different parts in order to make a logical whole.  
The changes in cognitive functions, as a part of normal ageing, have also 
been associated with increased vulnerability to financial fraud (Lichtenberg, 
Stickney, & Paulson, 2013; Spreng et al., 2017). This can obviously have an 
overwhelming effect on independence and wellbeing. James, Boyle, and Bennett 
(2014) examined the cognitive and psychological correlates of older people who 
are more susceptible to fraud. They studied 639 healthy older adults and assessed 
them on a wide range of neuropsychological assessments, including memory 
(episodic and semantic), language, attention and visuospatial ability. Depression, 
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wellbeing, personality, loneliness, social support and network size were also 
assessed. The authors found that older people who had a low cognitive function 
(with the exception of visuospatial functioning), lower psychological wellbeing 
and poorer health were more vulnerable to falling for financial fraud. 
Motivational changes 
Along with the concrete changes in physical and cognitive realms as a part of 
ageing, people’s motivation also changes. The selective engagement hypothesis 
and the socioemotional selectivity theory are two major theories discussed below 
that have shown a relationship with aspects of social perception.  
The selective engagement hypothesis is used to explain the adaptive 
aspects of behaviour in older adults. This theory, posited by Hess (2006), states 
that older adults select to engage in cognitive resources that are within the realm 
of their individual goals and ability to perform, which leads them to engage in 
activities that are more important to them (Hess, Queen, & Ennis, 2013). Lecce et 
al. (2017) found that older people’s motivation to take part in social activities 
partly predicted their social network, especially how many friends they engaged 
with.  
Consistent findings across nationalities and ethnic groups show fewer 
negative emotions and increased ability to control negative emotions in older 
people, as compared to their younger equivalents (Gross et al., 1997). 
Socioemotive selectivity theory posits that the awareness of limitations of time is 
related to the decreased importance placed on negative emotions as compared to 
positive ones. In other words, the reduced relevance of worries about the future 
leads to more understanding of one’s emotions, leading to attention to positive 
emotional experiences. Older people hence show less negative emotion, have 
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fewer worries about financial and social events (Powers, Wisocki, & Whitbourne, 
1992), fewer feelings of regret (Brassen, Gamer, Peters, Gluth, & Büchel, 2012) 
and in general experience less anger (Schieman, 1999). Another explanation is the 
positivity effect (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005), which is the bias of information 
processing that draws away from negatively valenced stimuli. In a study 
comparing young (ages 18 to 29), middle aged (ages 41 to 53) and older adults 
(ages 65 to 85) on a memory test that either had positive, negative or neutral 
images, Carstensen and Mikels (2005) found that as people grew older, they 
remembered positive emotional images better. When presented with two 
photographs–one positive and the other negative–older people had a tendency to 
avoid watching the negative one and to pay more attention to the positive emotion 
expression (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). However, different motivation theories 
have not been tested using more ecologically valid stimuli.  
Emotion recognition  
As we have already established in the preceding sections, the recognition of 
emotion is central to social communication. Difficulties in this area lead to 
difficulties in higher-order social perception skills as well. The implications for 
older people experiencing difficulties in emotion recognition are potentially large. 
Loneliness and isolation may influence the general wellbeing of people, and even 
affect mortality (Bath & Deeg, 2005; Fry & Debats, 2006). Therefore, the area of 
recognition of emotion deserves attention because of this potentially significant 
impact, especially in older adults.  
There has been an increasing amount of literature produced on the 
recognition of emotions in older people. Older adults have a general bias towards 
positive emotions, which they were better at recognising (Moraitou, Papantoniou, 
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Gkinopoulos, & Nigritinou, 2013b; Moreno, 1993). Increase in age was associated 
with decreased accuracy in the recognition of negative emotions such as fear, 
anger (Calder et al., 2003; Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicolich, 1987), sadness 
(Malatesta et al., 1987; Mill, Allik, Realo, & Valk, 2009) and disgust (Moraitou et 
al., 2013b; Moreno, 1993). However, the meta-analysis identified inconsistencies 
(Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008a). They included studies that 
looked into stimuli that were photographs, prosody, stories and videos. 
The meta-analysis, found compelling evidence (a larger effect size) that 
older adults were worse at recognising some of the basic negative emotions of 
anger and sadness but showed no impairment in the recognition of fear or disgust 
through the medium of voices (Ruffman et al., 2008b). Contrary to the positivity 
bias, they found that older adults were worse at recognising happiness compared 
to negative emotions in certain modalities. The study examined some of the issues 
that make interpreting the findings of various papers difficult. One reason was 
ceiling effects, particularly in the recognition of happiness. Ceiling effects are 
often seen as a measurement limitation when people get the highest possible score 
on a test. Younger adults showed almost 98% accuracy in recognising happiness, 
making the difference between older and younger adults more attributable to the 
ceiling effect. Another concern about the findings was that some of the poor 
performances that were seen around the recognition of the emotions could be 
largely because of task difficulty. The limitations of using only simple and static 
two-dimensional stimuli, such as pictures and photographs, to assess emotion 
recognition (Calder et al., 2003; Moreno, 1993) is noted to increase in task 
difficulty.  
More recently, there have been studies that have used other modalities 
such as voice and bodily cues to assess emotion recognition in older people. For 
38 
 
example, Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt, and Taumoepeau (2010) used the Facial 
Expression of Emotion: Stimuli and Test (FEEST) (Young et al., 2002) to assess 
recognition of emotions through pictures, video clips of people using non-verbal 
emotional sounds (e.g., “grrr” for anger) or used emotional intonation while 
reading a passage. In order to assess bodily expressions, pictures of people 
displaying emotions through their body, but with their faces blurred, were 
presented to participants. They found that older adults were significantly worse at 
recognising basic emotions compared to their younger counterparts. Although the 
FEEST was a standardised test, there are no reliability and validity data for this 
test. 
There are a few possible explanations as to why older people have been 
found to be worse at recognising emotions. Some of the changes seen in ageing 
studies are predominantly related to the recognition of negative emotions. As 
explained earlier in the biological basis of emotion recognition, multiple brain 
areas are responsible for the recognition of emotions. The ageing process includes 
changes in volume and changes in the activity of neurotransmitters. The cerebrum 
had approximately 10% decline in grey matter from ages 30 to 70, and a further 
reduction of about 11 to 12% by the age of 80 (Allen, Bruss, Brown, & Damasio, 
2005). White matter in the brain (the myelin sheath that makes transmission of 
information faster) starts to reduce at an accelerated rate after the age of 50 
accounting for poorer emotion recognition (O' Brien et al., 2002; Zheng et al., 
2012).The volume in the amygdala declines with age (Allen et al., 2005; Gerritsen 
et al., 2015), which may cause older adults to struggle with recognising some 
emotions, especially fear and sadness.  
The changes in brain activity with age are related to cognitive functioning, 
as seen on performance on neuropsychological assessments, however, findings 
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from studies examining the association between neuropsychological functioning 
and emotion recognition are inconsistent. MacPherson, Phillips, and Della Sala 
(2002) studied the relationship between age and social decision-making. They 
administered a series of dorsolateral prefrontal lobe neuropsychological tests and 
social perception tests (which largely target the ventromedial prefrontal lobe) to 
young adults (ages 20 to 38), middle-aged adults (ages 40 to 59) and older adults 
(ages 61 to 80). The social perception tasks involved a gambling task in order to 
detect social decision-making (gambling task), a test of ToM (Faux Pas Task), and 
an emotion recognition test (Ekman’s emotion identification task). The 
dorsolateral prefrontal lobe tests were Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, the Self-
Ordered Pointing Task and the Delayed Response Task. The temporal lobe tasks 
were the verbal paired associates subtest and the doors subtest. The doors subtest 
is a visual recognition task, thought to be sensitive to temporal lobe dysfunction. 
They found that social perception tasks mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal 
area were unaffected by ageing. On the other hand, older people did worse than 
younger adults on tasks mediated by the dorsolateral prefrontal area, which were 
largely memory and executive functioning tests. The lack of an association 
between cognitive functions and emotion recognition in older adults supports the 
idea of the automaticity of emotion recognition explained in the earlier sections. 
Higher-order social perception changes in older people 
Social perception appears to be important in maintaining meaningful relationships 
in older people. A study assessed ToM in 53 older adults who were between 60 
and 85 years of age. The authors also examined the relationship between ToM and 
social motivation, and the participants’ relationship with their relatives and friends 
(Lecce et al., 2017). Social motivation was measured using an item (“It is very 
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important that other people like me”) from the social sensitivity subscale of the 
social skills inventory (Riggio, 1986). The Lubben Social Network Scale was also 
used to measure social relationships. The results showed that having meaningful 
friendships was dependent on good ToM skills, as well as high motivation to be 
liked by others. In other words, ToM affects meaningful relationships but social 
motivation appears to play an important role as well. The knowledge about how 
ToM changes in old age is an important issue.  
As people grow older, they have more deficits in deciphering meaning and 
intent behind verbal communication, (i.e., ToM) (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & 
Bailey, 2013b). However, there have been mixed findings about the existence of 
deficits in ToM in older people. Some studies have found that older people 
performed worse on higher-order social perception tasks (Bernstein, Thornton, & 
Sommerville, 2011; Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013a), others have 
shown that there were no differences (Keightley, Winocur, Burianova, 
Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002), and 
yet others have found that these skills improved with age (Happé, Winner, & 
Brownell, 1998). One of the first studies of ToM in older people was by Happé et 
al. (1998). The performance of 19 healthy older people (Mean age = 73) and 52 
younger students (Mean age = 21) were compared with a ToM test that the 
authors devised. The test consisted of 24 short stories that had double bluffs, 
mistakes, persuasions and white lies. The participants were questioned about 
inferences or intentions of the characters. Findings revealed that older people 
performed better than younger people on ToM.  
On the other hand, no differences were found between older and younger 
participants. Some studies have found that there are no differences between the 
ageing process and higher-order social performance tasks (Keightley et al., 2006; 
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MacPherson et al., 2002). For example, Keightley et al. (2006), in an attempt to 
measure higher-order social perception, administered tests of emotion recognition 
(Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion also known as, JACFEE) 
(Biehl et al., 1997) and ToM stories adapted from (Gallagher et al., 2000) tasks to 
30 older (M age = 72.5) and 30 younger (M age = 25.7) adults. Older adults were 
slower in their responses to the tasks but were just as accurate as the younger 
participants were.  
Numerous studies have found that various aspects of higher-order social 
perception skills change with age. Participants from three age groups (17 to 22, 51 
to 59 and 60 to 85 years) were compared on a ToM task (a False Belief Task) to 
test if ToM abilities decrease with age (Bernstein et al., 2011). Middle-aged and 
older adults performed worse than the younger participants. A meta-analytic 
review (Henry, Phillips, & Von Hippel, 2014) of studies in ToM in older people 
looked at 23 datasets (790 younger and 672 older participants) and reviewed 
papers that used ToM tasks from different modalities, including verbal (stories), 
visual-static (pictures), visual-dynamic (videos), verbal and visual-static or verbal 
and visual dynamic (e.g., Faux pas). Across a wide range of participants, there 
was a consistent picture of older adults performing worse on ToM tasks. This 
generalised across the different modalities mentioned.  
Another important question is whether the deficits in ToM were associated 
with age-related cognitive deficits. Simply based on the difficulty of the ToM 
tasks, Henry et al. (2014) concluded that the deficits in ToM in older people 
would be affected by the decrease in executive function. By definition, ToM tasks 
that have been used in studies, for example the Faux Pas or Reading of the Eyes 
tests, inflict greater demands on executive functioning processes (Bull, Phillips, & 
Conway, 2008). Similar studies have reported that the higher-order social 
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perception tasks depend upon multiple higher cognitive functions, which include 
working memory (Phillips, Channon, Tunstall, Hedenstrom, & Lyons, 2008), 
executive functioning (Bull et al., 2008) and language abilities (Uekermann, 
Channon, & Daum, 2006). On the contrary, a small number of other studies have 
found that social perception tasks such as emotion recognition, ToM and social 
decision-making were unrelated to cognitive function (Keightley et al., 2006; 
MacPherson et al., 2002). 
There are a few points worth considering regarding the differences in the 
findings described above. One of these is the type of measure used. Another 
important difference between the previously described studies is the mode of 
presentation of ToM tasks. These include stories, pictures, videos or a 
combination of these modalities. The closer stimuli are to real life scenarios, the 
less demands they place on cognitive processes, thus showing less impaired 
performance (Light, 1991). The discrepancies between studies could be attributed 
to how they have defined ToM. Theory of Mind is operationalised in a few ways. 
For example, some tasks tap into affective states, emotions and feelings of ToM, 
and others focus on understanding cognitive states and intentions (Brothers & 
Ring, 1992).  
Perception of complex emotional stimuli is not straightforward. Higher-
order social perception, in terms of recognising information when presented in a 
counterfactual manner, is a skill that may also change as one gets older. For 
example, older people often chose logical answers to a joke and were frequently 
not able detect the humour in them (Uekermann et al., 2006). Two processes of 
higher-order social perception where counterfactual information is involved are 
the recognition of sarcasm and the recognition of lying.  
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Recognition of sarcasm. 
The changes that are seen in older people in their ability to perform ToM activities 
suggests that they would also show differences in tasks requiring ToM skills.  
Phillips et al. (2015) assessed the recognition of sarcasm by 40 young 
adults (18-39 years), 40 middle-age adults (40-64 years) and 36 older adults (65-
86 years) by using the social inference-minimal subtest of the TASIT and stories 
of sarcasm adapted from Channon et al. (2007). The stories assessed direct and 
indirect sarcasm and included an equal number of control conditions. They also 
assessed emotion recognition using FEEST (Young et al. (2002), ToM (the Faux 
Pas Task by Stone et al. (1998)) and working memory as measured by an n-back 
test. Older adults showed more difficulty in recognising sarcasm as determined by 
performance on the TASIT subtest and the stories. The recognition of sarcasm 
was also dependent on the performance in emotion recognition tests, which 
reinforces the previous findings about the link between the recognition of 
emotions and sarcasm. Working memory abilities were significantly lower in 
older adults, but this did not affect their performance on the sarcasm recognition 
tasks.  
Another study which assessed sarcasm in older people (Burdon, Dipper, 
and Cocks (2016), examined the difference between older (60 to 90 years) and 
younger (18 to 45 years) British participants on the TASIT. Once again, they 
found that older people performed worse on all the subtests of the TASIT. 
Although both age groups performed similar to the Australian norms, the 
unfamiliarity of the older participants to recognise the “Australian prosody” might 
be one of the reasons for their performance.  
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So far, there are only two studies that have looked into the ability of older 
people to specifically recognise sarcasm compared to their younger counterparts. 
Both of the studies described above used the TASIT in the assessment of 
recognition of sarcasm and both found that older people performed more poorly 
compared to younger adults. Similar studies in the field of assessment of lying 
have also been conducted.  
Recognition of lying. 
Most of the research on the recognition of lying has focussed on young adults. 
There have only been a few studies that have assessed the relationship between 
age and detection of lying. 
Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt, and Vater (2012) conducted a study with 
60 adults in New Zealand–30 of them were young adults (aged from 17 to 26 
years) and 30 of them older adults (age from 60 to 89 years)–to examine if older 
adults were less likely to be good liars. They hypothesised that this difficulty was 
because the older adults were being too transparent in their interactions and that 
they were not able to recognise emotions. They used a detection task similar to the 
one used by Frank and Ekman (1997), where 10 participants (actors) were 
videotaped while presenting arguments regarding a topical issue (“Stem cell usage 
in humans is ethical”), and half of those arguments were the opposite of the 
actors’ personal views. In other words, they were asked to lie about their views 
and were monetarily reinforced if the research assistant (who was blind to the 
experiment) believed them. A truth and a lie from each actor was then compiled 
into a set of stimuli to be presented to the participants. The NimStim face stimulus 
set (Tottenham et al., 2009), which is a still photo facial emotion recognition test, 
was used to assess emotion recognition. Findings indicated that older adults were 
45 
 
worse at detecting a lie compared to younger adults. The authors also found that 
general accuracy of basic emotion recognition reduced with age and mediated lie 
detection. The use of more ecologically valid tests in the assessment of emotion 
recognition is one of its limitation.  
Another study explored how the modality of presentation affected how 
accurate older people were at recognising lying. Stanley and Blanchard-Fields 
(2008) assessed 184 young adults and 210 older adults using emotion recognition 
and deception stimuli in audio, visual and audio-visual modalities. Further, in 
order to look at the relationship between cognitive abilities, participants were 
assessed on their verbal ability, fluid intelligence, working memory and visual 
acuity. Older people were worse at lie detection compared to younger adults, and 
did not seem to benefit from the audio-visual channels of presentation. In contrast, 
younger adults found the information given through both audio and visual 
channels were beneficial, as opposed to only audio or only visual modes. The 
recognition of fear and shame were significantly related to the recognition of 
lying. In other words, better emotion recognition led to better recognition of lying. 
The authors did not find a relationship between any of the participants’ cognitive 
abilities and the detection of lying. Although the authors used a few cognitive 
tests to assess working memory, fluid intelligence and verbal ability, they lacked a 
robust neuropsychological assessment that may have helped answer some of the 
questions they had. They also acknowledge in their paper that the use of static 
stimuli in emotion recognition might reduce the external validity of their findings. 
The role of cognition in the detection of lying in older people has largely 
been ignored in literature. Research with younger participants, including children, 
has pointed to the fact that the recognition of lying is complex in nature, and the 
neuropsychological functions associated with the recognition of lying include 
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executive functions such as planning ability and working memory, among others 
(Gombos, 2006). Like ToM, the recognition of lying shows a high likelihood of 
decline with changes in cognitive functions that accompany ageing.  
In summary, social perception changes as we age. These changes are seen 
in basic processes like emotion recognition as well as higher-order social 
perception skills like ToM, which is involved in the recognition of particularly 
difficult counterfactual information. Research findings in the area of social 
perception and ageing are inconsistent, with some studies suggesting that there are 
no changes, small changes, significant decline, or even improvement in certain 
skills. Further, research in the area of cognitive correlates of higher-order social 
perception skills in older people is lacking. Changes in the volume of the brain are 
associated with changes in cognition and social perception skills. With the advent 
of degeneration of the brain, these changes become more obvious, and this 
knowledge is extremely important in guiding diagnostic and treatment processes. 
One of the most common neurodegenerative disorders in older people is dementia. 
Assessing social perception in dementia may help with the identification of 
specific dementia types as it may help in the diagnosis of types of dementia and 
aid in rehabilitation. Mild cognitive impairment has been identified as a condition 
that precedes dementia. 
Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) 
The term Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) was proposed by Peterson et al. 
(1997), who initially viewed this as a prodromal phase of dementia. However, it is 
now been seen as a risk factor of developing dementia (Klekociuk, Saunders, & 
Summers, 2016; Summers & Saunders, 2012). It is identified using 
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neuropsychological testing as well as by performance on various basic cognitive 
screening tests, including the Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE) 
(Devanand et al., 2008). Mild cognitive impairment is characterised by (1) 
memory problems with a history of decline; (2) preserved cognitive functioning 
(not amounting to dementia); (3) intact activities of daily living; (4) no history of 
significant medical, neurological and psychiatric conditions; (5) no major risk 
factors for vascular disease; and (6) no history of alcohol abuse (Saunders & 
Summers, 2010). People with this condition have been shown to have deficits in 
memory tests, executive function tests assessing processing speed, planning, 
visuospatial tasks and language functions (Conde-Sala et al., 2012; Eppig et al., 
2012; Marshall et al., 2011a; Summers & Saunders, 2012). These deficits are not 
at a level to qualify for a diagnosis of dementia.  
A longitudinal study from 2001 to 2005 in the Aging, Demographics, and 
Memory Study (ADAMS) in the United States followed 180 older people and 
found that in 2002, an estimated 22.2% of people aged 71 and older had MCI 
(Plassman et al., 2008). Sachdev et al. (2015) reviewed 11 longitudinal prevalence 
studies from USA, Europe, Asia and Australia. The crude prevalence rate for MCI 
was 5.9%, which increased with age. The authors found a 4.5% prevalence in 
people aged between 60 and 69, 5.8% among 70 to 79 year olds and 7.1% in 
people between 80 and 89. There have been no published studies on the 
prevalence of MCI in New Zealand. There is an increase in the ageing population 
across the world. The increased prevalence of MCI and the considerable risk of 
them progressing on to dementia makes it a significant burden on society and 
health systems. Sachdev et al. (2015) report a widely-varied rate of MCI 
prevalence internationally, which has potential problems for the planning of 
public health and policies. One of the reasons why the prevalence rates are so 
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varied is because of the discrepancies in the diagnostic criteria of MCI. Consensus 
on the classification criteria, clinical presentation, cognitive and functional 
assessment is needed. 
Diagnosis of MCI 
The diagnosis of MCI has been an ongoing topic of debate and discussion. As a 
part of the first international working group on MCI, Winblad et al. (2004) 
recommended that for people to be diagnosed with MCI, they should not have 
dementia, their functional activities of daily living needed to be preserved or 
showing minimal impairment, and they should have several cognitive domains 
affected. Later, Petersen (2004) described subtypes of MCI that were either 
amnestic or non-amnestic. In order to clarify the criteria for the identification of 
MCI and its subtypes, Jak et al. (2009) reviewed the different classification of 
MCI based on neuropsychological assessments. By 2009, researchers were using 
neuropsychological assessments, clinical judgement, premorbid and clinical 
information from informants or a combination of these to diagnose MCI. 
Neuropsychological assessments typically consist of tests that measure several 
domains. Domains are broad cognitive processes that are distinct from one 
another and include memory, executive functioning, language, speed of 
processing or attention, and visuospatial functioning. The criteria for MCI consist 
of rules for cut-offs used for these tests. Jak et al. (2009) outlined five different 
neuropsychological criteria used to diagnose MCI. The historical criteria, also 
known as the Peterson’s criteria, diagnosed people with MCI if they had a 
subjective memory complaint and their performance on a memory test was at least 
1.5 SD below their age appropriate mean (Petersen et al., 1999). Petersen and 
Morris (2005) then adapted their criteria to include other domains and not just 
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memory. Therefore, for people to receive a diagnosis of MCI according to the 
typical or the Peterson criteria, they had to show 1.5 SD below the mean on any 
one test in at least one domain. The subsequent criteria did not need the person to 
have a cognitive complaint. The comprehensive criteria required the person to 
have at least 1 SD below the mean on two or more tests in a single domain 
(Heaton, Grant, & Matthews, 1992; Heaton, Heaton, & Psychological Assessment 
Resources, 2004). The liberal criteria stated that the individual needed to score 
below 1 SD on any one test of a domain. Lastly, the conservative criteria required 
that patients score 1.5 SD below the mean on at least two tests in a domain.  
Complaints about subjective memory loss is used as a criterion for 
screening for MCI in some studies (Koontz & Baskys, 2005; Kurt, Yener, & 
Oguz, 2011; Seo, Kim, Choi, Lee, & Choo, 2017; Tangen, Engedal, Bergland, 
Moger, & Mengshoel, 2014). Subjective memory loss may be identified by the 
patient (Jean et al., 2010; Kotani et al., 2006) and/or an informant (Buckley et al., 
2015; Leon et al., 2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2010). This is typically 
assessed using a single question to establish memory complaint (e.g., “have you 
noticed your memory has become worse?”) or via a questionnaire (e.g., Memory 
Assessment Clinics Questionnaire (Crook, Feher, & Larrabee, 2005). For 
example, Buckley et al. (2015) used a semi-structured interview to investigate 
various scenarios where the participant had lapses in memory and how they 
recovered from these. The authors of this study also used the Observer Memory 
Questionnaire with the informants to assess the informants’ concern about 
memory lapses in their loved one. Assessment tools like the Prospective and 
Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ), which consists of questions on the 
frequency of prospective and retrospective memory issues experienced by 
participants, have also been used in MCI studies (Ryu, Lee, Kim, & Lee, 2016). 
50 
 
However, studies have also found that subjective memory loss is not necessary or 
sufficient in determining if the person has MCI (Lenehan, Klekociuk, & 
Summers, 2012; Mitchell, 2008; Thompson, Henry, Rendell, Withall, & Brodaty, 
2015).  
The second, and one of the most important criteria for the diagnosis of 
MCI, is the exclusion of dementia. Most people use screening tools as a first point 
of assessment to rule out the possibility of dementia, to identify sub-clinical or 
normal cognitive functioning (Ahmed, De Jager, & Wilcock, 2012). The Mini 
Mental Status Examination (MMSE) (Arevalo-Rodriguez et al., 2015; Giseli de 
Fátima Dos Santos et al., 2016), Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
(Gagnon, Postuma, Joncas, Desjardins, & Latreille, 2010; Julayanont et al., 2015), 
a structured interview with the patient and/or their informant, the Dementia Rating 
Scale (DRS) (Bezdicek et al., 2015; Greenaway, Duncan, Hanna, & Smith, 2012), 
the Clock Drawing Test (Ehreke et al., 2011; Giseli de Fátima Dos Santos et al., 
2016), the telephone-based neurocognitive screening tests (Ehreke et al., 2011), 
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised (ACE-R) (Yoshida et al., 2012) 
and computerised screening measures such as the Computer-administered 
Neuropsychological Screen for Mild Cognitive Impairment (CANS-MCI) 
(Tornatore, Hill, Laboff, & McGann, 2005) are all used. The cut-off used to 
determine MCI for the MoCA or the MMSE differed between studies from ≥23 
(Buschert et al., 2011), ≥ 24 (Petersen et al., 2005; Rapp, Brenes, & Marsh, 2002; 
Smith et al., 2010), ≥26 (Koontz & Baskys, 2005), and between 24 to 28 (Doody 
et al., 2010). In order to determine the efficacy of screening MCI, Ahmed et al. 
(2012) compared the MoCA, MMSE, ACE-R and the CANS-MCI in assessing 
people with MCI and found that the MoCA and the ACER-R showed 90% 
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sensitivity in screening for people with MCI. A similar study evaluated the 
efficacy of the MoCA, ACE-R and the CANS-MCI conducted by de Jager, 
Ahmed-Ali, and Wilcock (2010). It was found that all of the tests, with the 
exception of the MMSE, were useful, but the authors recommended use of the 
MoCA and the ACE-R, as they are relatively shorter. Although screening tools 
provide a quick way of assessing general cognitive functioning, they are not 
necessarily useful or always accurate in identifying those with MCI, especially 
given the different use of cut-offs and the variety of tests available. On the other 
hand, screening tests often provide a quick way of looking into possible deficits 
which then need clarification through more extensive neuropsychological 
assessment. The next step in the process is to administer neuropsychological 
measures. 
The diagnosis of MCI is made by administering a battery of 
neuropsychological tests and determining the level of impairment in each. 
Neuropsychological testing provides important information about the levels of 
impairment, the domain affected and can be used to monitor functioning across 
time (Cullen, Neill, Evans, Coen, & Lawlor, 2007). The neuropsychological tests 
measure domains such as executive functioning, memory, language, attention and 
visuospatial functioning. In the last few years, there have been a multitude of tests 
that have been developed to assess cognitive function. Further, the advent of 
computerised batteries have resulted in such assessments being used widely 
(Snyder et al., 2011), especially in a primary prevention setting, where there are 
often constraints on time spent with patients. There are no widely accepted 
guidelines about the tests that need to be used in the assessment of MCI, and the 
type and domains of tests vary across studies. 
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Another criterion of the diagnosis of MCI is related to unimpaired daily 
living skills. The most visible indicator of dementia is the loss of independence in 
activities of daily living. While some of these activities are basic, like eating, 
dressing oneself and bathing, others are complex like continuing careers, 
managing finances and travelling independently (Perneczky et al., 2006). In other 
words, people with MCI should be able to bathe, dress themselves and eat 
independently, while being worse at complex activities of daily living compared 
to cognitively intact older adults (Lindbergh, Dishman, & Miller, 2016). Almost 
all studies of MCI have assessed activities of daily living, either as a part of a 
general interview (Perneczky et al., 2006) or by using measures such as the Bayer 
Activities of Daily Living Scale (B-ADL) (Perneczky et al., 2006; Reppermund et 
al., 2011), the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) (Marshall et al., 
2011b; Ryu et al., 2016), the Structured Interview for Diagnosis of Dementia of 
Alzheimer type, Multi-infarct Dementia and Dementia of other Aetiology-
Activities of Daily Living Scale (SIDAM-ADL Scale) (Luck et al., 2011), the 
Canadian Occupational Performance Measure (COPM) (Giseli de Fátima Dos 
Santos et al., 2016) and the Groningen Activity Restriction Scale (GRS) among 
others.  
Over the last decade, there has been research in neuro-imaging studies to 
determine biomarkers of MCI. These include examining functional changes in a 
person’s brain using Positron Emission Tomography (PET) (Moulin et al., 2007), 
electroencephalography (EEG) (Timothy, Krishna, & Nair, 2017; Tóth et al., 
2014) or magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Amezquita-Sanchez, Adeli, & Adeli, 
2016; Bruña et al., 2012) while participants performed cognitive tasks like 
working memory tests. This research is still in its early stages and there is no clear 
consensus on the biomarkers of MCI.  
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Subtypes of MCI 
As mentioned above, MCI encompasses a wide range of types of cognitive 
deterioration. This could include executive functions such as planning, reasoning, 
memory functions such as working memory, visuospatial functions and language 
functions. Thus, the neuropsychological profiles of people with MCI are very 
diverse, and this has given rise to the study of various subtypes: single domain 
amnestic MCI (sda-MCI), multiple domain amnestic MCI (mda-MCI), single 
domain non-amnestic MCI (sdna-MCI) and multiple domain non-amnestic MCI 
(mdna-MCI) (Petersen, 2004). The two main subtypes are diagnosed as shown in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. Description of subtypes of MCI 
Subtype of MCI Description 
Amnestic-MCI(a-MCI) Informant-corroborated subjective complaint of 
declining memory functioning 
Objective memory impairment  
No objective attention, working memory or semantic 
language impairment 
Non-amnestic-MCI(na-MCI) Informant-corroborated subjective complaint of 
declining cognitive functioning 
No objective memory impairment 
Objective attention, working memory or semantic 
language impairment 
Adapted from Saunders and Summers (2010) 
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Table 1 shows amnestic and non-amnestic subtypes. Single domain and 
multiple domain subtypes are defined based on the number of domains affected. 
For example, people with a memory domain and a non-memory domain impaired 
would be classified as mda-MCI. Similarly, people with more than one non-
amnestic domain impaired would be classed as mdna-MCI.  
Sachdev et al. (2015) used unified criteria in order to determine prevalence rates of 
MCI and its subtypes in 11 studies across the USA, Europe, Asia and Australia. 
These criteria included studies that showed 1.0 to 2.0 SD below the mean on at least 
one neuropsychological domain, the presence of a memory complaint, the absence 
of dementia and nil or minimum functional impairment. They explored two 
subtypes–a-MCI and na-MCI–and no information regarding single or multiple 
domains was given. They found that naMCI was more prevalent (3.9%) than aMCI 
(2%). They found naMCI was most prevalent in men between ages of 70 and 79, 
compared to men between 60 and 69 years old. For women, naMCI was greater in 
people between the ages of 80 and 89 compared to 70 and 79-year-olds.  
Progression to dementia 
The study of people with MCI is important, because people with MCI have been 
seen as having a greater risk of leading to dementia, and for many people, it is an 
intermediate stage between normal ageing and dementia. Epidemiological and 
longitudinal studies have found that there is an increase in rates of conversion 
from MCI to dementia over time. The most common type of dementia is 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), which constitutes 10.6 to 153 per 100 000 of the 
population. Frontotemporal dementia constitutes 1 to 15.4 per 100 000 of the 
population (Lambert et al., 2014), making it the second most common type of 
dementia (Ballard et al., 2009). The development of symptoms among different 
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types of dementia is varied. The following subsections will describe the main 
types of dementia, the early symptoms and the progression of MCI to the 
particular subtype.  
Progression to Alzheimer’s disease 
The pathological hallmark of AD are amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, 
which affect the cortex of the brain (Mathis, Wang, & Klunk, 2004). In AD, the 
tau protein is abnormal and does not support the microtubule (Perry, 2006). A 
definite diagnosis of AD can only be made be made post mortem (Thal & Braak, 
2005). However, a provisional diagnosis is based on symptoms and some imaging 
techniques. Usually, this begins with a clinical interview with information 
collected from informants or caregivers. Early symptoms of AD are memory loss, 
difficulty performing familiar tasks, problems with language, problems with 
abstract thinking and disorientation in time and place (Mundt, Kaplan, & Greist, 
2001).   
The course of the disease is insidious or starts slowly and gradually gains 
momentum. The annual conversion rate from MCI to AD in the US between the 
years 2000 and 2015 was 40% per year per person (Chen et al., 2017). Since 
memory impairments are one of the hallmarks of the disease, it is not surprising 
that people with amnestic MCI, particularly multiple domain, have a higher risk of 
developing the Alzheimer’s type of dementia (Michaud, Su, Siahpush, & 
Murman, 2016; Tzeyu, Dejun, Mohammad, & Daniel, 2017). A meta-analytic 
study found that 11.7% of single domain amnestic MCI progress on to AD, 12.2% 
multiple domain amnestic MCI converted to AD and a relatively smaller 4.1% of 
non-amnestic MCI converted to AD (Mitchell & Shiri-Feshki, 2009). Lee, 
Ritchie, Yaffe, Cenzer, and Barnes (2014) followed 382 participants with 
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amnestic subtype (95% single-domain, 5%-multiple domain) of MCI for three 
years. These participants were enrolled in the Alzheimer’s disease Neuroimaging 
Initiative (ADNI). The mean age of the group at enrolment was 75 years old. They 
found that 43% of these participants progressed to Alzheimer’s disease in three 
years. They also assessed predictors of risk for AD. These included list-learning 
difficulties, constructional difficulties like drawing a clock and functional issues 
such as shopping alone and forgetting appointments. A few behavioural changes 
such as stubbornness about accepting help, and anxiety around separation from 
caregivers were also noted.   
It may be prudent to conclude, based on these studies, that people with 
subclinical deficits in memory tests were more prone to developing AD as 
opposed to other types of dementia. Although most longitudinal studies like the 
ones listed above have attempted to follow the course of progression from MCI to 
AD, longer time lines would contribute to a better understanding of the possibly 
slower progression in some people. Studies have concluded that some good 
predictors of progression from MCI to dementia are neurological biomarkers 
(Csernansky et al., 2000; Dubois et al., 2007) such as cerebrospinal fluid markers 
(Blennow & Hampel, 2003; Mattsson et al., 2009; Popp et al., 2015), 
neuropsychological assessments (Ewers et al., 2012) and brain imaging (Du et al., 
2001; Ewers et al., 2012).  
Progression to frontotemporal dementia 
Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is progressive atrophy in frontal and temporal 
lobes of the brain (Kril & Halliday, 2004). Frontotemporal dementia is the second 
most common form of dementia, and has an earlier onset, typically before the age 
of 65 (Karageorgiou & Miller, 2014), with people reporting some symptoms in 
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their 50s or 60s and sometimes even earlier in their 40s and 30s (Ratnavalli, 
Brayne, Dawson, & Hodges, 2002). Frontotemporal dementia is usually subtyped 
as either a behavioural or language variant. As the names suggest, the subtypes 
are diagnosed depending on the type of impairment (Rascovsky et al., 2011). The 
behavioural variant of FTD is of particular interest, as it is associated with subtle 
changes in social cognition before the onset of other noticeable changes. People 
with behavioural variant FTD (bvFTD) usually lack insight into their problems 
(Rosness, Haugen, Passant, & Engedal, 2008; Sayantani & Carol, 2013), making 
it harder to identify early or aid treatment. Due to the lower age of onset and 
behavioural changes, these people are often misdiagnosed as having 
neuropsychiatric symptoms such as mood disturbances, psychoses, compulsions, 
anxiety symptoms and agitation (Rongve et al., 2016). Another hallmark of FTD 
is its relative speed of progression as compared with AD. Roberson et al. (2005) 
followed 177 people with FTD and 395 people with AD. They found that people 
with FTD progressed faster than people with AD. Some of the early symptoms of 
FTD are abnormal social behaviours, minor criminal offences such as shoplifting, 
changes in personality, atypical depression and preference for sweeter foods 
(Neary et al., 1998; Passant, Elfgren, Englund, & Gustafson, 2005; Swartz et al., 
1997; Woolley, Khan, Murthy, Miller, & Rankin, 2011). Apathy or the lack of 
energy, enthusiasm or concern are also common early symptoms of FTD 
(Shinagawa, Ikeda, Fukuhara, & Tanabe, 2006), which may be often confused 
with depression and treated accordingly (Bott, Radke, Stephens, & Kramer, 
2014).  
In neuropsychological testing, people with FTD show deficits in executive 
functioning in the early stages and in language functions later on (Bott et al., 
2014; Rascovsky et al., 2011), although deficits in either of the domains are 
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important markers. Smeding and de Koning (2000) found that executive 
functioning tests such as the trail making tests, digit symbol tests and card sorting 
tests were good markers of impairments in executive function in people with 
FTD. Impairment in the language domain of a neuropsychological assessment has 
been also recommended as a distinguishing factor in the diagnosis of MCI and 
AD from FTD (Beck, Schmid, Berres, & Monsch, 2014).  
On the other hand, there are some conflicting reports about episodic 
memory being affected in people with FTD. Hornberger, Piguet, Graham, Nestor, 
and Hodges (2010) found that people with bvFTD had intact episodic memory 
compared to the other variants of FTD. This is an important factor in the diagnosis 
of FTD, as people may often be misdiagnosed as a result. However, it is to be 
noted that although episodic memory is preserved in the initial stages of FTD, it 
may get worse as the disease progresses (Libon et al., 2007). Given that FTD, 
especially the bvFTD, results in changes in social perception, it has been 
suggested that social perception assessments such as the Social Cognition and 
Emotional Assessment (SEA) be used to aid diagnosis (Funkiewiez, Bertoux, de 
Souza, Lévy, & Dubois, 2012).. The SEA consists of subtests from other sources, 
including five subtests assessing emotion recognition, theory of mind, behavioural 
control and apathy. 
Not surprisingly, when looking at progression rates from MCI, the non-
amnestic subtype of MCI was more likely to progress to FTD (Ferman et al., 
2013; Rosenberg et al., 2011; Yaffe, Petersen, Lindquist, Kramer, & Miller, 
2006). Studies examining the progression of MCI have been conducted on the 




There have been a few studies that discuss the conversion from MCI to 
FTD (FTD-MCI). The first study, conducted by de Mendonca, Ribeiro, Guerreiro, 
and Garcia (2004), describes short case descriptions of their seven participants 
who were diagnosed with FTD-MCI according to the author’s proposed criteria. 
In addition to showing impairment in at least one executive functioning test 
(attention, language, graphomotor or conceptual thinking), the criteria included 
early symptoms of apathy, disinhibition, irritability, messiness, obsessions, lack of 
concern for others and aggressiveness. These patients were followed up for almost 
two years, and six out of the seven patients had progressed to FTD. The authors 
used neuropsychological measures that assessed a wide range of cognitive 
domains. The selected patients had difficulties that were largely executive 
functioning deficits, attention, and motor and language skills. The obvious 
limitation to this study is the small number of participants selected. In addition, 
the initial criteria for selection of participants suggest that they already displayed 
symptoms of FTD. Although not an inclusion criterion, five out of the seven 
participants studied had frontotemporal atrophy that was picked up from imaging 
measures, and two of them had a family history of frontotemporal dementia. In 
other words, they were not typical MCI patients but already showed signs of FTD. 
Another study by Yaffe et al. (2006) followed 43 people with multiple domain 
amnestic MCI, 250 people with amnestic MCI and 34 people with single domain 
non-amnestic MCI, longitudinally for five years. They found that all of the 34 
participants (100%) who had a diagnosis of a single non-amnestic subtype of MCI 
progressed to FTD. 
The detection of people who might develop frontotemporal dementia is 
very important, as medical management is different from that of the AD type. 
Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) have shown to improve 
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psychological and behaviour symptoms in people with FTD (Moretti, Torre, 
Antonello, Cazzato, & Bava, 2003). Further, the early diagnosis of naMCI among 
those that may develop into FTD may help in explaining the personality and 
psychological symptoms to the caregivers. With its quicker progression compared 
to other kinds of dementia, early identification is paramount. These, along with 
other reasons like legal considerations, competency decisions, as well as follow-
up care make the early diagnosis of FTD beneficial. There is an increasing 
necessity for other tests sensitive enough to identify early signs of changes in 
behaviour or social perception difficulties.  
Progression to other kinds of dementia 
Studies have examined progression of MCI to other kinds of dementia such as 
vascular dementia and dementia with Lewy bodies (Fujishiro et al., 2012; Zanetti 
et al., 2006). In a study by Yaffe et al. (2006), 50% of participants with amnestic 
MCI, 42% with multiple domain MCI and 8% of participants with single domain 
non-memory MCI progressed to vascular dementia. Few studies have been 
performed on the progression of MCI to dementia due to Lewy bodies.  
Non-progression of MCI 
Although people with MCI have an increased risk of dementia, not all do develop 
the disease. Some people with MCI stay the same, or revert back to normal 
cognition on neuropsychological tests (Brodaty, Connors, Ames, & Woodward, 
2014). An Australian longitudinal study by Brodaty et al. (2014) followed 185 
people with MCI at 3, 6, 12, 24 and 36 months and were assessed on their 
functioning ability using the Functional Autonomy Measurement System 
(SMAF), neuropsychiatric symptoms like delusions, agitation and anxiety, and 
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cognitive functions using the MMSE. They found that only 30% of the 
participants had developed dementia within three years, which meant that more 
than half of their population sample remained the same or may have reverted to 
normal. Predictors of a higher risk for developing dementia included older age, 
lower cognitive ability at baseline, and faster decline in cognitive ability over the 
first six months of follow up. Further, the diagnosis and progression was based on 
the MMSE, which does not necessarily capture the wide range of cognitive 
functions shown by the participants. Some items of the Functional Autonomy 
Measurement System (SMAF), which is rating scale that measures activities of 
daily living, communication, mobility and mental functions is highly prone to the 
clinical judgement of the rater, which was not measured in the study. 
In summary, although studies have found that MCI progresses to different 
types of dementia, it is a small percentage of people who progress, with most others 
remaining the same or reverting to normal cognitive functioning. This indicates that 
MCI cannot just be seen as a prodromal phase of dementia. Mild cognitive 
impairment needs to be seen as a risk factor to developing dementia, and other 
factors such as medical conditions, psychosocial stressors, neuropsychiatric 
conditions and subjective complaints need to be assessed (Klekociuk et al., 2016). 
Clarity in diagnostic criteria, classification of subtypes and further longitudinal 
studies using robust neuropsychological measures are required to make accurate 
assumptions regarding people who are at greater risk of progression to dementia. In 
addition, studies have largely focused on amnestic MCI, which is more likely to 
progress to AD, and there is a need for studies that focus on na-MCI.  
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Social perception in MCI 
There is some evidence that higher-order social perception is dependent on 
cognitive abilities. Further, it has also been seen that healthy older people show 
more deficits in social perception than younger people, but these deficits reduce if 
the tasks used to measure social perception are similar to real life situations. This 
further supports that the changes in cognition in MCI could lead to difficulties in 
social perception. Changes in subtle social perception skills may occur as early 
symptoms in certain types of dementia, for example bvFTD. 
Social perception skills are an important factor in forming and maintaining 
interpersonal relationships, which in turn affects wellbeing and quality of life. 
Changes in social perception as seen in AD, FTD and others may indicate these 
changes begin at an earlier stage, namely MCI. More recently, there have been a 
few studies in the area of social perception, such as emotion recognition and ToM, 
in MCI.  
Emotion recognition in MCI 
Research in the area of the recognition of emotion in MCI is still relatively new and 
developing. However, a number of studies have found that people classified with 
MCI perform poorly in the recognition of certain emotions (Anderson, Simpson, 
Channon, Samuel, & Brown, 2013; Fujie et al., 2008; Henry et al., 2009; McCade, 
Savage, Guastella, Lewis, & Naismith, 2013; McCade, Savage, & Naismith, 2012a; 
Pietschnig et al., 2015; Teng, Lu, & Cummings, 2007; Weiss et al., 2008; Yang et 
al., 2015).  
The latest recent review by Bora and Yener (2017) examined published 
articles of social perception in MCI which included the recognition of emotion. 
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They evaluated ten articles that examined emotion recognition in MCI. The results 
of the meta-analysis showed that people with MCI were impaired in their 
recognition of emotions (medium effect size), particularly with the recognition of 
fear (Henry et al., 2009), sadness and anger (Fujie et al., 2008; McCade, Savage, 
Guastella, Hickie, et al., 2013). The recognition of disgust (Henry et al., 2008), 
happiness (Sarabia-Cobo, García-Rodríguez, Navas, & Ellgring, 2015) and surprise 
(Bora & Yener, 2017) was relatively preserved in people with MCI. Similar results 
were found by another meta-analysis which was carried out by McCade et al. (2012), 
who reviewed six studies of emotion recognition in MCI. The detection of negative 
emotions such as anger, sadness and fear was more affected in MCI. One of the 
reasons why people with MCI performed poorly on recognition of emotions was 
also attributed to their cognitive changes. 
The recognition of emotions in people with deficits in two or more domains 
of cognitive functions, namely multiple domain MCI was associated with a 
significant decline in the performance in emotion recognition (Bora & Yener, 2017). 
In fact, the effect size was similar to that documented in a meta-analysis on emotion 
recognition in AD (Klein-Koerkamp, Beaudoin, Baciu, & Hot, 2012). These studies 
found that the more cognitive deficits a person had, the more likely they were to 
have poor performance on emotion recognition tasks. One of the limitations for 
these studies was the choice of the assessment of the recognition of emotions; they 
used static visual stimuli to assess emotion recognition. The apparent deficits in 
social perception may reduce if the stimuli were closer to real life situations with 
the inclusion of other cues such as prosody and contextual information. One of the 
other limitation of current studies in emotion recognition is that positive emotions 
are largely underrepresented, with most studies assessing more negative emotions 
than positive ones. Further, the deficits in emotion recognition and how they affect 
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everyday living, including social relationships and quality of life, remains to be 
known. In addition, only a few studies have examined social perception in various 
subtypes (single and multiple domain impairments) of MCI. Developing further 
knowledge in this area may provide more consistent information regarding the 
relationship between cognitive abilities and emotion recognition.  
There are a smaller number of studies that have found no differences 
between people with MCI and healthy controls in the recognition of emotions 
(Bediou et al., 2009). A small sample (10) of people with aMCI were compared to 
people with mild and moderate AD and FTD (Bediou et al., 2009). Morphed 
photographs displaying happiness, fear, anger and disgust were used to assess 
emotion recognition. Peterson’s revised criteria were used to diagnose amnestic 
MCI. Information regarding the number of domains impaired was not provided. 
The participants with FTD and AD showed impairment in the recognition of 
negative emotions, and the people with a-MCI did not show any impairments. The 
small sample size, lack of inclusion of other subtypes of MCI and the use of a test 
that was not psychometrically sound make these findings difficult to generalise.  
Of the research that has been conducted, most has focused on a-MCI. We 
now know a-MCI has a higher likelihood of converting to AD than na-MCI. 
Although AD does include changes in social cognition, other types of dementia, 
especially FTD, have more deficits in social perception skills. It is thus important 
to study people who have na-MCI. The study by McCade, Savage, Guastella, Lewis, 
et al. (2013) assessed emotion recognition in naMCI. Eighteen people with non-
amnestic multiple domain MCI, 19 with amnestic multiple domain MCI and nine 
healthy controls were recruited from a clinical setting at the Brain and Mind 
Research Institute in Sydney, Australia. They were assessed on their cognitive 
abilities (Premorbid IQ, working memory, verbal learning and memory, visual 
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memory, language, visuospatial skills, processing speed and executive functioning), 
emotion recognition (FEEST) and recognition of emotional content in complex 
scenes (The Movie Stills Task by Losh et al. (2009)). Participants with naMCI did 
not show any deficits in emotion recognition. In contrast, people with aMCI had 
deficits in recognition of all emotions on the Movie Stills Task and on the 
recognition of anger on the FEEST. Further, controlling for cognition, people with 
aMCI did not show deficits in the recognition of emotion. The other studies that 
have reported no deficits in emotion recognition in people included mainly people 
who met the criteria of single domain MCI.  
People with MCI show deficits in their recognition of emotion, particularly 
in people with multiple domain a-MCI. By choosing more ecologically valid tests 
of recognition of emotions, we may be better able to examine how people with MCI 
perform on social perception tasks without the challenge of a cognitively difficult 
task. This may reduce the effect of cognitive load on the task, thus giving more 
insight into the recognition of emotions in MCI. The deficits seen in the recognition 
of emotion in MCI may also affect one’s capacity in more complex social 
perception skills.  
Higher-order social perception skills in MCI  
Research on social perception in MCI is still in its infancy. Higher-order social 
perception deficits such as ToM and recognition of sarcasm, are documented in 
research (Baglio et al., 2012; Gaudreau et al., 2015b; Maki, Yamaguchi, Koeda, & 
Yamaguchi, 2013; Moreau et al., 2015; Poletti & Bonuccelli, 2013a). Only one 
study has found no deficits in the recognition of higher-order social perception 
skills in people with MCI (Dodich et al., 2016).  
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In the meta-analysis discussed above (Bora & Yener, 2017), seven 
published papers examined complex social perception skills in MCI. Most of the 
studies assessed ToM or mentalising skills and just one studied the recognition of 
sarcasm. ToM was assessed using False Belief Tasks and the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test. Sarcasm was studied using the Metaphoric and Sarcastic Scenario 
Test (MSST) (Adachi et al., 2004). People with MCI had poorer performance in 
tasks that required ToM abilities (medium effect size). The effect size increased (d 
= 0.89) when they analysed people with multiple domain aMCI and reduced (d = 
0.39) with single domain MCI. Thus, widespread cognitive impairment was related 
to more impairment in complex social perception tasks. Two out of the seven 
studies found that the deficits were specifically for the second order ToM skills 
(Baglio et al., 2012; Gaudreau et al., 2015a) (inferring what somebody might think 
about another person’s mental state). These findings suggest that cognitive abilities 
and complex social perception skills are related.  
Assessments that capture the recognition of counterfactual information (i.e., 
sarcasm) can be an important source of information about ToM abilities. One of the 
limited studies that was conducted on the recognition of sarcasm in people with 
MCI was by Maki et al., 2013. Forty-two people with aMCI (mean age, 74), 104 
older healthy controls (mean age, 72), 30 with mild AD (mean age, 78) and 31 
young healthy participants (mean age, 19) took part and completed the Metaphoric 
and Sarcastic Scenario Test (MSST) (Adachi et al., 2004). This tool had been 
developed initially to discriminate people with high functioning pervasive 
developmental disorders from ADHD in Japanese children. It consists of five 
metaphoric and five sarcastic sentences. The understanding of these sentences by 
participants was scored from 1 to 4 and was categorised as literal interpretation, 
following just a part of the sentence, misunderstanding of the sentence, and a 
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completely incorrect answer. People with aMCI showed slight declines in the 
comprehension of sarcasm and this decline was significantly larger in people with 
AD. These findings indicate that the comprehension of sarcasm appears to depend 
on cognitive abilities as well. However, this has not been formally examined in any 
studies to date.  
One of the few studies that have found no differences in higher level social 
perception tasks in people with and without MCI was carried out by Dodich et al. 
(2016) in an experimental study. Dodich et al. (2016) administered a Story-based 
Empathy Task (SET) to participants with AD (12), bvFTD (20) and amnestic MCI 
(15). Participants with MCI did not differ from the healthy participants in their 
performance on the aspects of ToM.  
In conclusion, the research in social perception is limited. People with 
more deficits on cognitive tests are more affected in their recognition of emotions. 
The materials used to date are artificial and cognitively demanding and the poor 
performance on these tests reflects broader cognitive changes.  
Summary and aims of the thesis 
Social perception is an important aspect to developing and maintaining good social 
relationships, which in turn foster positive wellbeing and mental health. Emotion 
recognition is the first step in processing higher-order complex social perception 
skills, such as ToM and recognition of sarcasm and lying. These complex social 
perception abilities are vulnerable to changes in our cognition, which occur due to 
ageing as well as other neurological and developmental conditions.  
With the increase in the ageing population, MCI is likely to be increasingly 
prevalent. Mild cognitive impairment by definition is associated with cognitive 
decline. Currently, it is unclear which aspects of neuropsychological functioning 
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are linked with successful social perception. Given the importance of intact social 
perception in quality of life and wellbeing, there is a need for research to examine 
social perception in MCI.  
To date, assessment of emotion recognition has largely used static pictures 
and unrealistic videos. These may be inaccurate measures, as interactions between 
people involve various other cues such as vocal tone and gestures. Some studies 
have examined ToM and recognition of sarcasm in dementia, but there are no 
studies on MCI. The same is true for the recognition of lying. With the possibility 
of an increase in vulnerability and risk of fraud, as well as the loss of social activity, 
assessing the recognition of higher-order social perception skills such as sarcasm 
and lying is important. The identification of deficits in social perception in a more 
ecologically valid way is paramount in aiding interventions, and thus improving 
mental health. There is, therefore, a need for research on the nature of social 
perception in the ageing population and its association with cognitive functions.  
Aims and Hypotheses 
The use of ecologically valid tests helps to generalise the results to everyday 
situations.   
i) The first aim is to examine social perception in those with and 
without MCI.  
a. It is hypothesised that participants with MCI would be worse 
than participants without MCI at all aspects of social perception, 
particularly the higher-order processes of recognition of sarcasm 
and lying.  
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b. It is also hypothesised that a greater proportion of people with 
multiple domain MCI will have deficits in social perception 
compared to people without MCI.  
 
ii) A second aim was to examine the association between social 
perception and neuropsychological functioning.  
a. It is hypothesised that the recognition of emotion will not be 
related to higher-order cognitive processes, including executive 
functioning, language and memory.  
b. It is hypothesised that the recognition of emotion would affect 
the accuracy of the recognition of higher social perception tasks–
sarcasm and lying.  
c. It is hypothesised that deficits in paradoxical sarcasm will be 
related to language difficulties.  
d. It was hypothesised that the recognition of lying would correlate 
to some of the higher-order cognitive functions, especially 
executive functions and language.    
iii) The third aim of the current study was to examine the differences 
between the recognition of positive and negative emotions among 
older people. 
a. It was hypothesised that older adults would perform worse on 
the recognition of negative emotions, compared to the 
recognition of positive emotions. 
iv) The final aim of the study was to examine the relationship between 
social functioning and social perception  
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a. It was hypothesised that people with deficits on social perception 








Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the School of Psychology 
Research and Ethics Committee at the University of Waikato (13:02) and the 
Health and Disability Ethics committee (HDEC) (16/NTA/68) to recruit 
participants through the Waikato and Bay of Plenty District Health Boards 
(DHB).  
Participants 
Recruitment of participants for this study was conducted in two ways–from the 
community and through the local DHBs. The first phase of the community 
recruitment included all people above the age of 50 while the second one included 
participants who had complaints of changes in their cognition (advertisements in 
appendix A and B).  
Initially, participants were recruited via advertisements in various places in 
the community such as at laundromats, GP practices, supermarkets, shops, around 
20 rest homes in Hamilton and Cambridge, online community notice boards, 
social and cultural clubs and social media websites such as Facebook. The study 
was also advertised and published in the local newspapers in the Waikato region.  
The inclusion criteria for the study were people above the age of 50, 
English speaking (as standardised administration of tests requires fluency in 
English), and with adequate visual and auditory functions along with hand 
mobility, as the tests required these faculties.  
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Participants interested in taking part completed three screening tests with 
the following cut-offs. The participants that scored below 26 on the MoCa were 
excluded to rule out dementia or other possible neurological problems. They were 
excluded if they had a score of ≥4 on the Geriatric Depression Scale and ≥8 on the 
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test to rule out depression and alcohol abuse 
respectively. Along with these, there were other exclusion criteria.  
Exclusion criteria included participants who had a formal diagnosis of 
dementia or had a history of significant traumatic brain injury or any other 
neurological illness. The presence of a history of traumatic brain injury was 
determined by asking if the participant had been hospitalised following a head 
injury. Participants under treatment for depression, anxiety disorders or any other 
psychiatric illness were also excluded from the study.  
Of the 60 participants (see Figure 2.1) who initially volunteered to take 
part, three were not eligible. Of these, one had a high AUDIT score, one of them 
was diagnosed and undergoing treatment for depression and one of them had a 
low score on the MoCa.  
We then advertised for participants above the age of 50 who had a 
subjective complaint of decline in cognitive functioning, including but not 
exclusive to memory functioning. Of the 49 people (see Figure 2.2) who 
responded to the second advertisement, 39 participants were eligible and 
completed the assessments. Of the 10 volunteers who were ineligible, one 
participant withdrew due to lack of time, one participant had a head injury, two 
participants had a low MoCA score and six participants had a high AUDIT score. 
The final community sample consisted of 96 participants (see Figure 2.3); 
27 (28.13 %) were male and 69 (71.9 %) were female. Their age ranged from 50 
to 83 years (M = 62.74, SD = 8.1). Fifty-one (53.13%) of the participants were 
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married, 19 (19.8 %) were divorced, eight (8.3 %) were in de facto relationships, 
ten (10.42 %) were widowed, four had never been married and four were 
separated from their partners. Seventy-nine (82.3 %) were New Zealand 
European, seven (7.3 %) were of New Zealand or Cook Island Māori descent and 
the others were from other ethnicities which included Australians, English, South 
African, South African-Indian and Irish.  
Additional participants were recruited through the Older Persons 
Rehabilitation Services (OPRS) and the Mental Health Service for Older People 
(MHSOP) at Waikato District Health Board (WDHB) and Bay of Plenty District 
Health Board (BOPDHB). The inclusion criteria for this sample was a provisional 
or definite diagnosis of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) given in the last 8 years 
by a general physician, geriatrician or a psychologist. This list was generated from 
the WDHB and the BOPDHB. Exclusion criteria involved the presence of a 
diagnosis of dementia, regular use of illicit substances, history of neurological 
conditions including stroke, head injury and other conditions, and if they were 
undergoing treatment for a serious psychiatric condition. Although all the 
measures were administered to the clinical sample, the MoCA and GDS were not 
used as screening tools for exclusion of participants, as they had received a formal 
diagnosis of MCI.  
A letter (see Appendix E) explaining the study along with the information 
sheet (see Appendix F) was mailed to eligible participants and followed up with a 
phone call a week after posting the letter.  
Ninety participants (see Figure 4) with a diagnosis of MCI were identified 
from the WDHB clinical files, and ten participants were from the BOPDHB. Of 
these, 14 had incorrect contact details (either wrong phone numbers or their letters 
were returned because of wrong details), one was deceased, eight had developed 
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dementia, two had multiple head injuries, and 54 were not interested in taking part 
in the study. Out of the 21 consenting and eligible participants, 19 were from the 
WDHB and two from the BOPDHB. Eleven (52.4 %) were male and ten 
(47.62 %) were female. Their age ranged from 46 to 88 (M =72.24, SD=10.4). 
Eleven participants were married, one was divorced, seven were widowed and one 
had never been married. Sixteen participants identified as New Zealand European, 
three were Māori, and there was one each from Dutch and Swedish descent. 
In addition to the participants, informants (when available) were contacted 
to complete two questionnaires (explained below) as well as a few questions about 
some demographic information. Of the 96 participants from the community 
sample, questionnaires were completed with 60 informants. Their age ranged from 
20 to 84 years (M =57.63, SD=14.7). Thirty-four of the informants were female 
and 26 were male. Thirty-six of them were either husbands, wives or partners of 
the participants, 11 were children of the participants, five of them were friends of 
the participants, and there were two colleagues, two siblings and all the rest were 
other relatives such as cousins. Fourteen out of the 21 participants from the DHB 
sample provided informant questionnaires as well. Their ages ranged from 35 to 
86 years (M =62.21, SD=15.7). Most of the informants (10) from the DHB sample 
were either husbands, wives or partners of the participants, and four were the 





Figure 2. 1 Flow chart of initial community recruitment 
 







Figure 2. 3 Flow chart of total community recruitment 
 




All the participants completed measures described below. The assessments are 
broadly divided into demographic and background information, screening 
measures, test of social perception, neuropsychological assessments, social 
functioning measures and informant measures. The measures were selected based 
on measures used by other researchers and the availability of norms for the age 
group of this study.  
Demographic and background information  
A study-specific questionnaire was designed to collect demographic and 
additional information about the participants. The questionnaire requested 
information about demographics (date of birth, gender, marital status, ethnicity, 
handedness and education), health problems (hearing, sight and mobility, history 
of or a formal diagnosis of dementia, head injury, concussions, stroke, 
developmental disabilities, multiple sclerosis [MS], seizures/epilepsy and any 
other neurological/organic illness) as well as formal diagnosis of any mental 
health difficulties.  
Participants were also asked to provide information about their 
relationship status (single/never been married, married, de facto, divorced or 
widowed), medications and driving status.  
Screening measures 
The eligibility measures assessed alcohol use, depression and overall cognitive 
function. The following are the measures used. 
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The Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT) (Saunders, 
Aasland, Babor, de la Fuente, & Grant, 1993). The AUDIT is a widely-used 
screening tool to identify hazardous and excessive use of alcohol consumption, 
developed by the World Health Organization (WHO). It has been used in a range 
of populations (Allen, Litten, Fertig, & Babor, 1997; Allen, Reinert, & Volk, 
2001). The AUDIT has been widely used in the older population across various 
cultures and languages, as a screening measure for alcohol abuse, as older adults 
are more vulnerable to the effects of alcohol as compared to a younger population, 
due to an increased risk of disease and possible interaction with medications 
(Aalto, Alho, Halme, & Seppä, 2011). The AUDIT has been widely used in the 
older population across various cultures and languages, as a screening measure for 
alcohol abuse (Chavez et al., 2016; Crome, Crome, Rao, & Crome, 2014; 
Nadkarni, Murthy, Crome, & Rao, 2013). The AUDIT was administered as an 
oral interview with the participants. The test takes about 10 minutes to complete 
and consists of 10 structured questions scored on a 0 to 4 ordinal scale. The items 
address alcohol consumption as well as the negative consequences experienced 
while drinking alcohol, including morning drinking, guilt following drinking, 
blackouts, alcohol related injuries and other people being concerned about 
drinking. Reliability coefficients range from 0.59 to 0.91(Shields & Caruso, 
2003). Scores of 8 or more are considered as indicators of hazardous and harmful 
use of alcohol and an even higher score could indicate alcohol dependence. People 
who obtained a score over 8 were excluded from the current study.  
 
The Geriatric Depression Scale–short form (GDS) (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986); 
Yesavage et al. (1982). The GDS is a self-report tool that assesses depression in 
older adults. The GDS short form was developed in 1986 and consists of 15 items. 
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It has been used in community and inpatient clinical settings (D'Ath, Katona, 
Mullan, Evans, & Katona, 1994; Mitchell, Bird, Rizzo, & Meader, 2010). The 
GDS is answered dichotomously (yes/no) and questions people on their subjective 
depression experienced in the last week. A meta-analysis of 69 studies of the 
diagnostic validity of the GDS short form found 81.3% sensitivity and a 78.4% 
specificity, making it a “good” screening tool but a poor diagnostic tool (Mitchell 
et al., 2010). The GDS short form has robust reliability and validity. A validation 
study found a correlation of 0.84 with the long version of the GDS (Yesavage & 
Sheikh, 1986) and high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.80) in a clinical 
population (D'Ath et al., 1994). Cronbach alpha coefficients in a cognitively intact 
general population depict acceptable internal consistency reliability of 0.75 
(Friedman, Heisel, & Delavan, 2005). Scores above 5 are suggestive of depression 
and above 10 have a definite indication of depression. Depression may also show 
neuropsychological deficits in people; therefore, people above the score of 4 on 
the GDS were excluded in this study.  
 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) (Nasreddine et al. (2005). The MoCA 
was developed in order to comprehensively screen major cognitive domains to 
detect early stages of impairment in neurodegenerative conditions such as 
Alzheimer’s disease. The entire assessment takes about 10 minutes to complete. 
The MoCA is currently used in over 100 countries and is currently available in 46 
languages and dialects, including five versions in Chinese (Chen et al., 2016). The 
MoCA has been widely used in studies with older adults (Del Brutto, Mera, Del 
Brutto, & Sedler, 2016; Julayanont et al., 2015; Kopecek et al., 2016; Larouche et 
al., 2016; Pendlebury, Klaus, Mather, de Brito, & Wharton, 2015; Suzuki et al., 
2015; Sweet et al., 2011) in populations with dementia (Brown et al., 2016; 
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Gluhm et al., 2013; Van Steenoven et al., 2014) and MCI (Gagnon et al., 2010; 
Julayanont, Brousseau, Chertkow, Phillips, & Nasreddine, 2014; Mei et al., 2016). 
It has also been used in other populations, such as those with psychiatric 
conditions (Gierus et al., 2015; Wu, Dagg, & Molgat, 2014) and other 
neurological conditions such as stroke (Del Brutto et al., 2016), traumatic brain 
injury (De Guise et al., 2013) and epilepsy (Phabphal & Kanjanasatien, 2011). 
The MoCA has two alternate versions to enable retesting in clients. The MoCA 
consists of 22 items that assess visuospatial functioning, naming abilities, 
memory, attention, language, abstraction and orientation. 
 Internal consistency for the MoCA was good with a Cronbach alpha of 0.83 
(Nasreddine et al., 2005). The MoCA showed good correlations with MMSE 
(r=0.66, p<.001) and with the Dementia Rating Scale (r=0.77, p<.001). The 
criterion validity for the cognitive domains were also well supported. Receiver 
operator characteristic (ROC) analysis helps analyse sensitivity and specificity of a 
test. The area under the receiving operating characteristic curve (AUC) for memory 
was 0.86, executive function was 0.79 and visuospatial function was 0.79 (Lam et 
al., 2013). Scores range from 0 to 30. One point is added to the final score for people 
who have had less than 12 years of education. Scores between 18 and 26 are 
suggestive of mild cognitive impairment, 10 to 17 of moderate cognitive 
impairment and scores less than 10 denote severe cognitive impairment. The MoCA 
showed 87% specificity in excluding cognitively normal older adults and high 
sensitivity (100%) and specificity (87%) to detect mild Alzheimer’s disease 
(Nasreddine et al., 2005). Version one was used in this study. A cut-off score of 26 
has shown 90% sensitivity of diagnosing MCI clients (Nasreddine et al., 2005), and 




The Awareness of Social Inference Test-Revised (TASIT); (McDonald et al., 
2003a). The TASIT is an ecologically valid test (McDonald, Flanagan, Martin, & 
Saunders, 2004) designed to assess disorders in social cognition using real-life 
stimuli in the form of videoed vignettes of professional actors engaged in 
conversation. It is the first published test that uses video vignettes to assess 
subtleties in perception of emotion, sarcasm and lies.  
The TASIT was initially developed for people with traumatic brain injury 
(Dimoska, McDonald, Pell, Tate, & James, 2010; McDonald et al., 2003a) but has 
also been used in adolescents (McDonald et al., 2015) and older people (Burdon et 
al., 2016; F. Kumfor et al., In press), and those with schizophrenia (Bratton et al., 
2017; Gattoni et al., 2015; Kern et al., 2009; Rocca et al., 2016; Sparks et al., 2010), 
autism (Zimmerman, Ownsworth, Donovan, Roberts, & Gullo, 2016), eating 
disorders (Gramaglia et al., 2016), people with different types of dementia (Kumfor 
& Piguet, 2013; Rapp & Wild, 2011) including Alzheimer’s disease (Henry et al., 
2008) and frontotemporal dementia (Kipps et al., 2009; Kumfor et al., Rankin et al., 
2009). Although developed in Australia, it has also been adapted and used in 
different cultures (Burdon et al., 2016; Westerhof-Evers, Visser-Keizer, McDonald, 
& Spikman, 2014).  
The TASIT is comprised of three parts, assessing basic emotion recognition 
through to the ability to grasp aspects of communication. There are two forms 
available for the TASIT: form A and form B. Form A was used for this study. No 
significant differences were found between the form A and B (McDonald et al., 
2003a). Part one of the TASIT assesses the person’s ability to identify the six basic 
emotions–happiness, surprise, sadness, anger, revolt, anxiety and a neutral emotion. 
The recognition of happiness, surprise and neutral emotions are classified as 
positive emotions. Sadness, anger, anxiety and revolt are classified as negative 
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emotions. Twenty-eight scenes are presented on a screen displaying either one or 
two actors enacting a particular emotion. Each scene lasts from 15 to 60 seconds, 
and at the end of the scene, the participant is asked to point to the emotion from a 
stimulus card that best describes the emotion conveyed in that scene. The six basic 
and neutral emotions are presented in a random order on five different response 
cards. Their answer is noted on the record form. Each correct response receives one 
point. Each emotion has four video vignettes, each giving a maximum possible 
score of 28.  
The complex or higher order social perception tests include the adequate 
recognition of sincere exchanges, simple sarcastic and paradoxical sarcastic 
exchanges, recognition of lying, sarcasm and the total scores for the social 
inference-minimal and social inference-enriched subtests of the TASIT. Part 2 and 
3 of the TASIT tap into higher order social perception skills. Part 2 of the TASIT 
is called social inference-minimal (SI-M) and consists of 15 video vignettes lasting 
20 to 60 seconds depicting conversations between two or more people. In five of 
these vignettes, the conversation is sincere. In the remaining 10 vignettes, 
exchanges are of a sarcastic nature, where the speaker means the opposite of what 
has been spoken.  
Social inference-enriched (SI-E) is the third part of the TASIT. It consists 
of 16 video vignettes similar to SI-M lasting between 15 and 60 seconds. Eight of 
the scenes convey a message that is the opposite of what the main speaker believes; 
in other words, a lie. These are intended to deceive for the sake of diplomacy. The 
other half of the vignettes involve lies as well but with cues that indicate that the 
speaker aims to highlight the truth rather than minimise it.  
At the end of each scene in SI-M and SI-E, the participant is asked to answer 
four questions with a “yes” or a “no.” For example, in one scene, Ruth is folding 
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clothes, while Gary reads a book and Ruth tries to pressurise Gary into helping her 
using sarcastic comments. The first question focuses on what the participant thinks 
the person is doing to the other person: “Is Ruth trying to pressure Gary into helping 
her?” The second question is what they think someone is trying to say to the other 
person, as in the message they are trying to get across. In this case “Is she trying to 
say it’s OK if he doesn’t help her?” The third question focuses on what they think 
someone is thinking or what their underlying belief is, which may be different from 
what they are saying–“Does she think he should stop what he is doing and help 
her?” Finally, the last question is what the participant thinks someone is feeling or 
what the emotion is that they feel or how they feel towards the other person or the 
situation. In the example, the question asked was “Is she annoyed with him?”  
For each correct answer, a point is scored. Therefore, each vignette warrants 
a maximum possible score of four. SI-M generates total scores for sincere 
exchanges, simple and paradoxical sarcasm scores. The total score for the SI-M is 
the summation of sincere, simple and paradoxical sarcasm. The sum of scores of 
some of the items of SI-E is recorded as total lie scores and others are sarcasm 
scores. The total score for the SI-E is the sum of lies and sarcasm scores. For this 
thesis, the total scores of emotion recognition, sincere exchanges, simple sarcasm, 
paradoxical sarcasm, total of SI-M, lie score, sarcasm score and total of SI-E have 
been used.  
The entire test takes about 45 to 60 minutes to complete, and the responses 
are scored using the TASIT manual. The manual provides norms for populations 
with traumatic brain injury, adolescents and more recently, older people (Mcdonald 
& Flanagan, 2017). The TASIT was designed to be a criterion referenced test and, 
therefore, has strong ceiling effects and low variability for social perception within 
the normal range (McDonald et al., 2003a). The ecological validity of the TASIT 
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has been established. McDonald et al. (2004) videotaped 21 participants with TBI 
having a spontaneous conversation with a partner. This was rated using a 
Behavioural Referenced Rating System of Intermediate Social Skills-Revised 
(BRISS-R) (Wallander, Conger, & C. Conger, 1985). The TASIT correlated with 
spontaneous social behaviour, showing high levels of ecological validity. The 
TASIT was chosen for this study because it is a more ecologically valid test that 
measures social perception by taking into consideration verbal and nonverbal 
aspects of communication such as tone of voice, contextual information and body 
language.  
Neuropsychological functioning 
Studies of cognition in ageing, MCI and dementia show difficulties across 
multiple domains of cognition (Collie, Maruff, & Currie, 2002; Perri et al., 2005; 
Rolstad et al., 2009; Simon, Yokomizo, & Bottino, 2012; Underwood et al., 
2017). The cognitive domains assessed in this study were selected based on 
previous research. They include memory, language, executive functioning and 
visuospatial abilities. After completing the assessments with the community 
participants, a principal components factor analysis was performed  using the raw 
scores from the cognitive assessment to see if if the test loaded on the prespecified 
cognitive Eighteen of the tests used as a part of the cognitive assessment were 
subjected to principal axis factoring to assess the dimensionality of the data. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin was 0.793 which is well above the recommended threshold 
of 0.6 and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance 
indicating the correlations were sufficiently large for exploratory factor analysis. 
The number of factors was decided based on eigenvalues and inspection of the 
scree plot. These components or factors were then rotated using a varimax 
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orthogonal rotation and interpreted by considering only those variables with a 
factor loading magnitude of 0.40 or greater. These factors were used to determine 
which test loaded on each cognitive domain. Table 2 summarises the five factors 
that were extracted.  
Attention is a difficult domain to define as this neuropsychological skill is a 
required for any of the tests. Hence, the tests that loaded on the ‘attention’ domain 
were allocated to the cognitive domains described   in each test manual. Colour 
naming and word reading tests that loaded on Attention were allocated to the 
language domain, and the color word interference was moved to executive 
functioning domain. Further, the GMCT which loaded on the executive 
functioning domain was placed under the visuospatial domain as it was more 
appropriate.   The final tests and their corresponding domains are illustrated in 




Table 2. Factor and factor loadingsa from principal components factor analysis using 18 raw scores of neuropsychological measuresb 









Letter fluency (DKEFS) -.135 -.160 -.103 -.702 .090 
Category Fluency (DKEFS) .150 -.116 .023 -.817 -.241 
Category Switching (DKEFS .123 -.166 .203 -.510 .099 
Logical memory .295 .010 .484 .132 .117 
ISRL .168 -.189 .571 -.087 .062 
OCL .188 .165 .718 -.108 -.417 
ONB -.334 .282 .582 -.390 .219 
TWOB -.109 -.317 .747 .104 .211 
Color Naming .111 -.784 -.048 -.161 -.117 
Word reading -.081 -.873 .001 -.010 -.025 
Color word interference .030 -.697 .224 -.126 .065 
Number sequencing trial 
making 
.385 .177 .043 -.331 .487 
Color word inhibition 
switching 
.227 -.384 -.008 -.211 .452 
GMCT .078 .047 .085 .092 .852 
Visual scanning Trials .674 -.231 -.106 -.179 .101 
Letter sequencing Trials .621 .051 .023 -.184 .383 
Number letter sequencing .500 .039 .114 -.371 .261 
ROCFT .741 -.008 .157 .135 -.072 
aFactor loadings represent the correlation between the individual variable and each factor (after rotation); bold font and shading indicates magnitude of factor loadings above 0.40 
bPCFA was implemented on the raw scores of neuropsychological measures. 
Abbreviation: DKEFS, Delis Kaplan Executive System; WMS, Wechsler Memory Scale; ISRL, International Shopping List Test; OCL, One Card Learning; ONB, One Back Test; TWOB, Two 
Back Test; GMCT, Gordon Maze Chase Test; ROCFT, Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure Test 
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The CogState Research Test Battery (www.cogstate.com ) is a reliable and valid 
computerised touch screen assessment of cognitive function including 
psychomotor performance, attention, memory, and executive functioning. The 
CogState consists of a number of individual tasks, which can be put together to 
form a test battery. All of the subtests are designed for repeated administration 
with minimal learning effects. The CogState has been used widely in aging 
studies (Harrington et al., 2017), Alzheimer’s disease (Snyder et al., 2016), 
frontotemporal dementia, cognitive impairment in older people due to HIV (Bloch 
et al., 2016; Underwood et al., 2017) as well as in the measurement of cognitive 
dysfunction in issues such as depression (Davis et al., 2017), schizophrenia 
(Benoit, Harvey, Bherer, & Lepage, 2016), and medical conditions (Kok, Koerts, 
Tucha, Scheeren, & Absalom, 2017; Sands et al., 2017). The CogState has also 
been used successfully in the screening and assessment of people with MCI (Lim 
et al., 2015). For the purposes of this study, five subtests were used, which took 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. They were presented on a computer and 
followed the same order of presentation. The test started with the International 
Shopping List Test (memory domain), the chase task (visuospatial functioning 
domain), one back test (memory domain), two back test (memory domain) and 
ended with the delayed recall of the International Shopping List Test (memory 
domain).  
All raw test scores of the five tests used were log-transformed or arcsine 
root-transformed according to the CogState manual guidelines. Norms in the 
manual ranged from 15 to 90 years of age.  
 
International Shopping List Test. This subtest assesses verbal learning and 
memory using a word list-learning paradigm. Shopping list tests have been 
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commonly used due to their sensitivity of detecting mild verbal learning and 
verbal memory issues (Thompson et al., 2011). During the test, the researcher 
reads out a list of words of shopping items as they appear on the screen of the 
computer. The participant was then asked to recall as many items as they can 
remember from the list. The same list is presented to the participant three times 
and then after a delay. The total number of correct responses made in 
remembering the list after a delay is recorded. This test takes about five minutes 
to complete. The total number of words recalled over three trials were recorded 
and the higher the score, the better the performance. The total number of correct 
items recalled after the delay was used in this study.  
 
Chase Task. This subtest uses a stylus to chase a target as it moves through a grid 
on the screen. This test assesses reaction time and attention span. The test begins 
after a practice with no time limit. The primary outcome for this test is moves per 
second. Lower scores indicate better performance. 
 
One Card learning. The one card learning test assessed visual memory using a 
pattern separation paradigm. A playing card appeared in the centre of the screen 
and the participant had to indicate if they had seen the card before in this test. 
They had to make a decision as quickly as possibly by indicating yes (right click 
on the mouse) or no (left click on the mouse). The test began after a short, timed 
practice to ensure the participant understood the task. The accuracy of response 
was the primary outcome of this test (the arcsine transformation of the square root 




One Back Task. The one back test assessed working memory and attention using 
an n-back paradigm. A playing card appeared in the centre of the screen and the 
participant had to decide if the card was the same as the one shown just before. 
The participant had to work as quickly as possible using the mouse in the same 
way as in the one card learning test. The speed and accuracy of performance was 
generated for scoring. The reaction time was used as the measure of performance 
in this study. Lower scores on speed indicated better performance.  
 
Two Back Task. The two back test also assesses working memory and attention. 
The test is similar to the one back test but the participant had to decide if the card 
was the same as the one shown before the previous card or two cards back. The 
reaction time was generated for scoring. Low scores on speed indicated better 
performance.  
 
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS); (Delis, Kaplan, & 
Kramer, 2001). The D-KEFS is a well validated measure consisting of nine 
subtests designed to assess a variety of verbal and nonverbal aspects of executive 
functioning, including concept formation, inhibition, flexibility of thinking and 
problem solving. It has been designed to be used in a flexible manner, using 
selected subtests to suit the specific research question or a client’s presenting 
problem (Delis, E. Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Each subtest is presented in an 
interactive game-style way.  
The D-KEFS was standardised on a stratified sample of 1750 healthy 
participants aged from 8 to 89 years of age. The D-KEFS showed a moderate to 
high split-half reliability for its subtests. For example, the letter fluency condition 
was .68-.90, the colour-word interference test was .62 to .86 Delis et al., 2001). 
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The D-KEFS is a well validated test. There were good inter-correlations between 
subtest as well as with similar cognitive tests. Moderate correlations were found 
between the DKEFS California Card Sorting Test (CCST) and the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST). The D-KEFS also show reasonable sensitivity in 
distinguishing between different clinical groups, including schizophrenia, foetal 
alcohol syndrome and chronic alcoholism. The D-KEFS was also found to be an 
ecologically valid test. The trail making, design fluency, verbal fluency and the 
tower tests from the D-KEFS were administered to older adults between the ages 
of 65 and 92. These measures accounted for approximately 26% of the variance in 
observed functional ability (r=.66) (Mitchell & Miller, 2008).  
Not only has the D-KEFS been used in cognitive studies in the older 
population (Berg, Swan, Banks, & Miller, 2016; Jefferson, Poppas, Paul, & 
Cohen, 2007; Mowszowski, Lampit, Walton, & Naismith, 2016), it has also been 
used in MCI (Delprado et al., 2012; Jefferson et al., 2006; Lindbergh et al., 2016), 
dementia (Gansler, Huey, Pan, Wasserman, & Grafman, 2017), traumatic head 
injuries (Cook, Katzenstein, McDonald, & Highley, 2014; Mayfield, Reyes, 
Mayfield, & Allen, 2014), frontal lobe lesions (Keifer & Tranel, 2013), stroke 
(Wolf, Stift, Connor, & Baum, 2010, Wolf & Rognstad, 2013), multiple sclerosis 
(Parmenter et al., 2007; Weinstock-Guttman et al., 2011) and psychiatric disorders 
like schizophrenia (Muñoz Negro, Ibáñez Casas, Ballesteros Ramos, Busaileh 
Salas, & Cervilla Ballesteros, 2013; Ryder, Lambert, & Blaszczynski, 2010).  
For the purposes of this study, three subtests (colour word interference, verbal 
fluency and trial making test) were used, which took approximately 15–20 
minutes to complete. Scoring was carried out according to the manual’s 
instructions. All the raw scores were converted to scaled scores (M=10 and SD=3) 
according to the manual. Higher scores indicate better performance. Each subtest 
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of the D-KEFS generates primary and optional scores, which are sometimes called 
the contrast scores. Further, error scores are also generated. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the primary scaled scores were used.  
 
Colour Word Interference Test. There are four conditions in the subtest that 
assesses cognitive flexibility, and it is based on the classic Stroop test (Stroop, 
1935). The entire subtest was administered using standardised instructions. In the 
first condition, the participant was required to name the blocks of colours in the 
test. In the second condition, they were asked to read out words of the colours. In 
the third condition, the participant was asked to inhibit reading coloured words 
while naming the colour. In the fourth condition, the participant was asked to 
switch between naming the colour and reading the conflicting word. The time 
taken and the errors made were recorded. The manual was used to record the 
scaled score  
 
Trail Making Test. There are three conditions in this subtest assessing visual 
scanning and attention, flexibility of thinking and working memory. In the first 
condition, participants strike out the number 3 as quickly as they can. In the 
second condition, participants draw a line from one number to another in 
numerical order. In the third condition, participants alternate connecting letters 
and numbers in numerical and alphabetical order. The total time taken to complete 
each condition was recorded in the summary sheet, and, once again, this was 
converted to the scaled score, which was used in this study.  
 
Verbal Fluency Test. There are three conditions to this subtest assessing letter 
fluency, category fluency and category switching. In the first condition, 
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participants are required to generate as many words as they can within a minute 
that begin with a certain letter (F, A and S). The number of correct responses were 
recorded and converted into scaled scores which was used in this study. In the 
second condition, participants are required to generate as many words that belong 
to a semantic category (animals and boy’s names). The correct number of 
responses which were converted to scaled scores for the first two subtests were 
used in this study. In the third condition, the participants are required to alternate 
between two semantic categories (fruits and furniture) for a minute. The total 
correct number of switching responses were recorded and converted to the scaled 
scores. This was then used for this study.  
 
Logical Memory I of the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) (Wechsler, 1987). The 
WMS is a neuropsychological measure designed to measure different memory 
functions. The logical memory subtest of the WMS is a widely-used test in 
screening cognitively healthy older adults from people with MCI or mild 
dementia (Gavett et al., 2016; Gavett et al., 2009; Rabin et al., 2009; Sei, 
Christine, Kristine, Irena Stijacic, & Deborah, 2007). It is one of the standard tests 
used in the assessment of people with MCI, for instance in the Alzheimer's 
Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI), one of the largest studies of MCI 
progression (Petersen et al., 2010). It has also been used in other populations such 
as dementia (Chapman et al., 2016). 
Memory tests based on prose or stories have shown ecological validity in 
assessing people with memory complaints. The participant is asked to listen to two 
different stories and is then asked to immediately recall the story just heard. Story 
A and story B were both presented verbally. A shorter story is used for older adults 
(Holdnack, Drozdick, Weiss, & Iverson, 2013). Therefore, adults over the age of 
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69 are administered the shorter story. Each correct part shown on the recording form 
for each story recalled is given a score of one. This is then summed and converted 
to a scaled score according to the manual, which was used in this study. 
 
The Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure Drawing Test (ROCFT) (Osterrieth, 1944; 
Rey, 1941). The ROCFT is a test used to assess visuospatial and constructional 
abilities. The complex drawing was presented to the participant and they were asked 
to copy the drawing to the best of their ability in their own time. The ROCFT has 
been widely used in MCI studies (Gu et al., 2017; Horr, Messinger-Rapport, & 
Pillai, 2015; Marková, Laczó, Andel, Hort, & Vlček, 2015; Tsolaki et al., 2011; 
Zhou & Jia, 2009) as well as in cognitively healthy older adults (Jabourian et al., 
2014). The copy test alone was used in this study. This test takes about 2 minutes 
to administer. For the copying task, the inter-rater reliability is reported to be r=0.96 
(p<0.0001) (Caffarra, Vezzadini, Dieci, Zonato, & Venneri, 2002). The entire 
drawing is broken down into 18 units and scored according to the manual. Points 
of 0 to 2 are assigned to each of the 18 units depending on the exactness and the 
placement of the drawing. The raw scores are then converted to T scores as 
elaborated in the manual (Meyers & Meyers, 1995). Possible scores range from 0 
to 36.   
Social Functioning Measures 
The participants completed these measures in order to supplement information 
regarding their social activities.  
 
The Social Activity Log (SAL); (Syrjala, Stover, Yi, Artherholt, & Abrams, 2010b). 
The SAL assesses the frequency and variety of social activities outside of 
94 
 
everyday responsibilities. The SAL has been used largely in cancer settings 
(Syrjala, Stover, Yi, Artherholt, & Abrams, 2010a). It has 15 items and questions 
focus on the frequency of various activities like shopping, social events and 
interaction with friends and family in a typical month of the person’s life. The 
three subscales of the SAL are non-contact events (receiving and sending emails, 
talking on the telephone), regular events (participating in sports/games, coffee, 
tea, other drinks, visits to homes and from others) and special events (social 
events, concerts, theatre, museums, art exhibits, etc.). This assessment takes 
around 10 minutes to complete and was used as an adjunct to the background 
information collected. The SAL has good internal consistency, Cronbach α of 
0.82 (Syrjala et al., 2010a). A higher total score means an increased frequency of 
social activities in the person’s life. For the purposes of this study, the total scores 
for the three subscales and the total score was used.  
 
The Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS-6); (Lubben et al., 2006). The LSNS 
was specifically devised to address the social network of the older population 
(Gabrielson & Holston, 2014; Gabrielson, Holston, & Dyck, 2014; James Lubben, 
Blozik, Gillmann, & Iliffe, 2006; Vilar-Compte, Vargas-Bustamante, & Lubben, 
2018) and is also sometimes used to identify social isolation in older adults 
(Lubben & Gironda, 2003a). It consists of six items that measure quantity, 
emotional closeness and frequency of contact with family and friends.  
It has a good internal consistency of 0.74 (Gabrielson & Holston, 2014) and 
0.78 to 0.90 in older adult population (Wells, 2010). It is scored on a scale of 0 to 
5, with total scores ranging from 0 to 30. In the present study, the items were totalled 
to produce a total score. A higher score in a particular subscale indicates a higher 
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perceived level of social support. Total scores for social network with friends and 
family, as well as the overall total score was used in this study. 
Informant Measures 
Subjective cognitive complaints from people may or may not be related to actual 
changes in cognition. Information about cognitive change secured from an 
informant is an important part of the assessment. Information about the 
participant’s premorbid and current level of independence was determined using 
the Informant Questionnaire on Cognitive Decline in the Elderly (IQCODE) and 
the Lawton’s Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLS). 
 
The Lawton Instrumental Activities of Daily Living Scale (IADLS; Lawton & 
Brody, 1969). The IADLS was developed to assess the more complex activities of 
daily living required to function in the community. These include cooking, 
shopping, managing finances, ability to use the telephone, laundry, housekeeping 
and managing own medications. The test consists of 8 items that take around 10 to 
15 minutes to administer and provides a resulting score of low function (0) to high 
function (8). It can be administered face to face or as a self-report questionnaire 
and is completed by people who know the participants well. It has been used 
widely in general populations as well as clinical settings with older people 
(Alosco et al., 2014; Ferrell, Josephson, Norvid, & Alcorn, 2000; Graf, 2008; 
Hilgenkamp, van Wijck, & Evenhuis, 2011; Wallace & Shelkey, 2008). There 
was a high level of internal consistency (.93) in participants who were in the early 
stages of dementia (Farias, Harrell, Neumann, & Houtz, 2003). A one month test-
retest reliability of the IADLS was also high (>.90) in people who had a probable 
Alzheimer’s disease (Green, Mohs, Schmeidler, Aryan, & Davis, 1993). The 
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IADLS showed moderate to high correlations with other measures that assess 
activities of daily living. For instance, in their assessments with older people 
Lawton and Brody (1969) found correlations of .61 with physical self-
maintenance, .48 with mental status examinations and .36 with behaviour and 
adjustment. Further, there was a moderate (.66) correlation between the IADLS 
and the Direct Assessment of Functional Status (DAFS) (Farias et al., 2003). In 
this study, a total score is calculated at the end of the assessment with the 
maximum score being 8 and the minimum is 0. Higher scores indicate a greater 
functional ability. 
 
The Informant Questionnaire on Cognitive Decline in the Elderly (IQCODE; 
Jorm, 1996). The IQCODE was used in this study to measure cognitive decline 
from a premorbid level of functioning. It is a 26-item assessment tool that rates 
change over the previous 10 years in memory and everyday tasks and takes about 
15 minutes to administer. Informants are required to rate each statement on a five-
point scale:1 is much improved and 5 is much worse. It is a widely-used 
instrument in older population settings and has been used as a screening tool to 
detect dementia (Harrison et al., 2014) and MCI (Li, Jia, & Jia, 2012). The 
IQCODE consists of long and short forms. The long form has been used in this 
study. It consists of 26 items that address everyday memory and function, 
including short-term and long-term memory, financial awareness, learning, 
orientation in time and space, and executive skills. The IQCODE is a valid test 
and has been used as a screening tool in dementia and has shown a moderate 
correlation (0.65) with a test of episodic memory performance (Jorm, 2009). 
Reliability studies that cover a range of populations, languages and cultures have 
shown high coefficient alpha that range between .93 to .97 (De Jonghe, 1997; Fuh 
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et al., 1995; Morales, Bermejo, Romero, & Del‐Ser, 1997). The IQCODE has 
been correlated with a few cognitive screening tests, especially the MMSE 
(between -.37 and -.78) (Helen Christensen & Jorm, 1992; Jorm & Jacomb, 1989) 
and the Abbreviated Mental Test Score (between -.54 and -.62) (Flicker, 
Logiudice, Carlin, & Ames, 1997; Thomas et al., 1994). The correlations are 
stronger when used in people with a diagnosis of dementia as compared with 
cognitively healthy ones. For example, Helen Christensen and Jorm (1992) found 
that the correlation between MMSE and the IQCODE was -.37 in healthy 
academics and scientists. In comparison, older participants (mean age 83) living 
in a residential facility showed correlations of -.78 between the MMSE and the 
IQCODE (Jorm & Jacomb, 1989). The IQCODE had high (-.65) correlations with 
episodic memory, -.42 (Jorm et al., 1996) with the WMS Logical Memory (Jorm 
et al., 1996) and .34 with the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Starr, Nicolson, 
Anderson, Dennis, & Deary, 2000).  
The IQCODE is scored by adding up the scores for all questions, and 
dividing this by the number of total questions (i.e., a mean score is calculated). 
Different cut-offs have been suggested to classify participants as having 
significant decline amounting to a probable diagnosis of dementia. Scores 
between 3.3 and 3.6 are suggestive of significant cognitive decline. For the 




Table 3. Description of neuropsychological domains, the tests used to assess each domain and the outcome scores 
Information Name of Test What does it measure Outcome Scores 
Screening Tests Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) 
Cognitive screening Total score 
 Alcohol Use Disorder Identification 
Test (AUDIT)  
Alcohol use and disuse screening Total score 
 Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) Depression screening in older people Total score 
Social perception The Awareness of Social Inference 
Test (TASIT) 
Emotion recognition, recognition of 
lies, sarcasm and humour 
Total score 
Neuropsychological Measures 
Memory Logical memory I (WMS) Narrative memory Total number of words recalled 
One back test (Cogstate) Working memory and attention Average reaction time for correct 
responses* 
Two back test (Cogstate) Working memory and attention Average reaction time for correct 
responses* 
One card learning (Cogstate) Visual memory Accuracy of response 
International Shopping List Recall 
(Cogstate) 
Verbal learning and memory Total number of words remembered 
Language Letter fluency (DKEFS) Verbal fluency Response accuracy 
Category fluency (D-KEFS) Verbal fluency Response accuracy 
Category switching (D-KEFS) Verbal fluency Response accuracy 
Colour naming (D-KEFS) Language Response accuracy 
Word reading (D-KEFS) Reading ability Response accuracy 
Executive functioning Number sequencing (D-KEFS) Number sequencing Completion time 
Letter sequencing (D-KEFS) Letter sequencing Completion time 
Number-letter sequencing (D-KEFS) Cognitive flexibility Completion time 
Colour-word interference (D-KEFS)  Cognitive flexibility Completion time 
Colour-word interference switching 
(D-KEFS) 
Cognitive flexibility Completion time 
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Visuospatial Functioning Rey Osterreith Complex Figure 
Drawing Test, Copy 
Visual and constructional abilities Total score 
Chase task (Cogstate) Attention and reaction time Average reaction time for correct 
responses* 
Visual scanning (D-KEFS) Visual scanning and attention Completion time 
Social Functioning Measures Social Activity Log (SAL) Social activity Total score 
 Lubben’s Social Network Scale Quantity, emotional closeness and 
frequency of contact with family and 
friends. 
Total score 
Informant Measures Lawton’s Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living (IADLS) 
Ability to perform complex daily 
activities 
Total score 
 Informant Questionnaire on 
Cognitive Decline in the Elderly 
(IQCODE)  
Informant’s view of cognitive 
decline from premorbid level of 
functioning 
Mean score 




Potential participants either responded to the advertisements or were contacted by 
phone after they had received a letter about the study. Over the phone, the 
potential participants were briefed about the study and were encouraged to ask 
any questions regarding the study. Once consent was obtained, a mutually 
convenient date, time and place was arranged to meet with those who were 
interested in taking part in the study. The venue for the assessment was either an 
office at the University of Waikato, the participant’s house or place of work. If the 
assessment occurred at the participant’s house or office, the assessment was 
carried out in a quiet room and the examiner and participant sat at a table with 
minimal distractions. The information regarding the study was provided to the 
participant along with an information sheet (see Appendix C) and both consent 
and confidentiality was also explained. Each participant signed a consent form 
(see Appendix C). Each participant went through the screening process. Those 
who failed to meet the inclusion criteria were thanked for their time and those 
with high scores on the AUDIT and GDS were encouraged to meet with their GP 
for further management.   
The entire assessment took between 3 to 4 hours, depending on the 
number and length of breaks. The testing was carried out either on the same day 
or on two or three separate days within a month of the first assessment. The order 
of test administration is described below in Figure _. At the end of the assessment, 
the participants from the community sample received a $15 coffee voucher and 
the DHB participants received a $30 supermarket voucher to thank them for their 
participation. Participants were asked if they would like a summary of the results. 
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The community sample were offered a summary of the overall results and 
findings, whereas the DHB sample were also offered a summary of their 
individual results sent to them and/or their GP.  
During this first meeting, eligible participants were also asked if there was 
a close friend/family of the participant who had known the participant for 10 or 
more years and were preferably living with them or spent considerable time with 
them who would be able to complete a series of informant measures. The 
informants were either met separately or were sent the questionnaires with a self-
addressed envelope to be completed and returned to the researcher. If they opted 
to post the questionnaires back, they were contacted over the telephone, where 
they were given information regarding the study as well as answering any 
questions they had regarding the questionnaires,  
 
Figure 2. 5 Order of assessments 
Statistical Analysis 
Data were entered into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 
version 23) and checked for missing data. Normality for the data was also checked 
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by examining histograms and pp plots as well as carrying out the required 
normality statistic.  
In order to interpret the neuropsychological data collected and to be able to 
carry out further analysis, the test scores were transformed to T scores, with a mean 
of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. If the scores were in the opposite direction 
(i.e., lower scores meant better performance), the z score sign was reversed. This 
was carried out using the following steps for each test. 
1. The mean of the participant’s age-appropriate reference group from the 
normative sample was subtracted from the raw score of each test.   
2. The result of this was divided by the standard deviation of the participant’s 
age-appropriate reference group, resulting in a z score for each test score for 
each participant. 
3. This was then multiplied by 10 (the arbitrary standard deviation used for T 
scores). 
4. Lastly, the result of this was added to 50, which is the arbitrary mean used 
for T scores.  
Finally, the domain scores were calculated by averaging the mean T score 
with the number of tests in the domain. This resulted in four separate domain scores 
(memory, language, executive functioning and visuospatial functioning) for each 
participant. 
In the current study, the analysis was conducted in four parts. In order to 
address the main research question regarding social perception in MCI, it was first 
necessary to decide on the most appropriate classification criteria for MCI. 
Therefore, the first part of the analysis focuses on identifying the most appropriate 
criteria to use to classify MCI for the subsequent analyses. These criteria were 
based on classification systems outlined in previous chapters (Jak et al., 2009). 
The difference between the classification systems is based on the cut-offs of the 
number of standard deviations below the normative mean (1 or 1.5 SD) and the 
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number of tests within the domain that reached the relevant cut-offs (at least one 
or at least two tests). This includes the liberal method, the comprehensive method, 
the conventional method and the conservative method. The four classification 
systems were used in order to examine how the DHB participants were classified. 
The classification system that was used at the DHB was the one that most closely 
approximated current clinical practice and was thus used as a “gold standard” 
diagnostic system to identify MCI in the community recruited participants. This 
classification of participants into “MCI” and “non-MCI” was then used for the 
rest of the analyses.  
To determine if MCI was associated with social perception difficulties, a 
series of between-groups analyses were conducted to compare the MCI and non 
MCI groups’ performance on the TASIT. Cohens statistic was used to determine 
effect size, where scores at or below .2 were considered having low effect size, .5 
was medium effect size and .8 and above depicted large effect size.  The 
normative data for older adults on the TASIT was also used to identify people 
who showed moderate deficits and scored at least 1.5 SD below mean. This was 
then used to compare the proportion of those with and without MCI who met the 
cut-offs.   
To explore the association between social perception and 
neuropsychological functioning, participants’ performance in each domain was 
correlated with the TASIT variables. Correlational analyses were also used to 
examine the relationship between the recognition of lower and higher order social 
perception skills.  
Lastly, participants with and without MCI were compared in social 





In order to answer the main question of this research regarding social perception 
deficits in mild cognitive impairment, the first step was to classify participants 
with MCI. The first section of the results describes the classification of MCI, 
followed by addressing the main questions of this thesis: the relationship between 
social perception, MCI and performance on neuropsychological tests. The next 
section focusses on using the TASIT norms to identify participants who have 
deficits on the subtests. The last section compares the social and informant 
measures between participants who show deficits on the TASIT subtests.  
Before beginning the analysis, the data were screened for missing values 
and normality. One participant did not complete the social inference-minimal and 
the social inference-enriched subtest, as he complained of not being able to hear 
the TASIT subtest. This was carried out using P-P plots and histograms. P-P plots 
or probability-probability plots graphically display the “cumulative probability of 
a variable against the cumulative probability of a particular distribution” (Field, 
2013, p.179). Histograms of neuropsychological domains, TASIT variables, social 
measures and informant measures were plotted and inspected. Further, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test was conducted in order to determine whether the 
main variables of the neuropsychological domains and the TASIT were normally 
distributed. Results for the histograms and the KS test for memory domain (D 
(117) = .075, p = .15), language domain (D (117) = .064, p = 0.200), executive 
functioning domain (D (117) = .146, p = <.001), visuospatial functioning domain 
(D (117) = .079, p = .070), emotion recognition (D (116) = .135, p = <.001), 
social inference-minimal test (D (116) = .124, p = <.001) and  the social 
inference-enriched test (D (116) = .167, p = <.001) were significant, indicating 
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that the scores on the neuropsychological domains were normally distributed, and 
the TASIT were not normally distributed. Additionally, results of the histograms 
and KS statistic for Social Activity Scale (D (74) = .074, p = 0.200), Lubben’s 
Social Network Scale (D (74) = .497, p = <.001), the Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living Scale (D (74) = .211, p =<.001) and the Informant Questionnaire on 




Part 1: Classification of participants 
Once all the scores were converted and placed on a common metric, the 
descriptive statistics for each of these tests were calculated for the community and 
the DHB recruited sample (see Appendix J).  
The participants from both samples (n=117) were then classified according 
to the four diagnostic criteria described earlier (see page 102 methods); the 
descriptive statistics of demographic variables, screening measures and 
neuropsychological domains are presented in Appendix M. This table shows the 
mean performance of the groups on the screening measures as well as the domain 
scores according to each of the classification systems.  
The prevalence of participants meeting criteria for MCI varied widely 
between classificatory systems used. As can be seen in Appendix M, 12.8 % to 
84.6 % of participants were classified as having MCI, depending on the system 
used. With the liberal criteria, more than three-quarters of the participants had a 
formal diagnosis of MCI, whilst only a third of the participants met the stricter 
criteria, being the conservative method.  As expected, participants in the 
conservative group had the worst performance across all the domains of 
neuropsychological functioning, whereas performance on neuropsychological 
domains was higher when the liberal method was used.   
The number of participants classified as having MCI according to the four 
different criteria were then examined. Table 3.1 shows the number and 
percentages of participants meeting the different criteria of MCI, presented 




Table 3. 1 Number and percentages of participants meeting the criteria for MCI 






Liberal Criteria (1 SD below mean on any one 
measure of a domain) 
21 (100%) 78 (81.3%) 
Conventional Criteria/Peterson’s criteria (1.5 
SD below mean on at least one measure in two 
domains) 
21 (100%) 47 (48.9%) 
Comprehensive Criteria (1 SD below mean on 
two or more measures of a domain) 
16 (76.2%) 25 (26.04%) 
Conservative Criteria (1.5 SD below mean on 
two or more measures of a domain) 
10 (47.6%) 5 (5.2%) 
Note. DHB = District Health Board; MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; SD = 
standard deviation 
 
There are no commonly agreed objective criteria for diagnosing MCI.  The 
formal diagnosis used by the DHB was the “gold standard” for deciding on the 
classificatory system used, due to the unavailability of other useful standards such 
as longitudinal studies, information from family members and biomarkers. In 
order to decide which the most appropriate criteria for the use was in the present 
study, classification using the criteria was conducted separately for the DHB 
group, all of whom had been independently clinically assessed and diagnosed with 
MCI.  Visual inspection of Table 3.1 shows that all participants who were 
diagnosed with MCI at the DHB met the criteria of MCI according to the liberal 
and the conventional method. Deciding between the liberal method and the 
conventional method was then based on level of impairment and prevalence rates 
of MCI in the community. The chance of false positives is high in the liberal 
method due to the lower (1 SD) levels of impairment. A majority of normal 
participants in neuropsychological studies have lower scores on one test without 
warranting an abnormal label (Jak et al., 2009). In addition, the prevalence rates of 
MCI in the community has been reported to be within the ranges of 4.5% and 
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26.7% from the age of 60 to 89 (Sachdev et al., 2015). The liberal criteria 
diagnosed 81.3 % of community participants with MCI, which is much higher 
than the prevalence studies. The conventional criteria classified 48.9 % of 
participants from the community as meeting the criteria for MCI. Based on these 
findings, the conventional method was chosen as the most suitable method to 
classify participants as meeting criteria for MCI or not.  
Based on this, two new groups were formed that included anyone 
(regardless of recruitment from DHBs or community) who met the conventional 
criteria (MCI group) and all the others (non-MCI group). From here onwards, the 
MCI group, according to the conventional criteria, will be referred to as the MCI 
Conv group. The group that did not meet the criteria according to the conventional 
method was labelled non-MCI. The demographic and mean scores on the 
screening measures and the neuropsychological domains for these two groups are 
presented in Table 3.2
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Table 3. 2 Descriptive and inferential statistics of performance on the neuropsychological measures in people with and without the diagnosis of 
MCI according to the conventional criteria 
Demographic details MCI-Conventional (n= 68 ) Non-MCI (n= 49) 
 Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
Age 66.22 (9.69) 46-88 61.98 (8.14)* 50-88 
Gender F = 67.6%  F = 67.3%  
Education (y) 12.33 (3.18) 0-17 12.94 (3.36) 0-17 
MoCA 27.10 (3.21) 14-30 29.04 (1.15) * 26-30 
GDS 1.32 (1.39) 0-7 .86 (1.08) 0-4 
AUDIT 2.51 (1.9) 0-8 2.96 (1.94) 0-8 
Memory Domain  49.24 (4.89) 32.05-59.87 51.47 (3.04) * 41.96-56.66 
Language Domain 54.61 (9.13) 24-70.67 59.67 (6.26) * 46.67-74 
Executive Functioning Domain 52.25 (9.09) 20-65.33 58.19 (4.4) * 46-66.67 
Visuospatial Domain 46.78 (5.81) 29.10-57.02 51.25 (3.84) * 43.20-58.1 
Note. SD = standard deviation; MCI = mild cognitive impairment; MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment; GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale; 
AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; DKEFS = Delis Kaplan Executive Function System; ROCFT = Rey Osterrieth Complex 
Figure Test 
* p<0.05 all p values based on t-test comparisons between MCI-Conventional and non-MCI groups
110 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the MCI Conv group obtained lower scores 
than the non-MCI group on all the neuropsychological domains. Further, the 
participants in the MCI Conv group were older and, on average, had lower MoCA 
scores. A series of independent t-tests confirmed that these differences were 
statistically significant.  
Participants in the non-MCI group were younger than those in the MCI 
group (t (115) = -2.49, p = .014, d = .47). The scores on the MoCA were 
significantly lower in the MCI Conv group (t (89.24) = 4.59, p = <.001 d = .80), 
possibly because the MCI Conv group included all the DHB recruited participants 
where the cut-offs for eligibility for the study on the MoCA were not applied. The 
participants who were in the MCI Conv group were not significantly different on 
their depression scores compared to the non-MCI group (t (115) = -1.952, p 
= .053, d = .37).  Similar results were found with the AUDIT scores.  People in 
both the MCI Conv and Non-MCI groups were below the cut-off for alcohol 
abuse and there were no significant differences between the two groups (t (115) = 
1.25, p = .213, d = .23). Additionally, there was not a significant difference in 
education between the two groups (t (115) = 0.996, p = .321, d = .019).   
The average T scores for the neuropsychological domains between the two 
groups were significantly different. This was not surprising, given performance on 
the neuropsychological tests were the main criteria for classification. Participants 
in the MCI Conv group performed significantly worse on all four 
neuropsychological domains–memory (t (112.8) = 3.03, p = .003, d = .55), 
language (t (114.75) = 3.56, p = <.001, d = 0.65), executive functioning (t (102.3) 
= 4.68, p = <.001, d = 0.83) and visuospatial functioning (t (114.22) = 5.002, p = 
<.001, d = .91). The effect sizes for all the domains ranged from moderate to high. 
It is worth noting that the means of the MCI Conv group, although lower than the 
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non-MCI group, were still in the normal range. The lowest scores were on the 
visuospatial domain, which was only slightly below the normal range for the T 
scores.   
Determining subtypes of MCI  
The classification of MCI also enables categorising subtypes of MCI. These 
subtypes are important, as they provide information regarding the type of 
dementia to which the patient is most likely to progress. Classification into 
subtypes is based on the number and the type of domain impaired. In this system, 
participants with only a memory impairment were classified as single domain 
amnestic MCI, and participants with a memory domain and another (language, 
executive functioning or visuospatial functioning) domain deficit was classified as 
multiple domain amnestic MCI. Participants with a single non-memory domain 
impairment were classified as single domain non-amnestic MCI.  Finally, 
participants with more than one non-memory domain impairment were classified 




Table 3. 3 Subtypes of MCI according to the conventional criteria and neuropsychological domains’ deficits 




 n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Single domain 
amnestic MCI (n=15) 
15 (100%) 0 0 0 
Multiple domain 
amnestic MCI (n=19) 
19 (100%) 8 (42.11%) 8 (42.11%) 11 (57.9%) 
Single domain non-
amnestic MCI (n=30) 




0 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 





The subtypes based on the classification criteria revealed that the largest 
group met the diagnostic criteria for single domain non-amnestic MCI, followed 
by multiple domain amnestic MCI and single domain amnestic MCI. The group 
that met the criteria for multiple domain non-amnestic MCI was the smallest. The 
biggest number of deficits in people with multiple domain amnestic MCI was in 
the visuospatial functioning domain. The visuospatial domain was also most 





Part 2: Research Question One: Social Perception in MCI  
The overall purpose of this thesis was to investigate social perception in people 
with MCI. As described earlier, the scores on the TASIT were not normally 
distributed and, therefore, non-parametric tests were used for the analyses. The 
Mann Whitney U test was used to compare the differences between the two 
groups on the total scores of the main subtests of the TASIT: recognition of 
emotions, social inference-minimal and social inference-enriched. Separate 
analyses for individual variables, such as recognition of individual emotions, were 
not carried out because of the risk of type 1 errors.  
Because performance on the TASIT subtests was skewed, median scores 
are the appropriate representation of central tendency.  However, the TASIT 
manual presents the normative data in the form of mean scores. Therefore, the 
results reported here include both median and mean scores.  




Table 3. 4 Descriptive statistics MCI Conv and non-MCI participants in their performance on the TASIT. 
Variables in TASIT MCI-Conventional (n= 68) Non-MCI (n= 49) Mann-Whitney U Test Results 
Median (IR) Mean (SD) Range Median (IR) Mean (SD) Range  
Emotion Recognition Test  
Happy 3 (1) 3.21 (0.73) 2-4 3.5 (1) 3.33 (0.8) 1-4  
Surprised 4 (1) 3.69 (0.61) 1-4 4 (1) 3.65 (0.69) 1-4  
Neutral 3 (1) 2.78 (0.84) 0-4 3 (1) 2.77 (0.78) 1-4  
Sad 3 (1) 3.09 (0.93) 0-4 3 (0) 2.92 (0.74) 1-4  
Angry 3 (1) 3.22 (0.86) 1-4 3.50 (1) 3.33 (0.83) 1-4  
Anxious 4 (0) 3.87 (0.42) 2-4 4 (0) 3.69 (0.62) 2-4  
Revolted 4 (1) 3.32 (0.85) 1-4 4 (1) 3.48 (0.75) 1-4  
Total Positive 
Emotions 




14 (2) (a=13) 13.50 (2.02)  8-16 14 (2)* (a=5) 13.46 (2.2) 6-16 U = 1663.5, z = -.014, p = .989, r = 
1.69 
Total  23.50 (3) 23.21 (2.68) 16-28 24 (4) 23.23 (3.42) 14-28 U = 1581, z = -.473, p = .636, r =.002 
Social Inference Minimal  
Sincere  16 (5) (a=11) 15.65 (4.03) 4-20 15 (6) (a=7) 14.38 (4.17) 4-20  
Simple Sarcastic 19 (3) (a=30) 18.18 (2.704) 8-20 19 (2) (a=17) 18.56 (1.61) 13-20  
Para Sarcastic 19 (2) (a=30) 18.53 (2.07) 12-20 19 (3) (a=22) 18.56 (1.96) 11-20  
Total  53 (7) (a=3) 51.76 (6.37) 27-60 52.50 (8) 51.96 (5.17) 38-59 U = 1585.5, z = -.261, p = .794, r = 
5.92 
Social Inference Enriched  
Lies 29 (5) (a=9) 27.78 (3.71) 18-32 28 (7) 26.48 (4.19) 17-31  
Sarcasm 26 (6) (a=1) 25.16 (4.25) 13-32 26 (6) (a=2) 25.77 (3.75) 15-32  
Total  53 (10) 52.43 (7.22) 36-63 53 (7) 52.33 (6.11) 32-62 U = 1561, z = -.399, p = .690, r 
= .0014 
Note. MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; n = number of participants, IR = interquartile range, SD = standard deviation; a =number of participants obtaining perfect 
scores; U = Mann-Whitney statistic; r = effect size; p = < .05
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The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.4 show that most 
participants performed well on the TASIT. There was evidence of a ceiling effect 
on the TASIT variables; 44.12% of participants with MCI and 45.8% of 
participants without MCI had perfect scores on the subtest of recognition of 
paradoxical sarcasm. On recognition of simple sarcasm, 44.1% of participants 
with MCI and 35.4% of them without MCI had perfect scores. Additionally, 
fewer, 16.2% of the MCI population and 14.6% of people without MCI scored 
perfectly in identifying sincere messages. Twenty percent of the population with 
MCI and 10.42% without MCI obtained a perfect score. In recognising positive 
emotions, 1.5% of the MCI group and about 6.3% of the non-MCI got perfect 
scores. Given the high proportion of participants who obtained maximum scores, 
the medians of the group were high, especially in the recognition of simple and 
paradoxical sarcasm.  
As can be seen in Table 3.4, both groups obtained similar scores on the 
main subtests of the TASIT. The Mann Whitney U test revealed no significant 
difference between the two groups in their performance on any of the TASIT 
subtest.  
In order to explore the difference between the recognition of positive and 
negative emotions, further analyses were conducted. To begin with, the total 
scores for recognition of positive and negative were converted to percentages, 
because there were different numbers of items in the two groups. As there were no 
differences in positive or negative emotion recognition between the MCI and non-
MCI groups, the data from the two groups were combined for this analysis. 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed that the recognition of positive emotions 
(Median = 80.91) was significantly lower than the recognition of negative 
emotions (Median = 84.19), indicating that negative emotion recognition was 
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better than positive emotion recognition (Z = -2.98, p = .0003). However, the 
inclusion of neutral emotions as a positive emotion is not common in most studies 
of the field. Further, recognition of neutral emotions in the TASIT are difficult for 
most people. Therefore, neutral emotions were removed and analysis were 
conducted once again. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed that the recognition 
of positive emotions (Median = 86.32) was significantly higher than the 
recognition of negative emotions (Median = 84.19), indicating that positive 
emotion recognition was better than positive emotion recognition (Z = -2.98, p 
= .0003). 
In order to investigate whether age was related to better recognition of 
positive or negative emotions, Spearman’s correlations were carried out. The 
recognition of positive (rs (115) = .014, p = .88) and negative emotions (rs (115) 
= .19, p = .34) were not significantly related to age. Additionally, there was no 
significant difference between female and male participants in the recognition of 
positive (U = 1492.5, z = -.05, p =.96, r = 2.2) and negative emotions (U = 1471.5, z = 
-.18, p = .86, r = 2.8).  
In conclusion, the participants’ performance on the TASIT showed a 
substantial ceiling effect. Additionally, participant performance on the TASIT 
from the MCI Conv group did not significantly differ from the non-MCI group in 
their performance on the TASIT. 
In order to explore the relationship between social perception and subtypes 
of MCI, three new groups were formed to include people who had multiple 
domain MCI, single domain MCI and non-MCI. Separate analysis between 
amnestic and non-amnestic MCI could not be conducted due to the small number 
of participants in these groups. Once again, non-parametric tests were used to 
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compare the medians of the three groups. Table 3.5 presents the descriptive 
statistics and results from the Kruskal-Wallis test.  
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Table 3. 5 Descriptive and inferential statistics between MCI Conservative and control group in their performance on the TASIT. 
TASIT 
Subtest 






Mean (SD) Range Median 
(IR) 
Mean (SD) Range Median 
(IR) 




23 (3) 23.3 (2.9) 16-28 24 (4) 23.2 (2.6) 16-27 24 (4) 23.23 
(3.42) 
14-28 χ2 (2) 





53 (8) 52.2 (5.8) 35-60 54 (7) 51.6 (6.7) 27-60 52.5 (8) 51.9 (5.2) 38-59 χ2 (2) 





53 (8) 51.7 (8.5) 25-63 53 (11) 52.8 (6.5) 32-62 53 (7) 52.33 (6.1) 32-62 χ2 (2) 
= .308, p 
= .86 
Note. MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; n = number of participants group, SD = standard deviation; IR = Interquartile Range; U = Mann-
Whitney statistic.  
p = < .05, χ2 = Chi-Square
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Nearly 34% of the MCI Conv participants met criteria for multiple domain 
MCI, in comparison to 66.2% who had single domain MCI. All three groups 
performed similarly on the three subtests of the TASIT, showing almost identical 
medians across the subtests. The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant 
differences among the three groups on the recognition of emotions, social 
inference-minimal and the social inference-enriched subtests. 
In conclusion, performance on the TASIT did not differ between MCI 
Conv (all subtypes) and non-MCI participants. Similarly, there were no significant 
differences between mdMCI, sdMCI and non-MCI participants on any of the 
subtests of the TASIT. Further, the recognition of negative emotions was 
significantly better than the recognition of positive emotions in all the 
participants.  Age was not significantly associated with the ability to recognise 





Comparison between MCI participants and older adult 
normative data on the TASIT 
There were no significant differences in performance on TASIT measures 
between people classified with MCI and those without MCI.  This was found 
when participants were classified according to the conventional method or when 
analysis was conducted only using participants with a multiple domain MCI. This 
finding may be related to the nature of the community sample; it is possible that 
recruitment resulted in a sample that was unusually high functioning in the realm 
of social perception. The ceiling effects seen on the subtests of the TASIT further 
supported this. 
This possibility was explored by comparing the performance on the 
TASIT by the MCI group to the normative, age-matched sample from the TASIT 
norms, which have recently become available (Mcdonald & Flanagan, 2017). 
These norms are available as means and standard deviations (rather than medians) 
by age group 40 to 59, 60 to 74 and 75 years and over. One-sample t tests were 
conducted to test the differences between the MCI conventional group and the 
TASIT norms. A comparison of the MCI group and normative group performance 








Figure 3. 1 Mean performance of the MCI-Conv group in comparison to TASIT 
norms on the emotion recognition subtest (a), social inference-minimal (b) and 
social inference-enriched (c). Data is presented as mean (SD).  
Note: n (40-59) TASIT norms = 34, n (60-75) TASIT norms =187, n (75 and above) TASIT 








The above figures depict the performance of the MCI Conv group in 
relation to the TASIT normative sample of older adults. The MCI Conv 
participants aged between 40 and 74 did not differ from the TASIT norms 
significantly on any of the subtests. However, participants above the age of 75 in 
the MCI Conv group performed significantly better than the TASIT norms, with 
moderate to high effect sizes, in the recognition of emotions (t (11) = 4, p = .002, 
d =.97), social inference-minimal (t (11) = 2.210, p = .049, d = .62) and social 
inference-enriched (t (11) = 5.292, p = <.001, d = .95) subtests.  
Overall, the participants above the age of 75 in the current study did better 
than the norms on the TASIT. However, conclusions about statistical significance 
cannot be derived based on the small number of participants (12) present in the 





Part 3: Research Question Two: What is the relationship 
between different cognitive domains and social 
perception? 
While no differences between MCI Conv and non-MCI were found in social 
perception tests, it was still pertinent to examine the relationships between 
neuropsychological domains and social perception tests.  
The analyses consisted of a series of correlations that examined the 
relationships between the TASIT subtests and the neuropsychological domain 
performance by the entire sample. Once again, non-parametric tests (Spearman’s 




Table 3. 6 Spearman’s rho correlations between social perception test scores of the TASIT (Part 1, 2 and 3) and neuropsychological domains 
 Memory  Language  Executive functioning  Visuospatial  
Emotion recognition -.002 -.101 -.13 -.01 
Sincere exchanges .12 -.08 -.13 -.11 
Simple sarcasm -.12 -.09 .04 .09 
Paradoxical sarcasm -.13 -.13 -.11 .03 
Social inference-Minimal .03 -.20* (p = .029) -.17 -.001 
Lies -.09 -.17 -.19* (p = .045) -.03 
Sarcasm -.11 -.20* (p = .031) -.15 -.08 
Social inference-
Enriched 
-.11 -.19* (p = .046) -.18 -.01 
Note. SD = standard deviation, n = 116 





Table 3.6 presents the Spearman’s correlations between emotion 
recognition, more complex social perception skills and the neuropsychological 
domains. The correlations among these sub scores of the TASIT and the 
neuropsychological domains are generally quite small. There was no relationship 
between emotion recognition and the neuropsychological domains. However, the 
language domain showed significant negative correlations with the social 
inference-minimal subtest, recognition of sarcasm and the social inference-
enriched subtest. The executive functioning domain showed a small but 
significant negative correlation with the recognition of lying. The correlations 
need to be interpreted with caution, because the large number of participants 
obtaining maximum scores on the TASIT subtests meant that the range of scores 
was restricted. Further, the chances of type II errors were high because of the 
number of correlations that were conducted.  
In addition to comparing neuropsychological domains and social 
perception subtests, relationships between social perception subtests were 
essential. To explore the relationship between the recognition of emotions and the 
recognition of higher order social perception tests, Spearman’s correlation was 




 Table 3. 7 Spearman’s rho correlation between recognition of emotions and 
higher order functioning variables of the TASIT (Part 2 and 3) 
 Recognition of Emotion (n=117) 
Sincere exchanges .26** (p=.004) 
Simple sarcasm .17 
Paradoxical sarcasm .41** (p<.001) 
Social inference-Minimal .42** (p=<.001) 
Lies .31** (p=<.001) 
Sarcasm .37** (p=<.001) 
Social inference-enriched .43** (p=<.001) 
Note. SD= standard deviation 
**Correlation if significant at 0.01 level 
 
Table 3.7 depicts Spearman’s correlations between the recognition of 
emotions and more complex social perception skills. There was a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the recognition of emotions and the 
recognition of sincere exchanges, paradoxical sarcasm, social inference-minimal, 
recognition of lies, recognition of sarcasm and social inference-enriched scores. 
Better emotion recognition was associated with better performance on the more 
complex social perception tests. As with the previous analyses, these findings 
need to be interpreted with caution due to ceiling effects on many of the TASIT 
subtests.  
In summary, there was no clear relationship between the 
neuropsychological domains, the emotion recognition and the higher order social 
perception variables. As expected, emotion recognition was related to the 
perception of higher order social perception tests, although the interpretability of 




Social Perception as a Neuropsychological Domain 
Thus far, analyses have focused on the participants who met the criteria .6 for 
MCI and how they performed on the social perception test along with the overall 
relationship between social perception and cognitive functioning. However, 
focussing on group level data can obscure the fact that some participants within 
the groups may have social perception deficits. The variability of the scores on the 
TASIT (see Table 3.4 and 3.5), indicates that there were people in the sample who 
have deficits on certain subtests of the TASIT. To further explore the relationship 
between neuropsychological function and social perception, this section focusses 
on using the TASIT as a separate domain.  
First, the TASIT norms were used to identify people who had deficits in 
the TASIT subtests. The TASIT manual provides cut-offs that determine three 
different levels of severity: mild, moderate and severe. The moderate (1.5 SD) 
level of severity was selected, as it was consistent with the cut-offs used to 
categorise participants with MCI according to the conventional method. This 
group will be referred as “impaired” in the TASIT. Table 3.8 presents the number 
of participants within the MCI Conv and Non-MCI group who met the “impaired” 
criteria in the TASIT. It also presents the descriptive statistics of their 





Table 3. 8 Medians, means, standard deviations and number of participants who were impaired (1.5 SD below mean) on TASIT subscales 
 MCI-Conventional (68) Non-MCI (49) 
 Median Mean 
(SD) 






19 (4) 19.38 
(2.3) 






38 (10) 36.10 
(5.86) 




41 (10) 37.86 
(6.72) 
7(10.3%) 38.5 (8) 37.75 
(4.2) 
4(8.2%) 
Note. MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; SD = standard deviation; n = Number of participants in sample. 
 
Overall, there were more people with deficits in the emotion recognition subtest, compared to the higher order social perception tests. Out 
of the total 117 participants, 19.6% participants showed deficits in the recognition of emotion, 8.6% showed deficits in the social inference-






Figure 3. 2 Venn diagram showing number of participants with MCI Conv that 
have deficits on the subtests of the TASIT 
The Venn diagram in Figure 3.2 displays the number of participants that 
show deficits on the different subtests in the TASIT. Twelve participants 
(17.65%) in the MCI group and 7 (14.6%) in the non-MCI group had deficits on 
one subtest of the TASIT. Five (7.4%) participants from the MCI group and one 
(2.1%) participant from the non-MCI group had deficits on two subtests of the 
TASIT. Finally, one (1.5%) participant with MCI and three (6.25%) participants 
without MCI had moderate deficits on all three subtests of the TASIT. One in five 
participants of the non-MCI group showed deficits in the recognition of emotion.  
A chi-square analysis was carried out to examine the association between 
meeting the criteria for MCI and deficits in social perception. There was no 
significant association between meeting the criteria for MCI Conv and having 
impaired social perception for the emotion recognition test, χ2 (14, N = 117) = 
16.41, p = .29, social inference-minimal test, χ2 (22, N = 116) = 17.16, p = .75 or 
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the social inference-enriched, χ2 (26, N = 116) = 20.44, p = .77. Figure 3.3 shows 
a graphical representation of the data presented above.  
 
 
Figure 3. 3 Percentage of participants meeting the criteria for MCI conventional 
method and those who do not, who showed moderate deficits on the TASIT 
Irrespective of MCI status, 19 participants showed moderate impairment 
on at least one subtest of the TASIT.  In order to examine these deficits further, 
and to examine whether having multiple deficits within the social perception 






Figure 3. 4 Number of participants who had impairment on one, two or three 
subtests of the TASIT 
 
Eighty-seven participants did not show any deficits on the TASIT. 
Nineteen participants had moderate impairment on only one subtest of the TASIT. 
Six had impairments on two subtests while four participants had impairments on 
all three subtests of the TASIT (see Figure 3.4).   
Table 3.9 shows the demographic variables and the performance on 
neuropsychological measures among people with none, one, two or three deficits. 
133 
 
Table 3. 9 Means and standard deviations of demographic and neuropsychological domains of participants that showed deficits on one, two or 
three subtests 
Demographic details No deficits (n=87) Deficits on one 
subtest (n=19) 
Deficits on two 
subtests (n=6) 
Deficits on three 
subtests (n=4) 
 Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 





 F=3, M=3  F=4, M=0  




3-17 14 (.0) 14 10.5 (7) 0-14 










































54.7-68 61.5 (4.9) 56.7-66. 
Executive Functioning Domain  53.87 
(8.8) 







Visuospatial Functioning Domain  48.53 
(5.7) 
29.1-58.1 48.5 (5.6) 34.7-
56.10 











In this sample, those with deficits on the TASIT were in the younger age 
ranges. People above the age of 75 fell into the criteria of no deficits, while quite 
surprisingly, the ones with the deficits on the TASIT were in the younger age 
range. The youngest participant with all three subtests impaired was only 55. 
Overall, people with deficits on one subtest performed lower on memory and 
language domains. People with no deficits on any subtest of the TASIT performed 
lower on the executive functioning domain and visuospatial functioning domain. 
Although formal statistics could not be performed, these differences appear quite 
small and not clinically significant.  
The four participants with deficits in all three subtests of the TASIT were 
female. All four of these participants were recruited from the community and only 
one of them met criteria of MCI Conv; this was a single domain amnestic MCI.  
Six participants had deficits on two subtests of the TASIT, half of whom were 
female. Five of these participants met criteria for MCI according to the 
conventional criteria; three of them had a single domain MCI (one amnestic and 
two non-amnestic) and one multiple domain non-amnestic MCI. However, two of 
the groups were small, which did not allow more inferential statistics to be carried 
out. In addition to this information, it is of interest to explore the types of social 




Figure 3. 5 Venn diagram showing number of participants that have deficits on 
the subtests of the TASIT 
Figure 3.5 displays a Venn diagram of the number of participants who had 
deficits the different subtests in the TASIT. Almost all (75.8%) participants met 
the cut-off for impairment on the recognition of emotion recognition. Most of the 
participants (13, 68.4%) with impairments on one subtest had impairments on the 
recognition of emotion. Two participants (10.5%) had deficits on only the social 
inference-minimal subtest. Four participants (21.05%) had impairments on only 
the social inference-enriched subtest. Three participants (50%) had impairments 
on both emotion recognition and social inference-minimal subtests; two 
participants (33.3%) had impairments on emotion recognition and social 
inference-enriched, and one participant (16.7%) had impairments on social 
inference-minimal and social inference-enriched. Four participants had deficits on 
all three subtests of the TASIT.  
In conclusion, when social perception was considered a separate domain, 
using the TASIT to classify participants as having deficits based on the provided 
norms, the most common deficits were in emotion recognition. As already 
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established, the deficits on the TASIT were not related to the MCI classification. 
Considering only social perception, most of the participants in the current study, 
regardless of classification, did not have any deficits on the TASIT and only four 




Part 4: Social and Informant Measures  
The final stage of analysis was to examine the measures of social activity and 
network, informant perspective on activities of daily functioning and cognitive 
decline in the participants with MCI and non-MCI. Additionally, social activity 
and informant measures between participants with and without deficits on social 
perception tests were explored.  
An important question was the relationship between informant’s 
perspective on the participant’s level of functioning and deterioration from their 
premorbid level of functioning.  The informant for each participant also provided 
information regarding cognitive impairments and decline across ten years. It was 
thus useful to look at the relationship between informant reporting and the 
classification of MCI.  
Informant measures 
There were two informant measures (IADLS and the IQCODE) that looked at the 
current activities of daily living and decline from premorbid functioning, 
respectively. Lower scores on the IADLS indicate greater deficits in activities of 
daily living. Low scores on the IQCODE indicated more decline in cognitive 
functions in the last ten years, according to the informant. Although some 
informants were met face to face, around 85% of the informants opted to mail the 
completed questionnaires back. Not all of them returned the completed 
questionnaires, and some participants lived on their own. Of the 68 MCI Conv 
participants, 43 (63.2%) had informant questionnaires, and out of 49 participants 
from the non-MCI group, 31 (63.3%) had questionnaires. In the MCI Conv group, 
26 informants were partners of the participants, ten were children, four were 
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friends or colleagues and the rest (three) were other relatives such as siblings and 
cousins.  Among the non-MCI group, 20 of the informants were partners of the 
participants, five were children of the participants, three were friends, and all the 
others (three) were other relatives. A visual inspection of the histograms of the 
informant measures as well as the KS statistic for the IADLS, D (74) = .46, p = 
<.001, and the IQCODE, D (74) = .21, p = <.001, suggested that the dataset was 
not distributed normally. Hence, non-parametric tests were used in the subsequent 
analyses.  
Table 3. 10 Performance ratings on the IQCODE and the IADLS between MCI 
and non-MCI groups 
Informant 
Measures 










IADLS 8 (0) 7.6(1.3) 2-8 8 (0) 7.84 
(0.52) 
6-8 
IQCODE 3 (0.32) 3.1 
(0.48) 
2.11-4.7 3 (0.2) 2.9 
(0.21)  
2.11-3.3 
Note. MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; n = number of participants; SD = 
standard deviation; IADLS = Instrumental Activities of Daily Living Scale; 
IQCODE = Informant’s Questionnaire on Cognitive Decline in the Elderly 
* p<0.05 all p values based on Mann Whitney U-test comparisons  
 
The informant ratings on the IADLS and the IQCODE were compared 
between the MCI Conv and the non-MCI group. The highest possible score for the 
IADLS was eight and the mean scores for both groups were close to this score. 
The IQCODE is calculated as an average score of the items, and ratings between 
3.3 and 3.6 are suggestive of cognitive decline from a premorbid level of 
functioning. On average, both groups fell outside this range, although there were a 
few people who had higher scores on the IQCODE (see upper limit of range in 
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Table 3.10), suggesting that only a small number of participants were rated as 
showing significant cognitive decline by their informants.  
The groups showed similar scores on the IADLS, and the non-MCI group 
had slightly lower scores on the IQCODE. There was no statistically significant 
difference between the MCI Conv and non-MCI on the IADLS (U = 665, z = -
0.61, p = .543, r = .005). On the other hand, there was statistically significant 
differences between the two groups on the IQCODE (U = 475, z = -2.13, p = .033, 
r = .06).  
Social Measures 
In addition to informant measures, assessment of social activities was collected 
from participants via two questionnaires–the Social Activity Log (SAL) and the 
Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS). The ratings on the social activity and 
social network scales between MCI and non-MCI groups were compared.  
The presence and frequency of engagement in different social activities 
was collected using the SAL, and the frequency of social networking with friends 
and family was collected using the LSNS. High scores on the SAL and the LSNS 
indicate more social activity and closer relationships between participants and 
their close ones, respectively. The LSNS consists of two subscales: network with 
friends and network with family. The items on the SAL are divided into non-
contact events, such as: email and telephone calls; regular events such as meeting 
the other for coffee, tea, drinks, visits to people’s homes; and special events which 
consists of social events such as concerts, theatre, and going to the cinemas. In 
this phase of analysis, the MCI Conv and the non-MCI groups were compared on 
their responses to the two social measures. As the data were not normally 
distributed, non-parametric tests were used. Table 3.11 presents the descriptive 
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Table 3. 11Descriptive and inferential statistics of performance on the Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS) and social activity log (SAL) between 
MCI and non-MCI groups 
Social Measures MCI-Conventional (n= 68) Non-MCI (n= 49) Mann-Whitney U Test 
Results 
 Median (IR) Mean (SD) Range Median (IR) Mean (SD) Range  
Family 11 (5) 10.41 (3.1) 5-15 12 (3) * 11.57 (2.2) 6-15 U = 1311.5, z = -1.971, p 
= .049, r = .033 
Friendships 9 (5) 9.03 (3.8) 0-15 11 (5) * 11.12 (2.9) 4-15 U = 1148.5, z = -2.872, p 
= .004, r = .07 
LSNS 19.50 (9) 19.10 (5.8) 1-29 24 (6) * 22.51 (4.18) 13-30 U = 1092, z = -3.178, p = .001, 
r = .09 
Non-contact events 18 (4) 15.63 (3.8) 3-18 18 (2) 16.73 (1.9) 11-18 U = 1534.5, z = -.811, p 
= .417, r = .006 
Regular events 12 (11) 12.37 (6.5) 0-26 13 (8) 13.31 (5.4) 2-26 U = 1499, z = -.925, p = .355, 
r = .007 
Special events 2 (5) 3.06 (3.33) 0-15 3 (4) 3.73 (2.9) 0-12 U = 1353.5, z = -1.743, p 
= .081, r = .026 
SAL 31 (15) 31.06 (10.23) 6-48 34 (8) 33.78 (7.63) 15-50 U = 1428, z = -1.316, p = .188, 
r = .015 
Note. MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment; n = number of participants; SD = standard deviation; LSNS = Lubben Social Network Scale; SAL = 
social activity log 





The results presented on Table 3.11 show that the participants in the MCI 
Conv group had significantly lower scores on all the LSNS compared to the non-
MCI group. There seems to be a pattern of generally more social events for the 
non-MCI group, but it was not statistically significant. When Mann Whitney U 
tests were carried out, the MCI Conv group had significantly less social contact 
with their families (low effect size), and their friends (medium effect size) 
compared to the non-MCI group. Overall, the MCI Conv group had lower social 
network scores (low effect size) compared to the non-MCI group. 
It was also of interest to explore the social network and social activity in 
people with deficits on the TASIT, in order to explore differences between groups 
that had fewer and more deficits on the TASIT. However, due to uneven group 
size and two groups with very small sample size, meaningful descriptive analysis 





Table 3. 12 Descriptive statistics of ratings on the Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS) and social activity log (SAL) groups based on number of 
impaired subtests of the TASIT 
Social Measures Deficits on one subtest (n=19) Deficits on two subtests (n=6) Deficits on three subtests (n=4) 
 Median Mean (SD) Range Median Mean (SD) Range Median Mean (SD) Range 
Family 11 10.8 (2.7) 5-15 10 10 (3.7) 5-15 13 13 (1.83) 11-15 
Friendships 12 10.7 (3.3) 1-15 10 9.8 (2.9) 6-13 12 11.5 (3.7) 7-15 
LSNS 22 21.5 (4.7) 10-28 21 19.8 (6.3) 11-28 25.5 24.5 (5.4) 18-29 
Non-contact events 18 15.8 (4.03) 6-18 18 17.2 (1.6) 14-18 17 17 (1.2) 16-18 
Regular events 12 12.3 (6.3) 5-26 12 12.8 (3.3) 9-19 12 12 (2.6) 9-15 
Special events 4 3.9 (2.7) 0-8 4 3 (2.45) 0-6 4.5  4 (2.9) 0-7 
SAL 34 32 (10.04) 12-48 32.5 33 (4.82) 26-40 33.5 33 (3.6) 29-36 





Table 3.12 shows descriptive statistics for the LSNS and the SAL among 
three groups of all participants who showed at least moderate impairment on one, 
two or three subtests of the TASIT. The most impaired group appeared to have 
slightly higher scores on the social network measures, but very small sample size 
means this is very tentative.  There was no consistent pattern of differences among 
the groups on the social activity measure.  
In conclusion, there was no difference between the MCI Conv and non-
MCI groups on the informant measures. The MCI Conv group had significantly 
poor social networking with family and friends. Although formal statistical 
analysis could not be carried out, the most impaired group appeared to have 
slightly higher scores on the social network scale. 
Summary of findings 
Participants in the current study who had a diagnosis of MCI according to the 
conventional criteria did not significantly differ in their performance on the 
TASIT compared to the non-MCI group.  When comparing participants who had 
only md-MCI and those with sd-MCI and non-MCI, there was still no difference 
between the groups in their performance on the TASIT. For the entire group, the 
recognition of positive emotions was significantly poorer than the recognition of 
negative emotions, and age was not related to this. Substantial ceiling effects were 
found on the TASIT for both MCI and non-MCI groups, and these ceiling effects 
made it hard to interpret the correlation analysis with the neuropsychological 
domains, which found the language domain to be weakly negatively correlated 
with two main subtests (social inference-minimal and social inference-enriched) 
and the recognition of sarcasm. Furthermore, executive functioning was slightly 
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negatively correlated with the recognition of lies. As expected, emotion 
recognition was positively correlated with the recognition of the higher order 
social perception skills.  
Examination of the characteristics of the participants showing deficits on 
the TASIT subtests showed that the majority of participants did not show any 
deficits and most of the participants with deficits were impaired on only one 
subtest, which was most commonly recognition of emotion. Further, there was no 
relationship between the presence of an MCI Conv diagnosis and deficits on the 
TASIT. The MCI Conv group did not differ from the non-MCI group in the 
informant ratings of activities of daily living and cognitive decline from 
premorbid level of functioning. Finally, the MCI Conv group had significantly 









The main aims of this thesis were to explore social perception in mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI) and to examine the relationship between social perception and 
neuropsychological function. More specifically this research explored several 
aspects of social perception including emotion recognition (happy, surprised, 
neutral, sad, angry, anxious and revolted) and two examples of higher order social 
perception skills (recognition of lying and sarcasm). It also incorporated collateral 
information on social functioning, and examined the relationship between this and 
direct assessment of social perception and neuropsychological functioning. 
Assessments were conducted on a community sample of people over the 
age of 50 years and a group of participants who had received a diagnosis of MCI 
from the local District Health Boards (DHBs). There is a lack of consensus in the 
literature regarding the most appropriate MCI classification criteria (Jak et al., 
2009; Petersen, 2004; Ritchie & Tuokko, 2010). The first analysis in this study 
focussed on identifying all participants (community and DHB) who met various 
published classification criteria (liberal, conventional, comprehensive and 
conservative) related to MCI. The conventional criteria (1.5 SD below age 
appropriate mean) provided the classification that appeared to be the best fit, 
classifying all DHB patients and 49% of community participants as having MCI. 
All other community participants were assigned to the non-MCI group. The 
conventional criteria (1.5 SD below mean on any one test of a domain) thus 
classified 68 participants (58%) with MCI, leaving 49 (42%) participants who did 
not have MCI according to these criteria. 
147 
 
Social perception in people with mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI) 
Based on the literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2013; Baglio et al., 2012; Bora & 
Yener, 2017; Fujie et al., 2008; Gaudreau et al., 2015a; Moreau et al., 2015; 
Poletti & Bonuccelli, 2013b; Teng et al., 2007), it was expected social perception 
would be worse for participants with MCI compared to those without MCI. 
Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences between the MCI 
and non-MCI participants in their performance on social perception subtests. 
When using cut-off criteria that identified people with moderate deficits on the 
TASIT, a quarter of all the participants showed deficits, and there was no 
significant association between MCI diagnosis meeting criteria for moderate 
deficit on the TASIT.  In comparison to single domain MCI, multi domain MCI 
has found to be better predictor of dementia (Rasquin, Lodder, Visser, Lousberg, 
& Verhey, 2005). Hence, new groups were formed to include only those 
participants who had multi domain MCI and analyses was conducted to compare 
three groups: multi domain MCI, single domain MCI and non-MCI. Contrary to 
other published studies (Teng et al., 2007; Weiss et al., 2008), participants 
showing multi domain MCI did not differ significantly from the single domain 
and non-MCI participants in their performance on the social perception subtests.  
 
Recognition of emotions among older adults 
Studies have found that older people performed better at the recognition of 
positive emotions compared to negative ones (Calder et al., 2003; Fujie et al., 
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2008; Moraitou et al., 2013b; Moreno, 1993; Phillips, Maclean, & Allen, 2002; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). The present study found that older participants were 
better at recognising positive emotions compared with negative emotions. This 
result was found after the exclusion of neutral emotions from positive emotions. 
The TASIT differs from other tests used in previous published studies in specific 
emotions studied. Positive emotions in the TASIT include happy, surprise and 
neutral. Most of the previous studies have included only happy and surprise as 
positive emotions. Other studies have classified the recognition of neutral 
expressions as a separate emotion that is neither positive nor negative (e.g., 
Abram et al., 2014; Forgeard, 2011; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). The 
neutral emotions in the emotion recognition subtest of the TASIT are the most 
difficult to interpret as they tend to be ambiguous (McDonald et al., 2006; 
Moraitou, Papantoniou, Gkinopoulos, & Nigritinou, 2013a). This result is 
consistent with the other studies that have found that certain negative emotions 
such as fear, sadness and anger were more difficult for older people to recognise 
than the positive ones (Calder et al., 2003; Fujie et al., 2008; Moraitou et al., 
2013b; Moreno, 1993; Phillips et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). This 
finding from the current study is also consistent with the theory of positivity bias, 
which postulates that as people grow older, they tend to focus more on positive 
aspects of emotions (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005), making the recognition of 
negative emotions less accurate than positive emotions.  
Social perception and neuropsychological functioning 
The next focus of this research was regarding the relationship between social 
perception and cognitive functioning across four domains. Contrary to findings in 
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other studies (Adolphs, 1999b; Keulers et al., 2010), due to the ceiling effects of 
the TASIT, it was concluded that there was no significant relationship between 
emotion recognition and higher order social perception skills. Consistent with 
prior literature (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Marrero-Fernández, Montoya-
Padrón, Jaume-I-Capó, & Buades Rubio, 2014; Tracy & Robins, 2008; 
Zimmerman et al., 2016), emotion recognition did not relate to 
neuropsychological functioning. Emotion recognition is an automatic task and 
does not require complex cognitive processes such as memory, executive 
functioning, language or visuospatial function. There was also no relationship 
between higher order social perception abilities and neuropsychological 
functioning. Specifically, there was no relationship between the recognition of 
paradoxical sarcasm and language in the current study as interpreted due to the 
small correlations present, which was in contrast to findings by McDonald et al. 
(2014) who found that poor ToM performance was related to poor executive 
functioning in participants and results from Symington et al. (2010), who found 
that recognition of paradoxical sarcasm, particularly with textual cues, was related 
to language functions in participants with complete agenesis of the corpus 
callosum. Further, Rankin et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between 
higher order social perception tasks of the TASIT and neuropsychological 
domains of language and verbal memory in people with dementia. 
Although emotion recognition was independent of cognitive functioning, 
there were differences in performance across people. When looking at 
performance on all subtests of the TASIT, participants were worse on the emotion 
recognition subtest compared to the higher order social perception tasks. When 
using the suggested cut-offs to identify participants with moderate deficits on the 
TASIT, almost all participants showed deficits on the recognition of emotion. 
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However, once again, these deficits were not related to neuropsychological 
functioning. The finding that participants performed better on the higher order 
social perception tasks compared to the recognition of emotion is inconsistent 
with other research, especially neurobiological (for review, see Adolphs, 2003) 
and developmental research (Heck et al., 2018; Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009). 
The difference in the findings in the current research may be attributable to the 
TASIT as discussed in a later section.  
Discrepancies with prior research 
There are several possible explanations for why the current results depart from 
previous studies’ findings, including recruitment methods, classification of MCI, 
classification of subtypes of MCI, age of participants and the measures used to 
assess social perception, including ceiling effects on the TASIT. 
While most studies (Anderson et al., 2013; Fujie et al., 2008; McCade, 
Savage, Guastella, Lewis, et al., 2013; McCade, Savage, & Naismith, 2012b; 
Pietschnig et al., 2015; Teng et al., 2007; Weiss et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2015) 
have classified people with MCI using the same criteria (conventional criteria) as 
the present research, most participants in those studies have been recruited 
through clinical settings (Anderson et al., 2013; Fujie et al., 2008; McCade, 
Savage, Guastella, Hickie, et al., 2013; Pietschnig et al., 2015). For example, 
McCade, Savage, Guastella, Hickie, et al. (2013) recruited 56 participants who 
were registered at the Centre at the Brain and Mind Research Institute in Sydney, 
Australia, all of whom were concerned about their cognitive problems and were 
referred to the centre by clinicians including neurologists, psychiatrists and 
geriatricians. A clinical sample of participants is more likely to include 
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participants who show widespread neuropsychological deficits affecting more 
aspects of daily functioning compared to people recruited through the community. 
Although by most definitions, people with MCI need to be functional in their 
basic activities of daily living (ADLs) (Greenaway et al., 2012; Petersen et al., 
1999; Rasquin et al., 2005; Summers & Saunders, 2012), there have been 
inconsistencies whereby some studies have found variation from none to large 
declines in ADLs among people with MCI (Lindbergh et al., 2016). In other 
words, people clinically diagnosed with MCI could have considerable deficits in 
their basic everyday functioning. Additionally, complex ADLs, such as driving, 
cooking and managing finances tend to be affected in people clinically diagnosed 
with MCI (Albert, Michaels, Padilla, & Pelton, 1999). Although not an exclusion 
criteria in the present study, information regarding basic activities of daily living 
were collected from informants and overall, the present study’s MCI group 
reported little or no decline in ADLs. The present study includes a large (almost 
70%) proportion of community-recruited participants who were then classified as 
MCI. While the second phase of community recruitment included participants 
who had a cognitive complaint, many did not voice any specific concerns, and so 
might best be considered ‘sub-clinical’, and likely less impaired than a clinically-
recruited sample.  
Concerning the lack of relationship between neuropsychological 
functioning and higher order social perception tasks, probably the most important 
difference between the present study and others mentioned above is the level of 
cognitive dysfunction in the populations studied. The present study consists of 
people from the non-MCI group who were mostly healthy and the MCI group that 
is sub-clinical who by definition did not have a known neurological condition (as 
determined by the exclusion criteria). In contrast, previous studies consisted of 
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participants with more neurological impairment. For example, Symington et al. 
(2010) used participants who had a complete agenesis of the corpus callosum, an 
important structure of the brain that supports the interaction between the two 
hemispheres. Rankin et al. (2009) assessed people with dementia. McDonald et al. 
(2006) study sample consisted of people with traumatic brain injuries.  
Another possible explanation for the different results of the current study 
compared to prior research was the method of classification of MCI. There is a 
general lack of consensus regarding the best way to diagnose MCI. Although 
neuropsychological assessments serve as a good tool of classifying MCI (Jak et 
al., 2009), other factors such as informant ratings, biological markers and clinical 
history to determine premorbid levels of functioning have been shown to be useful 
in improving the robustness of the classification of MCI (Ewers et al., 2012; 
Mattsson et al., 2009; Winblad et al., 2004) and these have been used in other 
studies of MCI (Albert et al., 1999; Marras et al., 2013). The classification of MCI 
in the community-recruited participants in this study focussed only on the 
neuropsychological functioning of participants.  
Another distinguishing feature of studies that reported a difference on 
social perception in MCI is the inclusion of specific subtypes. Multiple domain 
MCI has been found to be associated with widespread deficits in cognition and 
social functioning. Many of the previous studies have only used participants with 
multi domain MCI (34% of the MCI Conv group in the current study) (Baglio et 
al., 2012; Maki et al., 2013; McCade, Savage, Guastella, Lewis, et al., 2013; 
McCade et al., 2012b; Poletti & Bonuccelli, 2013b), and others have not 
differentiated between single and multiple domain subtypes (Pietschnig et al., 
2015; Yang et al., 2015). Further, some previously published studies have only 
included participants with amnestic MCI (Baglio et al., 2012; Bora & Yener, 
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2017; Gaudreau et al., 2015a; Maki et al., 2013; Moreau et al., 2015; Poletti & 
Bonuccelli, 2013b), which is linked to degeneration in the prefrontal cortex 
(Chang et al., 2010; Mufson et al., 2012) and abnormalities in the cortical 
thickness of the frontal lobes (Chang et al., 2010). The present study included 
amnestic and non-amnestic MCI participants, with only half of the participants 
meeting the criteria for amnestic MCI. Additionally, the present study included a 
small proportion of participants who had multi domain non-amnestic MCI (28%); 
the largest percentage had single domain non-amnestic MCI (44%). The people 
with single domain non-amnestic MCI have been found to show a relatively 
higher chance of reverting to normal cognition (Diniz, Nunes, Yassuda, & 
Forlenza, 2009; Forlenza et al., 2009; Ritchie & Tuokko, 2010) and thus may 
have more intact neuropsychological functioning.    
Average age of the participants. The average age of participants in the 
present study was lower (66 years) than that found in most other studies 
mentioned. Hence, factors associated with age might have contributed to some of 
the results found, especially the lack of differences between single domain and 
multi domain MCI. For example, Maki et al. (2013) included participants with 
MCI and older healthy adults whose mean ages were 74 years and 72 years 
respectively.   
Another reason for the differences in findings may be the measure used to 
assess emotion recognition and complex social perception abilities. Most of the 
previous studies used static visual, audio based or story based assessment stimuli, 
capturing only one modality at a time, such as visual or audio. For example, Teng 
et al. (2007) used the Florida Affect Battery (FAB) and Weiss et al. (2008) used 
the Venn Emotion Recognition Test to assess the recognition of emotion. Both of 
these tests assess emotion recognition using static photographs of people 
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displaying basic emotions. Additionally, the tasks used in prior studies have been 
relatively cognitively demanding. The tasks have less information available and 
adds the cognitive load of the participant to rely on subtle cues. A meta-analysis 
of social perception in MCI by Bora and Yener (2017) speculated that 
impairments found on Theory of Mind (ToM) are due to the cognitively 
challenging nature of the tests, such as Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET). In other words, an additional cognitive load was placed by these tests 
and these errors might be differentially more likely among people with cognitive 
deficits.  
The current and previous studies differs in the types of emotions assessed. 
Neither of the tests used in prior studies (FAB and Venn Emotion Recognition 
Test) included assessment of recognition of surprise or disgust. The studies only 
included recognition of happiness, sadness, anger, fear and neutral emotions. 
Recognising emotions through pictures is often confusing. For example, the 
recognition of surprise is frequently confused with fear (Adolphs, 2002; Rapcsak 
et al., 2000). On the other hand, certain positive emotions, such as happiness, are 
relatively easy to recognise, resulting in ceiling effects (Ruffman et al., 2008b).  
Characteristics of the TASIT 
The present study used the TASIT, which consists of dynamic videos of live 
actors, including information like facial movement, prosody, tone of voice and 
gestures, to assess the recognition of all the basic emotions (Alves, 2013; 
McDonald et al., 2004). In real life, although facial emotion recognition is 
important, a lot of information is derived from other cues such as head tilts 
(Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995), contextual cues (Ludlow et al., 2014), and prosody 
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(Ruffman et al., 2009). Studies have found that peoples’ recognition of emotions 
are generally better when the stimuli used are of a dynamic nature rather than 
static photographs (Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000) and therefore 
cognitive capacity has more of an effect in deciphering emotions from static 
visual stimuli compared to dynamic stimuli. In other words, the findings from the 
previous published studies may have been due to the difficulty of the task rather 
than reflecting deficits in social perception.  
In the present study, the TASIT displays a wider range of emotions 
(happy, surprised, neutral, sad, angry, anxious and revolted) and includes more 
information than just voices or only faces, creating a different and richer set of 
stimuli to evaluate emotion recognition.  
Having to decide whether a particular video is of an emotional nature or 
not seems to be what contributes to the difficulty of this task (McDonald et al., 
2006; McDonald et al., 2003a; Moraitou et al., 2013a).  
The TASIT differs from other tests used in previous published studies in 
specific emotions studied. The fact that the TASIT did not show many ceiling 
effects on recognition of happiness suggests that the test has been able to correct 
for the overly easy nature of detecting happiness that has been reported in other 
studies. Further, the emotion recognition subtest of the TASIT has improved the 
validity of the depiction of certain emotions like fear by increasing the number 
and accuracy of cues such as tone of voice.  
Another interesting finding in the current research was that participants 
performed very well, with many reaching the test ceiling, on higher order social 
perception tasks. In the recognition of more complex social perception tasks, the 
TASIT contains contextual, background information that made the recognition of 
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complex social perception tasks such as sarcasm, lies, and inference about another 
person’s intent relatively easy and accurate for a large portion of participants. 
The TASIT is a useful tool developed for assessing social perception in 
people with significant neurological problems. The TASIT has been used 
extensively with people with brain injuries (McDonald et al., 2013), dementia 
(Kipps et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2009) and psychiatric (Ladegaard, Larsen, 
Videbech, & Lysaker, 2014; Rocca et al., 2016) and developmental conditions 
(Zimmerman et al., 2016). The TASIT is the only ecologically valid test that 
assesses nuances of emotion recognition and social inference. However, because 
of ceiling effects such as those found in this study, it may be less useful in people 
with less severe neurological conditions.  
 
Clinical implications of the study 
This study has clinical implications for primary level care in terms of early 
screening, assessment of MCI and rehabilitation goals. The study of early 
symptoms for various types of dementia has been growing steadily in the last few 
decades (Gansler et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2017; Tzeyu et al., 2017). While research 
in the study of Alzheimer’s disease is a main focus of ageing research, the study 
of other kinds of dementia, including the frontotemporal type, is still in its 
infancy. One of the major early symptoms of behavioural variant frontotemporal 
dementia (bvFTD) is difficulties in social interaction (Bott et al., 2014; 
Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Karageorgiou & Miller, 2014; Kipps et al., 
2009). This includes behavioural changes, impulsivity, social inappropriateness 
and a lack of insight. A change in social perception abilities could be an early sign 
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for those most likely to develop frontotemporal dementia (Bora, Velakoulis, & 
Walterfang, 2016; Bora et al., 2015; Goodkind et al., 2015; Henry et al., 2014). 
Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) begins earlier in life, is fast progressing and is 
associated with symptoms that prevent early intervention, i.e., lack of insight. The 
present study has important implications in assessment of possible early signs of 
FTD. There is a subset of people who do not show impairment in 
neuropsychological tests, but do have deficits in social perception. It is not known 
whether this is a decline from premorbid social perception functioning or a stable 
weakness. However, this pattern might be a risk factor for FTD, which can be 
investigated through longitudinal studies. It is suggested that information 
regarding social perception changes such as understanding emotions and higher 
order changes such as ToM, sarcasm and empathy might be an important first 
point of assessment. 
Information from caregivers is paramount in the early identification of 
someone who may have a risk of developing frontotemporal dementia. However, 
the focus of primary intervention has been on people who have a greater risk of 
developing Alzheimer’s disease. In the assessment of MCI in New Zealand at 
present, general practitioners conduct an initial screen of people who have 
memory complaints and unless complicated, treat them conservatively (fewer 
follow ups) with some lifestyle advice, including making people aware that they 
can refer themselves to speciality services if they see further changes, and also 
provide treatment for any suspected underlying problems such as anxiety, 
depression, deficiencies, or alcoholism (Ministry of Health, 2013). However, in 
cases of changes in social perception, even subtle, someone as young as 50 years 
may warrant quicker assessment and intervention as they may be potentially at 
risk for FTD.  
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Social perception as a domain of neuropsychological 
functioning 
Aspects of social perception, both basic (emotion recognition) and higher order, 
or more complex functions such as the recognition of sarcasm and lying, appear to 
be independent of cognitive functioning. Social perception has evolved in humans 
because it is required for us to because it was an advantage in social interactions. 
The fact that social perception is not related to neuropsychological functioning is 
consistent with biological findings. The neurological underpinnings of cognitive 
domains are different from the neurological underpinnings of social perception 
(Adolphs, 1999a; Adolphs & Tranel, 2003). This has clinical and research 
implications. In the field of neuropsychological testing, the inclusion of social 
perception deficits as a separate domain is potentially useful in forming a 
widespread picture of a person’s functioning - one that has greater real life 
implications. For example, deficits in emotion recognition may lead to problems 
in friendships that lead to loneliness and isolation. Loneliness and isolation may 
then influence wellbeing and even rates of mortality (Bath & Deeg, 2005; Fry & 
Debats, 2006). Not being able to detect lying may make people more vulnerable 
to falling for financial fraud (Lichtenberg et al., 2013).    
The TASIT may be a useful tool for recognising people who have 
moderate to severe social perception problems and has been proven useful in 
assessing social perception in older people in the current study. The inclusion of 
social perception as a separate domain may point to subtypes of MCI that indicate 
risk of developing frontotemporal dementia, especially the behaviour variant.  
Assessment of social perception contributes to diagnostic processes. The 
understanding of deficits in social perception has implications in psychoeducation 
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for caregivers who are often the ones who deal with difficult behaviour (Bott et 
al., 2014). For example, people with behaviour variant FTD often have changes in 
social perception, leading them to behave uncharacteristically. Conveying this 
information alongside the findings from a patient’s assessment may help 
caregivers appreciate and manage changes in their loved one. In addition, goals 
that may target certain aspects of social perception may be useful in the treatment 
plan of these deficits.  
Limitations of study  
This study attempted to contribute to better understanding about changes in social 
perception in people with MCI. There were a number of limitations identified in 
this study.  
The issue of diagnosis and deciding on the most efficacious criteria is one 
of importance. We need a clear and consistent method of diagnosis of MCI. This 
may include a set of recommendations about neuropsychological tests, domains 
and number of subtests in each domain. Another limitation was that the current 
study did not have information on how patients in the clinical group were 
diagnosed. This could have helped to understand how this diagnosis is being used 
clinically. The MCI patients were included if any professional diagnosed them. 
This included a geriatrician, a clinical psychologist, a neuropsychologist, general 
physician or a psychiatrist. Not all patients from the clinical sample had been 
diagnosed using neuropsychological criteria. Additionally, a small portion of 
clinical participants who were contacted agreed to take part in the present study, 
possibly leading to a biased sample that may have potentially been more socially 
adept than those who did not participate.  
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Another limitation of the study was that information around changes in 
social perception was not sought from informants. Most of the informant 
assessments assessing behavioural change are focussed on dementia (Kaufer et al., 
2000). The changes include psychotic features, affective changes, changes in 
motor behaviour such as agitation, pacing, aggression, apathy and other severe 
symptoms such as screaming, hygiene issues and mutism. Including questions 
about the changes noted in their loved one about their understanding of jokes, 
inability to understand subtleties in conversations and an increased vulnerability 
to believing lies might be useful.  
The absence of informant measures for all participants was a limitation of 
this study. This was largely a logistic and a clinical challenge as many individuals 
lived on their own and getting an accurate picture of changes was difficult. 
Additional information around the impact of the deficits through interviews with 
significant others (caregivers or family members) or people who have known the 
participant for some time, even if they did not live with them or had regular 
contact with them, might have been helpful.  
In this study, few people met criteria for multi domain MCI, particularly 
multi domain non-amnestic MCI. Research has shown that this subtype is more 
likely to progress to non-Alzheimer’s type of dementia (Ferman et al., 2013; 
Yaffe et al., 2006). Additional research in the field may focus on including a 
larger sample of people with multi domain non-amnestic MCI and studying social 
perception in this cohort. 
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Strengths of the study 
The research extends our knowledge on social perception in people with MCI. 
This is the first known study in New Zealand to have explored social perception in 
MCI. The key strengths of this study are the use of an ecologically valid measure 
to assess social perception, recruitment from both clinical and community 
samples, the use of a comprehensive neuropsychological battery of tests, 
evaluation of different classification criteria of MCI including the classification of 
subtypes, and the use of informant measures and social measures. It has also 
further described social functioning as well as social perception and examined the 
relationship between these factors.  
This study is one of the first studies to have used the TASIT to assess 
social perception in people classified with MCI. To date, published research has 
largely used one or two sensory modalities (audio, visual, stories, etc.) to assess 
various aspects of social perception and tests used often lack information on 
psychometric properties. The TASIT is the only available test of social perception 
that is ecologically valid (McDonald et al., 2004). The current study contributes to 
the finding that the TASIT, despite it consisting of Australian actors, was used 
successfully in a New Zealand context and with older participants.  
This study’s strengths also lie in the large (96) number of participants 
recruited from the community. Further, considerable effort was placed on 
recruiting participants from a Māori background, resulting in 15% of the total 
sample who came from a Māori ethnicity. One of the biggest strengths of the 
current study is that considerable effort has been placed on the diagnosis of MCI. 
All participants were classified with MCI according to four different classification 
criteria available in research before selecting the most appropriate criteria. The 
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neuropsychological battery was selected by carefully examining literature and 
making sure there were at least three subtests in each domain, making the 
neuropsychological battery robust. The battery of tests included a variety of 
subtests that were both ecologically valid and well normed in the current 
population. Another strength of the current study is the inclusion of information 
regarding the subtypes of MCI. Subtypes of MCI not only give an overall view of 
the types of domains that are impaired but also provide information regarding the 
extent of impairment (single and multiple domain).  
Finally, the current study was one of the first studies to contribute to the 
understanding about social functioning and social network that may be associated 
with social perception. The inclusion of measures that tapped into the frequency 
of social contact as well as the quality of social networks further adds to the 
knowledge that these are important aspects of social functioning.  
Taken together, the current study provides valuable information that may 
be useful for future research in the area of identifying people with MCI who are at 
risk of developing a non-AD type dementia, particularly FTD, by including not 
only neuropsychological assessments but also social perception measures.  
Suggestions for future research 
Research into social perception in mild cognitive impairment is still in its infancy. 
Although there have been other tests (Funkiewiez et al., 2012), there are limited 
reliability and validity data available. There is a need for more robust social 
perception measures, which might prove useful in detecting people with early 
frontotemporal dementia or MCI. 
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 The TASIT is the only test that incorporates valid cues that mimic real life 
situations. However, there are drawbacks in using this test with people with mild 
deficits. The TASIT has a low ceiling and is designed for the assessment of 
deficits. In the assessment of neuro-typical people who may be developing deficits 
in social perception, such as people with a risk of developing frontotemporal 
dementia, there is a need to make the test more difficult. This may provide us with 
more information around the normal range of variability as well as impairment in 
social perception (Funkiewiez et al., 2012; Sarazin, Dubois, de Souza, & Bertoux, 
2012). Additionally, using the TASIT along with brain imaging methodologies 
would help provide information regarding the usefulness of considering social 
perception as a domain in a typical neuropsychological assessment. 
To supplement the objective assessment of social perception, future 
research could focus on developing a questionnaire that may be sensitive to these 
changes and that can act as an adjunct to the TASIT. Including even two or three 
informant reported questions regarding these changes may provide additional 
important information and might possibly give rise to criteria for frontotemporal 
MCI that includes answering “yes” to a question regarding subtle changes in 
social perception. Currently, most of these instruments are targeted largely at 
moderate to severe changes in people with neurological, psychiatric and 
developmental disorders.  
There is a need to collect information regarding social perception changes 
through the course of MCI, particularly the type of MCI that is likely to progress 
to frontotemporal dementia, which is the second most common type of dementia 
(Ballard et al., 2009). The age of onset in people with FTD may be as early as 40 
years and is fast progressing. Frontotemporal dementia, particularly the behaviour 
variant FTD, is associated with changes in social perception (Funkiewiez et al., 
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2012). Patients with FTD may have mood disturbances, anxiety and agitation. 
They may also show changes in personality and abnormal behavioural 
disturbances. These symptoms often lead to people with FTD being misdiagnosed 
with psychiatric conditions. Additionally, MCI that is likely to progress to FTD 
tends to be non-amnestic MCI (Ferman et al., 2013; Rosenberg et al., 2011; Yaffe 
et al., 2006) and people tend to show more executive functioning deficits in the 
early stages (Bott et al., 2014; Rascovsky et al., 2011). It may be beneficial for 
future research to focus on the addition of social perception assessments along 
with neuropsychological tests towards the early identification of frontotemporal 
dementia.  
Conclusions  
In this study, I sought to examine social perception in those with and without 
MCI. I explored social perception deficits in MCI and how this could be identified 
using the TASIT. I have also sought to examine the relationship between social 
perception and neuropsychological functioning in the hope that this may guide 
clinical practice as well as research.  
The current thesis found no significant differences between MCI and non-
MCI groups in their performance on the TASIT. Secondly, there was no 
significant association between social perception and neuropsychological 
functioning. The finding that the impairment on the TASIT did not differ between 
people with a diagnosis of MCI and those with no MCI further corroborated this. 
Future research could use the TASIT to possibly identify people who are at risk of 
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Appendix C Information Sheet and Consent Form for the Community Sample 
 
 
Communication in people over 
the age of 50 with concerns about 
their memory 
Information Sheet 
What is the study about? 
Social perception is the ability to accurately understand communication such as 
facial expressions, emotions and sarcasm. Social perception changes across the 
life span, particularly during childhood and adolescence. Currently there is little 
information about how social perception changes during adulthood, especially in 
older age groups 
This study is being conducted by researchers at the University of Waikato and 
aims to test social perception among people over the age of 50. 
Am I eligible to take part? 
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You are eligible to take part in this study if you are above 50 years of age, are not 
taking any medication that could impair your performance and have no history of 
dementia, stroke, head injury or substance abuse. You also should not be currently 
taking medication for any serious psychiatric illness. 
What am I being asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this study, it will involve two to three sessions 
on different days within a span of a month. Each session should take around 1 and 
half hours. You will be asked to take part in a number of puzzle/game type tasks, 
which most people find enjoyable and stimulating. On one of the tests, you will be 
audio recorded for scoring purposes. We will also ask for some information about 
you and how you are feeling. As a thank you, you will get one $5 Momento café 
voucher per session with a maximum of $15 worth of vouchers. You can be seen 
in your own home, at your workplace or at the University of Waikato, whichever 
is most convenient for you. 
What will happen to my information? 
Be assured that no one will be able to identify you. All forms will be stored in a 
locked cabinet, in the School of Psychology at Waikato University and will be 
accessible only to the researcher and her supervisors. The researcher will conduct 
the analysis of the data.  At the end of the study the paper-based forms will be 
destroyed. We will send a summary of our findings to the participants who have 
indicated they would like to receive this information, by email. The study has 
received ethical approval from the School of Psychology Ethics Committee 
What can I expect from the researchers? 




 ask any questions of the researchers about the study at any time during 
participation; 
 decline to answer any particular questions or carry out any of the tasks; 
 withdraw from the study;  
 provide information on the understanding that it is completely confidential 
to the researchers. All forms are identified by a code number, and are only 
seen by the researchers. It will not be possible to identify you in any 
articles produced from the study; 
 be given a summary of the findings 
Who can I speak with about my participation in this project? 
If you, or anyone you know is interested in taking part in this research please 
contact Ms. Sandhya Fernandez (PhD researcher) on ph 022 199 8650, or via 
email at fernandezsandhya@gmail.com 









PARTICIPANT’S  COPY 
 
 
Research Project:       
 
Name of Researcher:       
 
Name of Supervisor (if applicable):       
 
I have received an information sheet about this research project or the researcher 
has explained the study to me. I have had the chance to ask any questions and 
discuss my participation with other people. Any questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
I agree to participate in this research project and I understand that I may withdraw 
at any time. If I have any concerns about this project, I may contact the convenor 















Research Project:       
 
Name of Researcher:       
 
Name of Supervisor (if applicable):       
 
I have received an information sheet about this research project or the researcher 
has explained the study to me. I have had the chance to ask any questions and 
discuss my participation with other people. Any questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
I agree to participate in this research project and I understand that I may withdraw 
at any time. If I have any concerns about this project, I may contact the convenor 











Appendix D Information Sheet for Informants of Participants recruited from the 
Community Sample 
 
Daily Activities and Mental Capacity 
in Ageing 
Information Sheet-Informant/Caregiver 
What is the study about? 
Daily activities include the ability to look after oneself-being able to have a bath, 
cook a meal, and manage finance, to name a few. These activities are important as 
they make a person independent or dependent. As a part of the larger study on 
social perception in ageing, we want to know how people function- activity wise 
or in their capacity to think, remember and plan. 
Social perception is the ability to accurately understand communication such as 
facial expressions, emotions and sarcasm. Social perception changes across the 
life span, particularly during childhood and adolescence. Currently there is little 
information about how social perception changes during adulthood, especially in 
older age groups.  
As well as talking to the participant, we would also like to talk to someone who 
knows them well (you) about how they are doing and how they manage in their 
day-to day lives.  
This study is being conducted by researchers at the University of Waikato and 




What am I being asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this study, it will involve one session lasting about 20 
minutes where you will be asked some questions about you (age, educational 
qualification, your relationship with the participant) and more questions about 
daily activities of the participant. You can be seen in your own home, at your 
workplace or at the University of Waikato, whichever is most convenient for you. 
What will happen to my information? 
Be assured that no one will be able to identify you. All forms will be stored in a 
locked cabinet, in the School of Psychology at Waikato University and will be 
accessible only to the researcher and her supervisors. The researcher will conduct 
the analysis of the data.  At the end of the study the paper-based forms will be 
destroyed. We will send a summary of our findings to the participants who have 
indicated they would like to receive this information, by email. The study has 
received ethical approval from the School of Psychology Ethics Committee  
What can I expect from the researchers? 
If you decide to participate in this project, the researchers will respect your right 
to: 
 ask any questions of the researchers about the study at any time during 
participation; 
 decline to answer any particular questions or carry out any of the tasks; 
 withdraw from the study; 
 provide information on the understanding that it is completely confidential 
to the researchers. All forms are identified by a code number, and are only 
seen by the researchers. It will not be possible to identify you in any 
articles produced from the study; 
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 be given a summary of the findings 
 
Who can I speak with about my participation in this project? 
If you have any more questions, please contact Ms. Sandhya Fernandez (PhD 
researcher) on ph 022 199 8650, or via 
email at fernandezsandhya@gmail.com .  





Appendix E Letter to Potential Participants from the District Health Boards 
Date: 
Dear __________________________, 
Researchers from the School of Psychology, University of Waikato are 
conducting a study of communication in people with the diagnosis of mild 
cognitive impairment. As a person with a provisional diagnosis of mild cognitive 
impairment, we would like to invite you take part in research project. The title of 
the project is: 
Social Perception and Neuropsychological Deficits in Mild Cognitive 
Impairment 
This research will involve you meeting the researcher at your home, office or at 
the researcher’s office on one day or on two different occasions and completing 
some questionnaires and carryout some game-like exercises. 
An information sheet has been enclosed and the researcher will contact you to 
discuss your potential involvement in the study. You will have an opportunity to 
ask any questions before you consent to participate. Please do not hesitate to 
contact the research team if you have any questions about this project.  
Many thanks for your time. 
Kind regards, 
Ms. Sandhya Isabella Fernandez 
PhD Student and Clinical Psychologist  
University of Waikato 
fernandezsandhya@gmail.com 
0221998650 
This study has received Ethical Approval from the Health and Disability 
Ethics Committee (Ref 16/NTA/58) 
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Appendix F  Participant Information Sheet and Consent 
Form for the Clinical Sample 
 
Project Title: Social Perception and Neuropsychological Deficits in Mild 
Cognitive Impairment 
Researchers: Sandhya Fernandez, PhD student and Clinical Psychologist, 
University of Waikato 
Nicola Starkey, Associate Professor and Carrie Barber, Senior Lecturer and 
Director of Clinical Psychology, University of Waikato. 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in this project looking at social 
perception and neuropsychological deficits in mild cognitive impairment. This 
project is being run as a part of my PhD study at the School of Psychology, 
University of Waikato.  
Social perception is the ability to accurately understand communication such as 
facial expressions, emotions and sarcasm. Social perception changes across the 
life span, particularly during childhood and adolescence. Currently there is little 
information about how social perception changes during adulthood, especially in 
older age groups 
This Participant Information Sheet will help you decide if you’d like to take part.  
We will go through this information with you and answer any questions you may 
have. You do not have to decide today whether or not you will participate in this 
study. Before you decide you may want to talk about the study with other people, 




If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to sign the Consent Form 
on the last page of this document.  You will be given a copy of both the 
Participant Information Sheet and the Consent Form to keep. 
This document is 5 pages long, including the Consent Form. Please make sure you 
have read and understood all the pages. 
WHAT WILL I HAVE TO DO? 
If you agree to take part in this study, it will involve one or two sessions on 
different days within a span of a month. Each session should take around 1 and 
half hours. You will be asked to take part in a number of puzzle/game type tasks, 
which most people find enjoyable and stimulating. These tests will examine your 
thinking, problem-solving and reasoning abilities. On one of the tests, you will be 
audio recorded for scoring purposes. We will also ask for some information about 
you and how you are feeling.  
You can be seen in your own home, at your workplace or at the researcher’s office 
at the University of Waikato, whichever is most convenient for you. 
Information about your medical history will be obtained from your medical file. 
With your consent we will also send a questionnaire to a family member to 
complete.  
As recognition of your time and participation you will receive a $30 supermarket 
voucher at the end of the assessments.  
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF THIS 
PROJECT? 
Your test results will be sent to your clinician at the Bay of Plenty hospital with 




WHAT WOULD EXCLUDE ME FROM PARTICIPATING IN THIS 
PROJECT? 
Exclusion criteria for this project include: 
1. A diagnosis of dementia 
2. Regular use of illicit substances 
3. History of neurological conditions including stroke, head injury or other 
conditions 
4. Taking medication for a serious psychiatric illness 
This is to ensure that the results on the tests and exercises are not influenced by 
other factors.  
WHAT ARE MY RIGHTS? 
Whether or not you take part is your choice.  If you don’t want to take part, you 
don’t have to give a reason, and it won’t affect the care you receive.  If you do 
want to take part now, but change your mind later, you can pull out of the study at 
any time.  The information that is collected from you will still be part of the 
research. A summary of the individual findings can be provided if you request 
this.  
The information collected will be stored confidentially. The database will be 
stored on the University of Waikato computer system and the paper assessments 
will be stored securely in locked drawers, the key to which will be kept with the 
principal investigator. It will be accessed by a password by the researcher 
collecting the data. The data will be held for a maximum of 7 years and may be 






WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE STUDY? 
At the end of the study, a summary sheet with the general research findings will 
be sent to you directly within a year of the completion of the study.  
 
WHO CAN I CONTACT? 
If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about the study at any stage, 
you can contact:  
 
Ms. Sandhya Fernandez      
PhD Student and Clinical Psychologist 
Private Bag 3105, University of Waikato, Hamilton 
0221998650 
fernandezsandhya@gmail.com 
If you want to talk to someone who isn’t involved with the study, you can contact 
an independent health and disability advocate on: 
 
Phone:  0800 555 050 
Fax:   0800 2 SUPPORT (0800 2787 7678) 
Email:  advocacy@hdc.org.nz 
 
For Māori health support please contact: 
Regional Māori Health Services in Tauranga is located in the west wing of Silver 
Birch House. This site can be accessed via Clark street gate 4 with easy access to 
car parks directly adjacent to Silver Birch House. Phone: 07 579 8000 
Regional Māori Health Services in Whakatāne site is located in a dedicated 
building between Te Toki Maurere and the clinical school.  This site can be 
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accessed via Garaway Street gate 5, with limited car parking directly outside this 
site; however, there is easy access to clearly sign posted public car-parks. Phone: 
07 306 0999 
You can also contact the health and disability ethics committee (HDEC) that 
approved this study on: 
 Phone:  0800 4 ETHICS 
 Email:  hdecs@moh.govt.nz 
FINALLY 
This study has received Ethical Approval from the Health and Disability Ethics 





         
 
Consent Form 
Social Perception and Neuropsychological Deficits in Mild Cognitive Impairment  
Sandhya Fernandez, PhD Student and Clinical Psychologist, University of 
Waikato, Nicola Starkey, Associate Professor and Carrie Barber, Senior Lecturer 
and Director of Clinical Psychology, University of Waikato. 
I have read and I understand the Participant Information Sheet.    No  
I have been given sufficient time to consider whether or not to 
participate in this study. 
 No  
I have had the opportunity to use a legal representative, whanau/ 
family support or a friend to help me ask questions and understand 
the study. 
 No  
I am satisfied with the answers I have been given regarding the 
study and I have a copy of this consent form and information sheet. 
 No  
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) 
and that I may withdraw from the study at any time without this 
affecting my medical care. 
 No  
I consent to the research staff collecting and processing my 
information, including information about my health. 
 No  
If I decide to withdraw from the study, I agree that the information 
collected about me up to the point when I withdraw may continue to 
be processed. 
 No  
I agree to an approved auditor appointed by the New Zealand Health 
and Disability Ethic Committees, or any relevant regulatory 
 No  
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authority or their approved representative reviewing my relevant 
medical records for the sole purpose of checking the accuracy of the 
information recorded for the study. 
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and 
that no material, which could identify me personally, will be used in 
any reports on this study. 
 No  
I understand that my data will be kept indefinitely and the data can 
be used in future research, including this consent form. 
 No  
I understand my response to the Test of Premorbid Functioning 
(TOPF) will be audio-recorded  
 No  
I would like my  scores for the cognitive and social perception 
(TASIT) tests to be attached to my medical file.  
Yes  No  
I know who to contact if I have any questions about the study in 
general. 
 No  
I understand my responsibilities as a study participant.  No  















Declaration by participant: 





Declaration by member of research team: 
I have given a verbal explanation of the research project to the participant, and 
have answered the participant’s questions about it.   
I believe that the participant understands the study and has given informed 










Appendix G Information Sheet for Informants of Participants from the Clinical 
Sample 
    
         
Information Sheet for Informant/Caregiver 
 
Project Title: Social Perception and Neuropsychological Deficits in Mild 
Cognitive Impairment. Daily Activities and Mental Capacity in 
people with Mild Cognitive Impairment. 
 
Researchers: Sandhya Fernandez, PhD Student and Clinical Psychologist, 
University of Waikato, Nicola Starkey, Associate Professor and 
Carrie Barber, Senior Lecturer and Director of Clinical Psychology, 
University of Waikato 
You are receiving this information sheet because your family member/friend 
____________________ has consented to participate in this research project 
looking at social perception and neuropsychological deficits in mild cognitive 
impairment. As part of the project we are wanting to get caregiver’s perspectives 
on daily activities and mental capacity of the participant. 
 
This project is being run as a part of my PhD studies at the School of Psychology, 
University of Waikato.  
Daily activities include the ability to look after oneself-being able to have a bath, 
cook a meal, and manage finance, to name a few. These activities are important as 
they make a person independent or dependent. As a part of the larger study on social 
perception in mild cognitive impairment, we want to know how people function- 
activity wise or in their capacity to think, remember and plan. 
Social perception is the ability to accurately understand communication such as 
facial expressions, emotions and sarcasm. Social perception changes across the life 
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span, particularly during childhood and adolescence. Currently there is little 
information about how social perception changes during adulthood, especially in 
older age groups.  
As well as talking to the participant, we would also like to talk to someone who 
knows them well (you) about how they are doing and how they manage in their 
day-to day lives.  
If you agree to take part in this study, it will involve one session lasting about 20 
minutes where you will be asked some questions about you (age, educational 
qualification, your relationship with the participant) and more questions about daily 
activities of the participant. You can be seen in your own home, at your workplace 
or at the University of Waikato, whichever is most convenient for you. 
If you choose to have these questionnaires posted to you, a return self-addressed 
envelope with the questionnaires will be sent for you to send back.  
The researcher will call you at a mutually convenient time and explain the 
questionnaires to you. 
At the end of the study, a summary of the general research findings will be available 
on the Bay of Plenty District Health Board website.   
WHO CAN I CONTACT? 
If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about the study at any stage, you 
can contact:  
Ms. Sandhya fernandez, PhD Student and Clinical Psychologist 
Private Bag 3105, University of Waikato, Hamilton 
0221998650 
Phone: 0221998650   Email: fernandezsandhya@gmail.com 
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If you want to talk to someone who isn’t involved with the study, you can 
contact an independent health and disability advocate on: 
Phone:  0800 555 050   Fax:  0800 2 SUPPORT (0800 2787 
7678) 
Email:  advocacy@hdc.org.nz 
For Māori health support please contact: 
Regional Māori Health Services in Tauranga is located in the west wing of Silver 
Birch House. This site can be accessed via Clark street gate 4 with easy access to 
car parks directly adjacent to Silver Birch House. Phone: 07 579 8000 
Regional Māori Health Services in Whakatāne site is located in a dedicated 
building between Te Toki Maurere and the clinical school.  This site can be 
accessed via Garaway Street gate 5, with limited car parking directly outside this 
site; however, there is easy access to clearly sign posted public car-parks. Phone: 
07 306 0999 
You can also contact the health and disability ethics committee (HDEC) that 
approved this study on: 
Phone:  0800 4 ETHICS  Email:  hdecs@moh.govt.nz 





Appendix H Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Ask the following questions and record the answers. 
Q#  Question  
H1.1.1 Could you tell me 
your current marriage or 
partnership status? (Tick 
any one) 




Divorced or permanently 
separated from my legal 
husband or wife (3) 
Widow or widower (4) 
Single (5) 
H1.1.2 Which ethnic 
group do you identify 
yourself to the most? 
(Tick any one) 









H1.1.3 Are you right or 






H1.1.4 What is your 
highest secondary school 
qualification? 
 
H1.1.5 What is your 
highest qualification and 
the main subject? 
 




H1.1.7 If yes, how many 
hours in a week do you 
work? 
 
H 1.1.8 If no, how long 
has it been since you 
retired? 
 
H1.2.1 Do you have any 
significant problems with 




H1.2.2 Do you have any 
significant problems with 
your sight? If yes, 
specify. 
Yes (1) __________ 
No (2) 
H 1.2.3 Do you have any 
significant problems with 




your hand mobility? If 
yes, specify. 
H1.2.4 Now I am going 
to ask you about any 
medical condition. Has a 
doctor or medical person 
ever told you that you 
have any of the 
following in the last 2 
YEARS? 
Previous head injury 
resulting in loss of 
consciousness (1) 
Previous concussion (2) 
Stroke(3) 
Alzheimer’s disease (4) 
Dementia other than 
Alzheimer’s disease (5) 
Developmental 
disability (6) 




Any other serious 
medical condition (10) 
H1.2.5 Do you suffer 
from any mental health 
difficulty (psychiatric 














H 1.2.6 Would you like a 
summary of the findings 
of the group at the end of 
the study? 
Yes- Please 
indicate your email 
address or your home 
address where you would 









Appendix I Background Information 
 
Q# Question  
H 5.1 How many people 
live with you in the 
same household at 
present? Who are 
they? 
My legal husband or wife 
(1)   
My partner or de facto, 
boyfriend or girlfriend (2) 
My son(s) and/or 
daughter(s) (3)  
My parent(s) and/or 
parent(s)-in-law (4) 
My sister(s) and/or 
brother(s) (5) 
My flatmate(s) (6) 
My grandchild(ren) (7) 
  
My friend(s) (8)  
My boarder(s) (9)   
Pet (s) (10) 
Other (s) (please specify) 
(11) 
None of the above-I live 
alone (12)  
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H 5.2 How many different 
medications do you 
take everyday? 
None (1)  
1 to 2 (2) 
3 to 5 (3) 
6 to 7 (4) 
8 or more (5) 
H 5.3 Do you take any of 
these medications at 
least once a week? 
Circle ONE number 
per row. If 
respondent is 
uncertain about any 
you can refer to the 
separate medications 
information sheet 




Nitrados)No (1), Yes (2), 
Don’t know (3) 
Anti-psychotic or anti-
anxiety medicines 
(Zyprexa, Ridal) No (1), 
Yes (2), Don’t know (3) 
Narcotic medications 
(Codeine Phosphate Tabs, 
M-Elson, Oxynorm, 
Oxycontin, Tramal)
 No (1), Yes (2), Don’t 
know (3) 
Muscle relaxants (Pro-
pam) No (1), Yes (2), 




medicines (Viagra, Cialis, 
Avigra, Vedafil, Silagra) 
No (1), Yes (2), Don’t 
know (3) 
 
H 5.4 Do you now take any 
of these medications 
every day or almost 
everyday? Circle one 
number per row. If 
respondent is 
uncertain about any 
you can refer to the 
separate medications 
information sheet 
Ulcer and stomach 
medication (e.g.Famox, 
Losec, Dr. Reddys 
Pantoprazole, Somac, 
Ranitidine Arrow) No (1), 
Yes (2), Don’t know (3) 
Arthritis and pain 
medicines (e.g. Apo-
Allopurinol, Apo-Diclo, I-
Profen, Panadol, Celebrex) 
No (1), Yes (2), Don’t 
know (3) 
Diabetes medications (e.g. 
Apo-Gliclazide, Minidiab, 
Arrow Metformin) No (1), 
Yes (2), Don’t know (3) 
Blood pressure medicines 
(e.g. Betaloc, Atacand, 
Dilzem, Felo, Apo-Prazo) 
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No (1), Yes (2), Don’t 
know (3) 
Nitrates (e.g. Duride Tabs, 
Corangin, Nitrolingual 
pump spray) No (1), Yes 
(2), Don’t know (3) 
Other medicines of the 
heart (e.g. Cordarone X, 
Lanoxin, Tambocor, 
Duirin) No (1), Yes (2), 
Don’t know (3) 
Anticoagulants (e.g. 
warfarin) No (1), Yes (2), 
Don’t know (3) 




Dilantin, Epilim) No (1), 
Yes (2), Don’t know (3) 
Anti-Depressant 
medications (e.g. Amitrip, 
Arrow-Citalopram, Anten, 
Fluox, Loxamine) No (1), 





Razene, Telfast) No (1), 
Yes (2), Don’t know (3) 
Sedating, sleep inducing 
antihistamines (e.g. 
Phenergan) No (1), Yes 
(2), Don’t know (3) 
Cholesterol lowering 
medicines (e.g. Arrow-
Simva, Lipitor, Bezalip) 
No (1), Yes (2), Don’t 
know (3) 
Bladder medicines (e.g. 
Apo-Oxybutinin, Apo-
Prazo, Flomax, Hytrin) No 
(1), Yes (2), Don’t know 
(3) 
 





H 5.5.2 How often do you 
drive? 
Never (1) 




At least once a month but 
less than weekly (3) 
At least once a week but 
less than daily (4) 
Daily or almost daily (5) 
H 5.5.3 If you currently 
drive, have you ever 
considered reducing 
the amount that you 




H 5.5.4 If you have 
considered stopping 
driving altogether OR 
you have stopped 
driving OR you have 
never driven: what 
was the MAIN reason 
for this? 
Family/friends 
recommended that I stop 
(1) 
Licensing or license 
renewal problems (2)  
Changes due to ageing (3) 
I don’t need a car (4) 
Friends drive me if needed
 (5) 
Health reasons make 
driving difficult (6) 
My GP/doctor 




Driving is unpleasant (8) 
I feel anxious when 
driving (9) 
My spouse/partner drives 
me if needed (10) 
Driving is expensive/car 
costs a lot (11) 




H 5.6 We would like to 




indicate if you have 
never, once a year, 
twice a year, 4 times 
a year, monthly or 
yearly participated in 
any of what I will 
read out to you.  
 
H 5.6.1 Have you….. Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
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Been a spectator at a 
sports event 
 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 
H 5.6.2 Have you….. 
Gone to a concert, 
movie, play or other 
cultural event 
Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 
H 5.6.3 Have you….. 
Gone to a restaurant, 
café, pub or bar 
Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 
H 5.6.4 Have you….. 





Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 
H 5.6.5 Have you….. 
Gone to a library or 
museum 
Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
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Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 
H 5.6.6 Have you….. 
Gone to a barbeque, 
hangi, or similar 
event away from your 
home 
Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 




clubs. Please indicate 
below how often you 
attend each 
organization or club. 
 
H 5.7.1 Sports club Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 





H 5.7.2 Community or 
service organizations 
that help people 
Never (1) 
Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 





Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 




Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 




Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 












Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 
Four times a year (4) 
Monthly (5) 
Weekly (6) 
H 5.7.7 Any other club, 




Once a year (2) 
Twice a year (3) 











Appendix J Descriptive statistics of the community recruited sample and the MCI diagnosed DHB recruited sample 
Demographic details Community sample (96) DHB recruited MCI (21) 
 Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
Age 62.74 (8.12) 50-83 72.24 (3.1) 0-17 
Gender F=71.9%  F=47.6%  
Education (years completed) 12.97 (3.1) 0-17 10.83 (3.5) 0-14 
MoCA 28.8 (1.29) 25-30 23.86 (3.75) 14-28 
GDS 0.96 (1.1) 0-4 1.9 (1.76)   0-7 
AUDIT 2.77 (1.75) 0-8 2.38 (2.42) 0-8 
 Mean T score (SD) 
 
T score range 
 
Mean T score (SD) 
 
T score range 
 
Memory 
Logical memory I 53.2 (8.02) 30-70 38.5 (11.9) 20-60 
One back test (Cogstate) 50.6 (8.5) 34.6-80.21 59.2 (11.67) 36.61-82.59 
Two back test (Cogstate) 46.1 (8.8) 23.70-68.34 59.8 (13.7) 41.5-82.7 
One card learning (Cogstate) 49.1 (7.2) 31.77-68.81 41.5 (6.8) 28.54-57.39 
International Shopping List Recall (Cogstate) 55.9 (7.6) 38.68-67.42 31.74 (13.1) 10.19-49.08 
Memory Domain Score 51.04 (3.3) 41.96-59.87 46.2 (6.1) 32.1-55.6 
Language 
Letter fluency (DKEFS) 61.9 (12.02) 30-80 50.6 (12) 26.67-80 
Category fluency (DKEFS) 63.1 (11.7) 40-80 44.2 (10.4) 20-60 
Category Switching (DKEFS)     
Colour naming (DKEFS) 53.8 (7.1) 33.33-66.67 47.3 (10.8) 20-63.33 
Word reading (DKEFS) 55.2 (7.01) 30-66.67 49.5 (11.11) 26.67-70 




Number sequencing (DKEFS) 56.07 (10.1) 20-70 50.9 (11.5) 20-66.67 
Letter sequencing (DKEFS) 57.96 (7.5) 30-66.67 50.15 (10.8) 20-60 
Number-letter sequencing (DKEFS) 57.2 (7.1) 33.33-70 41.6 (14.6) 20-63.33 
Colour-word interference (DKEFS)  54.8 (8.7) 30-66.67 46.98 (10.4) 20-60 
Colour-word interference switching (DKEFS) 55.9 (7.97) 20-70 46.03 (16.21) 20-70 
Executive Functioning Domain Score 56.4 (6.4) 34.67-66.67 47.1 (10.2) 20-58 
Visuospatial Functioning 
ROCFT, Copy 45.8 (11.6) 1.19-59.85 35.09 (17.3) 0.69-60.02 
GMCT (Cogstate) 44.9 (9.49) 22.09-75.21 52.9 (10.04) 35.65-75.27 
Visual scanning (DKEFS) 56.1 (6.6) 36.67-66.67 53.5 (7.1) 40-66.67 
Visuospatial Functioning Domain Score 48.97 (5.2) 33.75-58.08 47.2 (6.8) 29.10-57.02 
Note. SD= Standard deviation; MCI=Mild Cognitive Impairment; MoCA= Montreal Cognitive Assessment; GDS= Geriatric Depression Scale; 





Appendix K Means and standard deviations on neuropsychological measures of community participants who met the MCI diagnostic criteria 
according to four different classification criteria of MCI. 
Demographic details Liberal (78) Conventional (47) Comprehensive (25) Conservative (5) 
 Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
Age 63.19 (8) 50-83 63.53 
(8.1) 
51-79 66 (7.2) 53-79 63 (10.2) 53-75 
Gender F=70.5%  F= 76.6%  F=64%  F=80%  
Education (y) 13.03 (3)  0-17 13 (2.8) 0-17 12.32 
(3.7) 
0-17 12.4 (1.6) 10-14 
MoCA 28.71 
(1.3) 





GDS 0.96 (1.2) 0-4 1.06 (1.1) 0-4 1.2 (1.29) 0-4 2.4 (1.5) 1-4 
AUDIT 2.74 
(1.69) 
0-7 2.57 (1.6) 0-7 2.8 (1.68) 0-6 2.6 (1.9) 1-6 











































































Appendix L Means and standard deviations on neuropsychological measures of DHB recruited participants who met the MCI diagnostic criteria 
according to four different classification criteria of MCI. 



















Gender F= 47.6%  F=47.6%  F=43.8%  F=20%  




0-14 11.1 (3.3) 0-14 11.8 (1.5) 10-14 
MoCA 23.9 (3.7) 14-28 23.9 (3.7) 14-28 22.9 (3.8) 14-28 21 (3.5) 14-27 
GDS 1.9 (1.8) 0-7 1.9 (1.8) 0-7 2 (1.9) 0-7 2.10 (2.4) 0-7 
AUDIT 2.4 (2.42) 0-8 2.4 (2.42) 0-8 2.3 (2.5) 0-8 2 (2.6) 0-8 



































Language Domain Score 46.8 (7.7) 24-59.33 46.8 (7.7) 24-59.3 45.6 (8.5) 24-59.33 42.33 
(8.6) 
24-52 



















Note. SD= Standard deviation; MCI=Mild Cognitive Impairment; MoCA= Montreal Cognitive Assessment; GDS= Geriatric Depression Scale; 
AUDIT=Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; TOPF= The Test of Premorbid Functioning 
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Appendix M Means and standard deviations on main measures of all participants who met the MCI diagnostic criteria according to four different 
classification criteria of MCI 
Demographic details Liberal (99) Conventional (68) Comprehensive (41) Conservative (15) 





46-88 68.2 (9.2) 46-88 68.2 
(11.9) 
46-88 
Gender F=65.7%  F=67.6%  F=56.1%  F=40%  
Education (y) 12.6 (3.2) 0-17 12.33 
(3.2) 
0-17 11.8 (3.5) 0-17 12 (1.5) 10-14 




14-30 23.3 (4.4) 14-30 
GDS 1.16 (1.4) 0-7 1.32 (1.4) 0-7 1.51 (1.6) 0-7 2.20 (2.1) 0-7 
AUDIT 2.67 (1.9) 0-8 2.51 (1.9) 0-8 2.6 (2.03) 0-8 2.20 (2.4) 0-8 









































24-70.7 52.6 (9.9) 24-72.7 46.44 
(11.1) 
24-70 
Executive Functioning Domain Score 54.1 (8.4) 20-65.33 52.3 (9.1) 20-65.3 48.9 (9.9) 20-64 44 (12.2) 20-62 












Note. SD= Standard deviation; MCI=Mild Cognitive Impairment; MoCA= Montreal Cognitive Assessment; GDS= Geriatric Depression Scale; 
AUDIT=Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; TOPF= The Test of Premorbid Functioning 
 
